


JPRS-UKO-90-014  
15 OCTOBER 1990



FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE

---

# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

---

**KOMMUNIST**  
*No 11, July 1990*

# Soviet Union

## KOMMUNIST

### No 11, July 1990

JPRS-UKO-90-014

## CONTENTS

15 October 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

### 28TH CPSU CONGRESS

Party and Society. Angles to the Congress .....	1
---	---

### PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

Russia in the Present World .....	9
Perestroika as Revolution; Past Experience and Attempt at Forecasting [V. Mau, I. Starodubrovskaya] .....	23
The Communist Idea in the Context of Global Civilization [V. Samchenko] .....	29

### SOCIAL PRIORITIES

Education in the Time of Change [A. Zotov, V. Tykheyev] .....	35
Geographic Aspects of New Thinking [V. Kotlyakov] .....	41

### ECONOMIC POLICY

Exploitation: How To Understand It Today? [G. Chibrikov] .....	47
What Deputies Vote For [B. Sergeyev] .....	51

### THE STATE AND SOCIETY

Electoral Campaign—Lessons for the Future [A. Ivanchenko] .....	55
---	----

### PAGES FROM HISTORY

Stalin's Letters to Molotov .....	61
-----------------------------------	----

### SOCIAL THOUGHT ABROAD

The World in the Year 2000: Our Synopses [J. Naisbitt, P. Aburdene] .....	70
---	----

### CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Vietnam: Traditions and Renewal [N. Makarov] .....	75
--	----

### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

On Social Progress in a Changing World [Yu. Borko] .....	80
Chronicle .....	86
Publication Data .....	87

## KOMMUNIST

No. 11, July 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

### 28TH CPSU CONGRESS

#### Party and Society. Angles to the Congress

915B0002A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 3-15

[Text] Tatyana Vasilyeva, secretary, Oktyabrskiy CPSU Raykom, Leningrad:

What is happening to us? From all rostrums, including that of the congress, appeals are being launched for consolidation. Meanwhile, society lives according to the formula of "all against all." We are against the "conservatives" and against the "radicals." We are against the "left" and against the "right." We are against the "bosses," who are not leading us to where we want to go and against the "crowd" which does not take us where we want to be.... The monolithic unity has disappeared. Tested, it turned out to be a myth. It has now become clear that hiding behind the concept of "we," is a large number of individuals with their different interests and views. Is this good? Unquestionably it is, if this variety can be integrated within a single progressive process through the mechanism of democracy. For the time being, we are balancing ourselves on the brink of a crisis and many are those who view the victory of their position over that of others as consolidation.

If there is anything that rallies us it is the general status of superexpectations and a search for the reasons of our difficulties anywhere else other than within ourselves. With increasing persistence the party is described as the culprit whereas we, the members of this party, are hastening to find the culprits within our midst: "The Politburo and the Central Committee must be held accountable, must answer." I am convinced that both accountability and answerability are needed for a number of matters, which is something normal in any party. Nonetheless, I recall the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev on how easy it is today, having become confused in our assessments, to become confused in our actions. Did we not reach a situation in which the congress, carried away by the accessibility of the party leadership which, until recently, had been thoroughly protected from contacts with rank-and-file party members, was literally one step away from turning into a court of law, both immoral and unpredictable in terms of political consequences?

Paradoxical though this might sound, the more united we become in such actions the closer we come to a split which threatens the existence of the party. Conversely, in order to organize ourselves within a united collective,

every one of us must become once and for all an individual, a personality, an independently thinking person, with a "turned on mind." Such, in my view, is the decisive prerequisite for consolidation, without which even the most attractive idea in terms of our unification could become distorted and damaging.

I remember that when we began to discuss the priority of the individual, some of my colleagues, ideology secretaries, showed concern: Were we about to forget our ideological concept according to which society is always superior to the individual? We had worked to implement this principle, sparing no efforts. However, equally accurate concepts had taken shape within that same historical segment: personal responsibility, an active life stance, creative initiative, a conscientious attitude toward labor and even a "feeling of ownership." Alas, they never acquired a real meaning, adapting themselves to the actual alienation of the people from decision making and the right to choose a type of social destiny. Our history contains a number of examples proving that merely the suspicion of independent thinking was sufficient, at one point, to entail repressive measures and, at another, to remove someone from society and put him in a hospital or deprive him of his citizenship. Equally terrible was the fact that a huge mass of people, including party members, became used to a mythologized awareness and had to live in a world of dogmas and slogans, isolated by an ideological "iron curtain" from reality and from the daily concerns of every individual. Unfortunately, this was manifested at the 28th Congress as well.

This, in my view, is both the fault and the difficulty of our party which, as A.N. Yakovlev justifiably points out, turned from a party of ideas into a party of power. Let me add that it also became a party of people who had not learned how to think independently and who tried to make the entire society fit their own image. When the question of what had prevented the RKP(b)-VKP(b)-CPSU from providing normal living conditions to the people was raised at the congress, I wanted immediately to answer: it was precisely the fact that the party or, rather, its leading echelons, appropriated the right to express the interests of the people as they saw them and to earmark the ways for their implementation. Such were the roots of spiritual dependency, the struggle against which, I am confident, is today the most important task not only of ideological workers but of the entire party. The party must create conditions, both on the level of ordinary life and in the area of theoretical knowledge, so that everyone may be able to make his own choices and have the possibility to do so deliberately.

It is not sufficient today to say that the CPSU is the party of the socialist choice and the communist future. It is important to determine the real meanings of these definitions and to replace faith with knowledge. This can be achieved through serious discussions. Then we shall have convincing arguments to submit to society, including to the newly hatched anticommunists (in my view they too were misled by the limitations of dogmas

and were hasty in their own self-determination). These will be arguments in support of the communist idea, the main feature of which is for man to reach a higher freedom, find himself and surmount all forms of alienation.

I well remember that at the 19th Party Conference S.N. Fedorov, general director of the "Eye Microsurgery" MNTK, called upon us, party workers, to make the people happier and to assess the effectiveness of our activities accordingly. Fedorov's efforts are to me an example of combining ideology with healthy pragmatism. In my view, this man is a better communist than those who mourn over socialism or the socialist community in its barracks manifestation.

A person who thinks and acts independently can establish for himself what is true and what is false, what are political circumstances and what is political helplessness. It is only an organization of such people that could be effective in the implementation of the communist idea. Its essence lies, above all, in its orientation toward man and only then in the adoption of all sorts of plans, principles, structures and Central Committee memberships. Unfortunately, the congress frequently forgot this, replacing a discussion of the objectives with a discussion of means. The speakers simply forgot that the party needs politics and economics not for their own sake but for the sake of ensuring the spiritual, moral and material well-being of the people. At the same time, speeches which dealt with a morally healthy society and party were either ignored or triggered a negative reaction.

The congress convinced me that we need a serious philosophical and theoretical interpretation of the party's role in a renovating society. This topic is too important to have its discussion limited to political articles or meetings.

**Varlam Keshelava**, editor of ZARYA VOSTOKA, newspaper of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, Tbilisi:

The congress led all of us to a historical landmark which indicated that the time had come to realize that we need a qualitatively new party. If we are trying to put an end to the command-administrative social management methods, and to eliminate the political system which suppressed the society, the conclusion becomes self-evident: this must be a question of a radical reform of the party.

There is nothing unnatural in this. The party has changed in accordance with historical conditions in which it has had to function. For many decades our party was the party of the government, so to say, and as such it acted as the foundation of the political system. Today the prime task is for the party to get out of the governmental structures and, as a result of renovation, to establish itself as a political organization called upon to function in the conditions of a civil society. It is precisely in this kind of political self-determination of the party that I see the principal instrument for restoring its live

and comprehensive relations with the masses and the suitable methods for its activities.

In many people the image of a government party is associated with the principle of democratic centralism. It is even being said that abandoning it is almost the same as the liquidation of the party as such. I consider this comparison wrong. Conversely, if we retain this principle without change we would find it exceptionally difficult to make it into a modern party which is functioning and having an influence in a civil society. It would be virtually impossible to speak of political pluralism and cooperation with other parties and sociopolitical movements. It is inadmissible to turn democratic centralism into a fetish, to raise it to the level of an absolute. Democratic centralism was the answer to the demand of its time. The conditions of the prerevolutionary situation, the revolution and the Civil War dictated quite clearly the need to adopt specific principles of organizational structure. Always surrounded by hostile political forces, the party could not fulfill its mission without supercentralism and strictest possible discipline.

Today we live in entirely different conditions and our society has been subjected to extremely fundamental changes. The breakdown of political forces is entirely different and so is the way of thinking.

Failure to note all of this and stubbornly to hold onto the old forms and principles, which became anachronistic long ago, is lethal to a political party. Therefore, in my view it is significant that the programmatic declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress contains the conclusion that "supercentralization and the suppression of critical thinking have had a pernicious reflection on internal party relations," and that the party supports truly democratic standards of internal party life and firmly rejects democratic centralism as it developed under the conditions of the administrative-command system. I see in this admission the start of an understanding of the type of organizational principles on the basis of which the party should be structured in the future.

What matters the most is the impetus provided by the congress. I would like to believe that the opening of opportunities for the drafting of platforms, their organization, defending the views of the minority, dissidence and a variety of opinions allowed within the party are all necessary components which make the process of its democratization real.

I also believe that the party could allow factionalism. If a number of parties exist within society and every individual is free to switch to another party the danger of the existence of factions becomes rather theoretical. For example, we speak of the right of nations to self-determination, including secession. Does this mean that, whatever the case, a given republic should leave the Union? No. The right to secede is not the same as a call to secession.



In precisely the same way we could approach the principle of the self-determination of the party masses and the closely related idea of the sovereignty of communist parties of Union republics. In my view, the view that this would weaken the party is wrong. In the same way that the difference in potentials increases energy, the party's energy will increase the moment it puts an end to uniformity and stops fearing a live and fruitful difference of opinions.

I also see as the importance of this congress the fact that it led quite a large number of party members to an understanding of what is perhaps the central contradiction of perestroika: the party which initiated the transformation of society has fallen behind it in its democratic development. It obviously proved to be more conservative than was thought and has changed little over the past 5 years. This contradiction proves that our understanding of the inevitability of many social processes which were activated by perestroika has been insufficiently profound. This could adversely affect the future of the party and its authority. Furthermore, the disparity between changes within the party and within society carries in itself a high conflict potential and could noticeably hinder progress toward a humane and democratic socialism.

Here is another quite important matter. What were the features that the discussion of problems related to the development of the country and the party at the 28th Congress introduced in CPSU national policy?

If we have accepted that society is developing faster than the party, it is at this point that we find the clearest example of this fact. I am referring to the idea of the USSR President concerning our statehood and the future of our Union as a union of sovereign national states. This is a very daring and far-reaching concept, in the course of the implementation of which a number of contradictions could be surmounted, tension driving us to conflicts could be eliminated and problems which accumulated in the course of decades could be resolved within the shortest possible time. In this area as well we, the party members, in frequent cases turn out to be more conservative than the President. Unfortunately, in frequent cases in the course of the debates concerning the new statutes and organizational structure the congress was inclined to preserve, as a whole, the traditional relations among republic communist parties. I take this as a convincing proof that in our political thinking we are still insufficiently daringly looking at the future.

In the immediate future, perhaps before the end of the year, the party may have once again to reconsider its national policy, taking into consideration the formulation of and prospects for the conclusion of a new Union treaty. Clearly, relations between republic party organizations and the central CPSU authorities and among themselves will be structured differently. I consider this matter as just about the most important in terms of the

party's future. We are proceeding from our old understanding of the national problem and of its subordination and secondary importance when compared to the international, the class problem. In its time this approach was justified by the specific historical circumstances. However, conditions have changed radically while we keep repeating the old formula, unwilling to understand the simple fact that today national self-awareness has increased and that Union republics are acquiring increasingly greater economic and political independence. If the communist parties now wish to remain an effective political force, they must consider national problems as a priority area in their activities.

The old type of relations between the center and the Union republics led to the fact that gradually the communist parties within them lost their national aspect and provided sufficient grounds to be considered not simply as supranational or nonnational but, occasionally, even as antinational organizations.

This problem must be closely considered also from the viewpoint of the process occurring within the CPSU. The party is becoming democratic and, sooner or later, must be subjected to a radical reform. In that connection, how to consider, let us say, the founding of a Communist Party of the RSFSR? We frequently reduce the last constituent congress to individuals, not realizing that it is a question of an essentially new phenomenon in the existence of our party and of changes in its entire structure. The very fact of the founding of the RSFSR Communist Party indicates that the national aspect can and must become the instrument which will facilitate and accelerate the process of further democratization.

Distancing ourselves from this fact, the problem of a multiparty structure could be approached from a different angle. If we persist in our rejection of the national aspect, who would believe that we shall actually accept a multiparty system? In the final account, the national communist parties are parties which share the same theoretical platform and have substantially more features that unite rather than separate them, for which reason they are natural allies.

It is quite frequently said that lately the CPSU had become a "party of parties," i.e., that it encompasses totally disparate trends, for the time being formally operating under a common name, statutes, and political terminology, and that should it become consolidated, the base for such a consolidation is still unknown. I must point out that this is not exclusively typical of us. The experience of various foreign parties indicates that in major historical changes, when difficult problems arise, the solution of which is complex, such situations appear. A variety of trends and groups appear within the parties, indicating that the party is alive. I see nothing tragic in this. This is a normal, a natural process of existence during a transitional period. The existence of platforms and even factions should be viewed positively, for they allow us to preserve unity. Does this look paradoxical? It is, however, a philosophical law repeatedly confirmed by

societal history. The more active the individual elements are the more stable the political structure itself remains.

It seems to me that under the conditions of our multinational state the attitude toward the concept of a new Union treaty will, precisely, prove to be the "testing stone" indicating the ability of the party to cross the Rubicon of renovation. The purpose of such a treaty is not to weaken the Union but, conversely, to strengthen it, to bring within it, in addition to economic, political and cultural relations, a moral commonality and reciprocal trust and respect. That is precisely why I consider national policy to be so important and view it today as the shortest way leading to the revival and strengthening of the humanistic and moral principles within the party.

**Vladimir Fedorov**, milling machine operator, Kirovskii Zavod Association:

It pleases me that the question of the interrelationship between the party and the labor movement was raised at the 28th Congress. We can no longer avoid it, and a confrontation between the working class and the intelligentsia (let us recall a number of speeches at the RKP(b) Initiative Congress and the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party) can lead to nothing good. This makes us quite watchful. If the old Central Committee had not ignored the real problem of the social protection of the working class this dangerous game related to it would not have started.

My nomination as member of the Russian Central Committee has been submitted. I am currently considering whether to accept. I would not like to be something like a parade general representing the working class. As it is, a substantial number of the 153 already elected members are workers. I am confident that without "brains," without the participation of the production intelligentsia, the labor movement has no future, and that all creative forces in society must be represented in the leading party authorities.

The programmatic declaration contains an assessment of the situation in which the country and the party find themselves. It is a harsh and, I believe, just assessment. If it is read by a good person who, however, may poorly understand contemporary problems, such as a rank-and-file party member, a nonparty member, a turner or an engineer, would he clearly understand what lies ahead? There is a stipulation about social protection but how to implement it, bearing in mind our confusion and economic instability? The programmatic concepts must be presented in greater detail. Personally I do not believe that there are in the economy phenomena which are so complex that one could not explain them in simple terms.

It would be difficult to say what percentage of the workers are in favor of a market economy. Obviously, not 100 percent. The market will require high-quality work and it will be difficult for many people to reach that level for in the past, somehow, they managed. Take me: I am a sixth-grade brigade leader and I have learned a

few things. Yet we also have inexperienced young people. There also are those who have only a few years until they get their pension. Therefore, we need clear guarantees and, above all, we must make the people interested and answer the following question: Why should they work better?

We need a healthy competition. In the past our tractors were being distributed among the various farms on the basis of orders. Now we have begun to feel the influence of the Kharkov Tractors Plant, which is able to offer machines no worse than those produced in Leningrad. This alone makes designers, technologists and managers think. The work has become more interesting. If one makes an effort while another enterprise produces an item which is better and less expensive and the purchaser prefers his item, we may find this hurtful but it is fair.

A market economy cannot work without a market for capital and labor. We can use the experience of world civilization which also shows us what to reject. The world is changing and the various economic systems borrow a great deal from each other. We must try to combine what was good in our system with the experience of the developed countries. Unfortunately, very little has been done in this area over the past 5 years.

Something else: glasnost is a natural condition in a healthy society. The rank-and-file party members are being blamed for never having raised their voices outside their cigarette breaks in the past. However, many of them were not fearful. They sincerely believed that the country was following the right path. Fifteen years ago life was plentiful and few people knew about the petrodollars which supported that life. Without glasnost we lived in some kind of fog. Now we are beginning to trust in the possibility of change. This faith must be supported through real action. If "repentance" is necessary, let it be through work and not through statements and self-scourging.

It is hurtful when even honest people, who have lost faith in the fact that anything could change for the better with the help of the party, leave the CPSU. One of the tasks of the congress, in my view, was also to let the party members feel that everything will depend on ourselves. If all of us were to realize that our voice can be heard, that it is truly decisive, the party will live and the nonparty people will trust us. The main thing is for the CPSU not to lock itself within internal party affairs and not to be a party for its own sake.

**Vladimir Vylegzhanin**, party committee secretary, Kama Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing Association:

At the congress a great deal was said about the class approach. Unfortunately, what we were short of, above all, was the main thing, the manner in which this approach should have been manifested: the study of the interests of the social groups which make up the party. The party, which expresses the interests of the working class, is offering reforms to the country, while the working class is striking. Already 1 year ago the powerful

strikes should have forced the people to consider how to restore the link between the labor movement and daily party work.

The speeches of many delegates voiced the old stereotypes and a nostalgia for the old ways and means of work. Society, however, is no longer what it was. It is no longer sufficient to raise a party banner such as a programmatic declaration or come up with theses addressed to the people. One must structure a mechanism for the implementation of these concepts and think of how to implement the party's programmatic objectives within the framework of a law-governed state. Considering the present dynamic situation, many of the decisions made today could soon turn out to be obstructions. Views change because life changes, and this is natural. To blame people for what they thought and wrote 5 or 10 years ago is, to say the least, thoughtless.

The harsh (and frequently unfair) criticism which was heard at the congress led to yet another important problem. The party press must become a tribune and an organ of the entire party and not only the party committee. It must have the possibility to criticize specific communist ministers and the government as a whole and to discuss internal party problems freely, calmly and analytically. So far, frequently it is not viewed by the party members as the main source of efficient, sharp and intelligible information. The party press must also be subsidized if we wish both to hear our own voices and be heard by society.

**Aleksandr Kosarev**, chairman, Cherkassy City Soviet of People's Deputies:

A stereotype of mistrust in the Communist Party has taken shape in society, not simply toward individual party members, committees or their actions but of the political organization as a whole. It has become the hostage of the system it created and, along with the crisis in that system, it has lost its authority. To keep persuading ourselves that such is not the case and the people support us as they did before is nothing but a waste of time. Today we must act in such a way as to assume our real place within the social structure, transferring to the soviets the prerogatives of political power.

We must not do that which, in principle, no single political party should do: use diktat and interfere in the daily work of the authorities and the economic units, thus somehow in advance tying itself to future results. Such results may not be attained. Let us remember that governments come and go but parties stay and rejoin the struggle.

Today the party committees could assume the role, conventionally speaking, of constructive opposition in regards to the soviets. It is important to establish the direction of one trend or another and the moods in society, to analyze them and, on this basis, to formulate a viable program which would be supported by the population through its implementation.

However, many communists are not ready to accept such a possibility, even psychologically. What if we lose even more of our influence? What if the soviets "do not work out?" In the past they could not take a single independent step, and all they did was based on the instructions of obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. Having both energy and experience in economic management, the party managers make a poor showing in other areas of activity which they subconsciously fear.

All of this is understandable but we cannot wait for the new type of thinking to assume its final aspect and prevail. Today quite active groups of the ecological society, the "Ukrainian National Movement," and the SNUM—the youth wing of the Ukrainian Republican Party (the former Ukrainian Helsinki Union) are represented in the Cherkassy City Soviet. Although the majority are members of the Communist Party, we too are by no means united in our views. In order for the soviet to be active and for the opposite factions not to block decision making, it was necessary to make them our allies, to accept some of their demands and to appoint some of their representatives to the soviet's leadership. In turn, the "informals" supported the communists. Subsequently, political differences frequently turned out to be minor as soon as we undertook to resolve practical problems on a constructive basis.

The fact that the party workers seem to be suspecting the leadership of the soviet makes it all the more distressing. They go so far as to accuse us of flirting with populist feelings, establishing relations with nationalistic forces, eroding ideological positions and wishing to break down the party and seize the power. However, the soviet is not a party committee. Here what matters most is practical work and performing the parliamentary function about which there has been so much talk. As chairman of the soviet, I am no longer only an ideologue but also a coordinator who rallies the efforts of a broader range of people regardless of their party affiliation and political views. Actually, all of us want the same thing: for the people to live better and for society to advance. I am not distancing myself from the party. I consider communist ideology vital and I would not like for the party which expresses it to lose its positions.

We are still being fettered by the dogmata of "Article 6," which was also manifested at the congress, in the speeches of some of the delegates. This is that same old aspiration to impose upon society one's will and to tell the government how it should act. Yet, for the past year we have been speaking of a conversion to a market economy. Consequently, we should have long started laying under it a scientific-theoretical and sociopsychological and political foundation. In that case the suggestions of the government would fall on a mind ready to accept them and we would be able to avoid social stresses and the aggravation of the situation and not lose all that much time. Such is the task of a ruling political party and that is what being in the vanguard means. For 70 years we shaped a society and now, having suggested entirely



different economic social approaches and a different way of life, we are demanding immediate support. This is impossible.

**Boris Guseletov**, coordinator, group of "Young Communists-Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress," docent, Sverdlovsk Engineering-Pedagogical Institute:

In my speech at the congress I said that the young are not joining the party and that this is a reality which we are trying to ignore. I quoted figures for Sverdlovsk Oblast: the acceptance of new members in the party has declined by a factor of 4 and the number of young people entering the party, by a factor of 7. Actually, the annual enrollment of people under 30 in the CPSU has dropped from 7,000 to 1,000. What are we to do? In my view, the tremendous share of negativism in the interpretation of party history and the rejection, one would think, of eternal Marxist postulates are the decisive reasons. As a result, many young people are turning to the ideas of the liberals, the socialists and the anarcho-syndicalists, and to the church. Any alternative, regardless of how meaningful it may be, is attracting them. For the time being, however, we are unable to offer anything new. I am not against criticizing ourselves but we must also bring to light the real, the progressive factors which are found in the ideas of communism and socialism.

Naturally, it is not a question of ideas only. So far the official "state role" of the CPSU, the strict formal discipline, the nomenclatural approach in the selection of cadres and the classification of rank-and-file members of an organization and highly placed members have all repelled and are turning the young away. I know firsthand that when direct elections for the soviets began, many young people reacted and showed a great desire to participate in the country's political life. However, the party committees concentrated all their efforts on helping the leadership—the first and second secretaries. The other party members could only suffer from their membership. I felt this personally, having lost 22 votes at the elections simply because, it seems to me, I am a member of the CPSU. Therefore, the second condition which is necessary for involving the young people in the party is giving real political help to all of its members. The present situation should be changed: despite all obstacles a communist manages to become a member of a soviet; meanwhile, brandishing the statutes, the party committee starts demanding of him to implement the party's resolutions. It must be one or the other: we either help a member of our own party by ensuring his success, at which point we have the right to make demands on him, quite specifically related to his work, or else we alienate him from our organization with groundless claims to leadership.

The party committees are frequently self-serving. We must truly develop their activities. We must urgently organize information centers at the party organizations. This idea has long been making the rounds in society and the first person to implement it will be successful in

politics. Second, successful political activities are impossible without feedback. We need objective sociological studies. Work in the soviets brought to light the low legal and political standards of many deputies. Therefore, the party organizations must also have consultation-legal services. Many of the newly elected people's deputies willingly attend the higher party schools which are beginning gradually to change, no longer stamping the political cadres in the old mold but providing knowledge in the areas of sociology, politics and economics.

In no case should the party retain its present semi-military aspect. Free competition of ideas must become normal and natural to it. If we continue to oppose the creation of platforms and factions, we shall also strangle the newly developing political methods as well as the ideological renovation. The party must be an organization without any social or other artificial membership restrictions. It is important for a person to share the objectives and tasks of this party and to be willing to work for it. That is why when the discussion once again turns to the party of the working class, or the party of the labor segment of the population, this concerns me. This can hardly be attractive to contemporary young people who try to gain knowledge and higher skills and to become members of the intelligentsia. Why do we have to introduce stratification?

Now as to the name. One may agree that the building of a socialist society is better consistent with our conditions and the party should proceed on the basis of real targets. However, the definition which Marx provided for communism as a movement does not make it a swear word. Should we not postpone this argument for a couple of years? Today, when the country is in a most difficult economic crisis, when society is being torn by national quarrels and conflicts, in politics one must be absolutely accurate and try not to damage the consolidation of society. It would be hardly sensible to pour into this fire the "oil" of views concerning the name of the party.

**Aleksandr Tsalko**, military unit commander, colonel:

In my opinion, no serious discussion took place at the congress concerning the real problems of the army. We cannot consider as such the numerous complaints of "defamation" or the sharp and sometimes simply insulting attacks on the authors of new political thinking. All of this was unfailingly mentioned on behalf of "all armed forces," although the composition of the corps of delegates, filtered through the system of selection through several levels of party conferences, did not reflect the entire range of feelings in army circles. My comrades are concerned not about the fact that "they left Eastern Europe without a fight" (could it be that the Afghan War, which I too experienced, was not enough?), but the lack of housing, the difficult social problems, the conditions of military service and jobs for members of their families....

Another conclusion, considered seditious by the high military leadership but quite popular among officers is



the following: the armed forces must be subordinated to the state. This becomes even more necessary under the conditions of a developing multiparty system, which presumes an honest and open competition and where there could be no place for any "attendant" factors. For example, is the unwritten yet existing rule of party affiliation consistent with these conditions (if you are not CPSU member the highest rank you can reach is senior lieutenant or, at best, captain)?

As long as the party retains its administrative-order system it fits perfectly in the structure of the armed forces which can only be a strictly command structure based on one-man command. Any commander will assert that the political officer and the party organization are today weapons of repression against the violators of discipline. However, as the processes of democratization within the CPSU develop, they will increasingly obviously and objectively clash with the laws of army life. The commander must not find himself in a situation in which he must try to please the party organization so that the latter may issue him the reference needed for promotion.

Therefore, I believe that after a while the idea of the depoliticization of the army, which is currently rejected by many people, will become necessity. Naturally, this will not be a one-time act but a process which will develop gradually.

Does it follow from this that today, as many people assume, one should fear the army and its intervention in political processes? Personal observation leads me to provide a negative answer to this question. As in any society, there are two trends in the armed forces: democratic and conservative. The former, to the best of my familiarity with army life, is stronger than the latter, particularly on the "lower" levels, among the junior and the middle officer ranks.

As to a "conservative coup" within the party, the possibility of which is also being extensively discussed today, in military language this would be described as a victory with "unacceptable casualties." One cannot go far ahead of the front line, for any local victory on any given sector without rear-line support turns into an encirclement and subsequent defeat. In the case of the party, the rear line is its rank-and-file membership, the people, who will simply not support such a maneuver.

In my view, the congress rallied the leftist democratic forces around the simple idea: Gorbachev must be protected from attacks from the right and the left, for otherwise the situation not only of the party but of perestroika and of all of us will become deplorable. In my view many of the delegates who had come to the congress with the single purpose of "winning" the President over on their side (right or left), realized that the congress needs Gorbachev in any case no less than Gorbachev needs the congress.

**Nikolay Yegorov**, first secretary, Kirzhachskiy CPSU Raykom, chairman of the rayon soviet of people's deputies, Vladimir Oblast:

During the section on agrarian problems was meeting at the congress, as a people's deputy representing the RSFSR I preferred to attend the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. We have the resolutions of the March Plenum, M.S. Gorbachev's line on such problems, the stipulations of the programmatic declaration and the political report. A great deal was said and stated. Union laws on the land and on ownership are interesting but there is no mechanism for their implementation, as was openly stated at the congress as well. In my view, these are tactics formulated by the republic government and the soviet authorities.

Perestroika freed us (I headed a kolkhoz for 17 years) from the need to engage in endless planning sessions and daily reports with every step we take. Now kolkhoz chairmen go to work dealing with what must be done instead of looking for justifications and excuses.

Middle management, including that of the party, is not following that line everywhere (in my view, prior to the congress this factor was underestimated). On the rayon level, however the chairman of a soviet is already able to do more than the first secretary. After the Congress of Russia's People's Deputies and the drafting of the Decree on Power, the new Soviet structures have acquired the feeling of being protected.

However, this is not enough. The countryside will not improve unless we can surmount its degrading dependence on the monopolists, the producers of agricultural equipment, and unless the scientific and technical potential of the defense complex does not undertake to meet its needs. It is precisely in achieving this that the state should display its power. The party can help with its intellectual potential and knowledgeable economic analysis but not by issuing directives to specific plants and sectors.

No one has ever been so mocked, deprived of the ability to think and work independently or have his dignity violated as the peasantry. On the moral level, it is very important for the sake of the party that statements were heard at the congress on restoring the good reputation of the peasantry and that the crimes committed during the period of collectivization were described precisely as crimes. This is one of the main moral lessons drawn at the congress.

I agree that radical changes in the rural economic and social structure became pressing a long time ago. We must not destroy the farms which can work normally and stably. However, wherever kolkhozes and sovkhoses have existed on subsidies for decades, we must encourage a conversion to a variety of forms of ownership, including private ownership of the land. The name which this will be given is not important. What matters is for the peasant to have the opportunity to prove

himself, to live like a human being and to be protected from the diktat of monopolists and from ignorant orders.

On the other hand, the prevailing belief in society (as manifested also at the congress) is that it is possible to do without radical economic reform in the countryside. This was the view of the managers of the strong farms. They demand and obtain all they need: materials, resources and equipment, frequently at the expense of others. With all due respect for their talent and industriousness, I believe that such people are living in the past, trying to preserve both their exclusive status and their "special" work methods. However, the moment such people retire the farms begin to weaken. The efficiency of an economic management system cannot be based on personal authority alone.

In that respect the party must help the soviets. After the Russian deputies passed a resolution on the inadmissibility of combining leading positions in both the party and the soviets, a wave of cadre renovation swept the rural raykoms. I believe that after the congress the party members will think and properly evaluate every one of their leaders. If we are unable to interpret the problems which the congress brought to light and which cannot be resolved by holding meetings, the party will face the threat of a slow breakdown. However, although the peasants are tired of their hopelessness and although frequently a decent person in the village becomes shy and ignored (he may have spoken out once or twice been rejected and become withdrawn) there are many people who are able and willing to work. To locate such people is the party's vitally important task.

**Valentin Fedorov**, chairman, executive committee, Sakhalin Soviet of People's Deputies, doctor of economic sciences:

If we analyze the congress from an economist's viewpoint, the impression is double: on the one hand, it is clear that today it is impossible to tolerate the economy in its present condition. Nonetheless, I would not dare to claim that at the party forum a kind of clear attitude developed regarding a conversion to civilized market relations in general, or as to what specifically to do, given the existing situation. The debates on simply what to call the congress' resolution on socioeconomic policy speak a great deal.

The party is withdrawing from economic concerns and direct administrative interference in economic processes. It is at this point that the main question arises: What will replace it and what economic policy will the party pursue? I frequently think about the various CPSU platforms with which the party came to the congress. I assess the weak and strong sides of each one of them. Honestly speaking, however, so far I do not see an economic program for pulling the country out of the crisis. Therefore, when I am asked what platform I support, I answer that I am supporting a platform which has not as yet been drafted but which must simply be developed today within the party, i.e., a platform for

economic revival or, to put it briefly, simply a market-oriented program. The difficulty today is also that society has increased its demands toward the science of economics. This is unfair. I may seem excessively harsh but there is no economic science in our country or, rather, there is no science such as we need today. Its "market" roots were uprooted in the 1930s (think of Kondratyev, Chayanov, Yurovskiy and many others, today forgotten). Generally speaking, a science begins where there is a certain lack of clarity, where there is a problem. In our country, after 1937, there were no problems. Economic science was adapted only to serve the purposes of economic propaganda of what was ordered from above.

We have already made substantial progress in understanding the type of economy we need. We must convert from a planned-market to a regulated market economy. I believe that this, nonetheless, is not enough. We need a social market economy. The word "regulated" does not mean anything. What is being regulated, by whom and for what purpose? One could regulate the market under a totalitarian regime as well. We need a market mechanism which is socially oriented and aimed at the people. So far, we have done too little to ensure this. For the past few months I, a Muscovite, have been chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast Executive Committee. What are we doing today on the island? We are developing new production facilities on an accelerated basis. People are telephoning us even all the way from Donetsk, asking: "Do you have a thermoelectric plant?" My answer is, "we do." "If you do you are using coal?" "We do." "This means that you have slag. So, it is decided, we shall come to you to manufacture bricks. We are free to do so." Someone else would ring up from Novosibirsk, suggesting to build us roads. We are even producing now the type of goods which the island never produced in the past, such as soap. We are now making cheese locally. After we have enhanced our level of self-protection, our self-sufficiency and our "unsinkability," we shall then also undertake a more decisive breakup of the old system. For the time being we cannot do so. If we were to close down sovkhoses and kolkhozes immediately, the people would simply remain without food.

I keep tirelessly repeating that as yet we have not achieved success. We are merely formulating prerequisites. This applies to the country at large as well. How successful is a peasant who has just planted seed potatoes in the ground? We are in the situation of that peasant. Taking a broad view, I am certain of our success. This is not mindless uncritical optimism but something backed by the experience of global history, the NEP, West Germany, Japan and South Korea. As a whole, let me say that in terms of a planned economy the state is assuming a burden which it clearly cannot withstand. With market relations, conversely, it is the economy that leads the state. Currently we are somewhere in the middle. On the one hand we pull and on the other we push and the normal situation about which I dream will develop when

the executive committee will no longer deal with vegetables, fruits and irrigation machinery, and so on, when there will be normal contractual relations and a normal market.

The materials for this publication were compiled by the journal's special correspondents to the 28th Congress V. Dymarskiy, N. Maslennikov, V. Nekhotin and Ye. Khokhlov.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

### Russia in the Present World

915B0002B Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 16-31

[Text] The journal sponsored a roundtable meeting on the topic of "Russia and the West. Contemporary Trends of Social Development," which was covered by Central Television. The following participated: E.A. Arab-Ogly, doctor of philosophical sciences, member of the editorial board of *KOMMUNIST*; S.A. Baruzdin, writer, editor-in-chief of the journal *DRUZHBA NARODOV*; N.B. Bikkenin, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, *KOMMUNIST* editor-in-chief; Haruki Vada, professor, Tokyo University; A.A. Iskenderov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, editor-in-chief of the journal *VOPROSY ISTORII*; V.I. Kerimov, candidate of philosophical sciences, *PRAVDA* section deputy editor; B.I. Oleynik, poet, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.S. Panarin, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of sector at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy; V.S. Rozhkov, archpriest, senior priest of the Nikolo-Kuznetsk Church, Moscow; and V.G. Khoros, doctor of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

### The Russian Idea

N.B. Bikkenin: The tempestuous process of sociopolitical and cultural-moral renovation of our country is organically combined with substantial changes in the traditional meaning of the word, and the place and role of it of Russia and the USSR. After the "iron curtain" separating the peoples and the artificially erected "concrete walls" of reciprocal alienation crumbled, Soviet society obtained the possibility of looking at itself with a new set of eyes, as though from the outside, through the eyes of its neighbors. It became more open to accepting the experience of the global community, the progressive ideas of Western Europe and the universal human ideals and values. The world no longer sees the USSR as an irreconcilable "bloodthirsty" enemy and does not consider it the "evil empire."

In connection with the revision of many familiar words and concepts and the new meaning ascribed to various theoretical formulas, we should clearly recall Kipling's thought that West is West and East is East and the twain shall never meet. This formula, which was classical for its time, is hardly valid today. I believe that they can and must meet within our common home which is being created with great efforts. Naturally, this must be done providing that everyone remain true to himself and not lose his unique appearance, coloring and individuality. The world needs variety. Accurately understood, such variety does not hinder cooperation among nations.

However, a mutual rapprochement does not mean uncritical borrowing. The mechanical transfer of cultures, ideals and values from one environment to another can cause nothing but harm, as confirmed by the entire experience of past Russian history. Therefore, we cannot agree with suggestions made today from different rostrums of adopting ready-made "models" from the Western countries, claiming the uselessness of trying to invent a "fifth wheel." Thus, in the shaping of democratic political structures and power institutions, and new relations in material production, mores and customs in life, it would be stupid blindly to copy the British parliamentary system or the presidential institutions of the United States, to import from Sweden the so-called sexual revolution (although there, in my view, a "counterrevolution" has already started), hastily to introduce Japanese technology regardless of the national features of the human production factor, and so on, and so forth. In other words, it is a question of acknowledging realities and sensibly combining national with international features and using both domestic and international experience in development.

In defining one's place in the world it is important to bear yet another circumstance in mind. Under the conditions of the radical renovation of our society, glasnost and democracy, the process which has spread throughout the country of creating national fronts and movements and new parties with different ideological orientations, parliamentary factions and party platforms carries the threat of destroying the integrity of the historically developed subject of global relations. The division of intellectuals into hostile "Neo-Westerners" and "Neo-Slavophiles" and "promarket" and "antimarket," and the classification of writers and journalists "according to their blood" as liberals and conservatives and supporters of progress or stagnation, and the ambitious labeling of various social organizations which profess somewhat different views on the pace and specific trends of perestroika are having a destructive influence on governmental institutions. All they are introducing is confusion in the social awareness, preventing us from concentrating the efforts of the people on the solution of the common problems of historical progress. A multinational society, torn by internal and frequently enhanced strife, cannot protect itself from the pressure of external factors. We must remember this, in my view, in the course of the theoretical interpretation of reality and the formulation of political programs.



**B.I. Oleynik:** I admit that I came to this roundtable in order to make a greater clarification of the problem possible. What is unquestionable to me, however, is that a given interpretation or decision directly affect the national feelings of the individual and the fate of a multinational state. Today this problem is being painfully felt by the entire society.

In frequent cases in the West and even in our country Russia is identified with the Soviet Union in a variety of aspects. Naturally, this is detrimental to other nations and provokes anti-Russian speculations. In this case we need a clear "demarcation." The term "Russia" is self-sufficient. We should not ascribe to the Russian people anything unnecessary, even if motivated by good intentions. The Russian people do not need any makeweights. Russia is Russia and when we define its place in the world within the system of European countries we must not ignore the Ukraine, which is a state whose potential is equal to that of France, as well as other republics.

I do not wish to belittle in the least the role of the other government formations within the USSR but, departing from the topic of our discussion, let me emphasize the permanent significance of Russia. I believe that the West cannot do without it in resolving any whatsoever major problem of contemporary civilization. Those who are listing the various ways of its dismemberment in the hope that it will leave the world arena as an autonomous and integral formation are wrong. Russia was, is and will be, whether some people, both Russian and European, wish it or not, and will remain one of the determining factors in shaping the political and moral-ethical climate of the globe, scientific and technical progress and (in a certain sense) economic prosperity of the global community.

Above all, however, the meaning of its appearance in the world, which has always been God's intention, is, I believe, the fact that it was and is a source of spirituality. Its historical existence is justified by the very fact that Russian culture provides humanistic moral guidelines and has a powerful spiritual-constructive charge. The pragmatic West realizes this when it calls upon us not to humiliate our own hollies, hollies which are virtually inaccessible to it because of a way of life hamstrung in the clutches of a colossal inhuman industrialization.

Let us consider religion. Orthodoxy reflected the peculiar spiritual foundations and moral expectations of a nation which was international in spirit and acted as its unifying force. This link must not be broken. We must not fear the mystery of the Russian soul reflected, in particular, in the concept of the Russian idea, for otherwise we are depriving the Russian individual of his national profile and thereby destroy his vital roots.

Each nation has its own unique aspect. There is no such thing as universal nations without clearly manifested pivotal ideas, for otherwise we would have a simply spiritually dispersed population sharing an economic territory. In this torn world in which all of us live today,

the supreme meaning of the activities of the Russian people, in my view, is the task not declaratively but really to help the peoples of all republics to achieve self-determination. At that point the authority of the Russian individual will rise to the level to which the best sons of Russia aspired and which they reached.

The Russian people have always found reciprocally enriching points of contact with other nations in all areas, culture in particular. This was not hindered by the Russian idea. Religion plays an important role in culture and when we, from the positions of the new thinking, are solving the accumulated problems of cultural autonomy, we must not ignore problems of the features, the autonomy of the religious life of nations. Now, after the Ukraine acquired the status of sovereign state, there is a separation less in terms of national than religious features. This aggravates the question of the autocephalic nature of the Ukrainian church. I believe that this problem must be resolved positively for the good of the entire orthodox church.

**N.B. Bikkenin:** Let me illustrate this idea with the words of Lord Kenneth, from his recently published letter in *KOMMUNIST*. "To us," the author writes, "the Soviet Union means Russia: therefore we, obviously, look at the non-Russian republics as being Russian.... Few people in our country have first-hand familiarity with Latvian or Uzbek culture.... (Nor are we familiar with Hungarian or Portuguese culture.)" What are we facing, assuming that we do not consider these words as insulting to the nation? What are the reasons for the phenomenon of the West's identifying the USSR with Russia? What should our attitude be toward such views, taking into consideration the complex situation in inter-republic relations, which developed with the creation of the new federation? How to react to it in practical terms? These are difficult problems which makes it all the more necessary for us to resolve them calmly if we want to structure a realistic policy in our relations with the world without, at the same time, harming internal interrelationships.

Clearly, one of the reasons for such an approach to the Soviet Union may be because, to cite Kenneth once more, "Russian culture has imbued within itself half of all the smaller cultures which surround it, and also because Russian culture, particularly literature, music and dance, is so great and so enchanting that it may seem that we simply have no time left to go beyond it.... Russian culture is part of European culture, the culture of the European home, to use Gorbachev's famous formula." In my view, we should listen to these words of a Western politician and understand them without prejudice in the context of interpreting the place of the USSR and of its individual constituent republics in the contemporary global community. We must quite accurately, without unnecessary emotion, achieve our self-determination as Russians or as members of other nationalities and of equal and truly sovereign republics.



One of the errors in our history was the fact that national problems were reduced to economic and personnel problems and, more than anything else, sociopolitical problems. Let us recall Stalin's statements and policies. He considered the national problem essentially as one of a petty peasant family, which obstructed the building of socialism, and he proclaimed it subordinate to the cause of the proletarian revolution. With a bureaucratic "proletarian internationalization" of this problem the original history of each nation and its language, culture, traditions and beliefs were ignored. Any one of its formulations was interpreted as a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism. Such a policy caused nothing other than harm.

True Marxist tradition has always distinguished between national pride and national boastfulness. National dignity yes, national exclusivity, no. How not to cross this fine line in national self-determination and the development of sovereignty? I believe that this is possible only by following the path of reason, reciprocal respect, civil peace and interethnic accord.

**S.A. Baruzdin:** The topic of this discussion is quite relevant, perhaps for the reason alone that on the eve of the 21st century the world seems to be at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is clear aspiration toward integration; on the other, we have a sharp separation, which may even take the shape of open extremism, including our own home-grown one: from bloody in the Transcaucasus to legal in the Baltic area. Therefore, where are we going and what is motivating us? Without addressing ourselves to the problem of Russia, the study of this transitional situation can only be superficial.

Looking at Russia's history—prerevolution and Soviet—we are bound to note its influence on global history. They are closely interlinked and one is incomplete without the other. Both are complex and contradictory and largely tragic. Kiev Rus and the Moscow State, looked at from the viewpoint that they borrowed from each other, and independence, continuity and renovation, the historical movement of various nations, the Tatar-Mongol yoke, foreign invasions, and just and unjust wars, are all events of centuries-old Russian reality and which, one way or another, are also facts in the history of the European world, confirming the interweaving of the destinies of the peoples of Europe, Asia and the Orient. The latter is manifested with particular clarity in Russian culture in which antiquity and Christianity are the neighbors of Islam and Buddhism, something which so characteristically expresses the feature of Russia as a multinational state.

Nor should we forget in this case the complex solution of the problem of Russia's historical development. Some nations entered into a natural alliance with the Russians, strengthening organizationally their long joint history, or else joined Russia voluntarily, considering it their last rescuer and powerful defender of their age-old interests. Others were forced into such an alliance by the merciless

logic of global historical development. As a whole, however, both benefited. Although before the 1917 Revolution Russia was described as the "prison of the nations," it is hardly possible to ignore its beneficial influence on the development of many non-Russian nations and nationalities.

In this connection I would like to discuss the question of the so-called Russian idea. For a long time this concept has been extensively used both in our country and the West. However, during the different stages in history and in the different countries its content was and is interpreted differently. Sometimes it is negative and sometimes it is given positive shades of meaning. That is why it would be expedient to turn to Russian social thinking of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, when an entire range of problems related to this idea were subject to intensive development. Here as well we must recall the fierce debates between two powerful trends: the Slavophiles and the supporters of Western ideas.

They differently assessed Russia and its history. It is important to note the curious way of historical thinking displayed by P. Chaadayev. In his "Philosophical Letters," speaking of the unity of destinies of Russia and Europe, he seems to proceed from the opposite, emphasizing the uniqueness of Russian life, consisting of its negative aspects. In particular, he bitterly complains of Russia's alienation from "the universal upbringing of mankind." To a certain extent, this approach is found also in Herzen, Belinskiy and Bakunin.

N. Karamzin interpreted this uniqueness entirely differently. He singled out the special merit of Russia and its sons which, in his view, was the following: "Let us look at the space occupied by this single state; our mind is blocked; never could Rome in its grandeur compare to it, even when it ruled from the Tiber to the Caucasus, and from the Elba to the sands of Africa. Is it not amazing the way lands divided by the eternal boundaries of nature, endless deserts and impassable forests and cold and hot climates could join into a single state with Muscovy? Is the mixture of its population, of different tribes and appearances, so distant from each other, any less wonderful?" This Russian historian is fascinated by the hugeness and significance of Russia and its unusual way of development. We see in his views and comparisons, as a general concept, one of the main interpretations of the concept of the Russian idea.

However, in order to achieve a more profound understanding of the meaning of the Russian idea we must turn to the works of N. Berdyayev. He defined the Russian national type and identified the distinctive nature of the Russian soul and Russian religious nature. He paid great attention to the study of the topic of "East and West," i.e., he developed the main components of the social phenomenon we are considering. In particular, Berdyayev reached the conclusion that Russia lives not for its own sake but for the thought and the significant fact that for nearly 100 years it had decisively lived exclusively for the sake of Europe. Naturally, one could

argue with many of the concepts of this Russian philosopher but we cannot reject them a priori.

**V.I. Kerimov:** There is nothing bad in the fact that a given nation tries to make its truly spiritual values accessible to all mankind. However, how to attain these generally noble objectives and by what ways and means? Should we follow the so-called path of "Christ" or the path of "Xerxes," the path of humanism or of political violence? It is precisely from this viewpoint that we must consider the messianic aspects of the Russian idea.

It seems to me that in any case the Slavophiles always took the West into consideration. Their original West Russian orientation was linked to the cultural mission played by Russia and the dissemination of orthodoxy in Christian countries not through political methods. For example, in publishing his theological works in Europe, A. Khomyakov considered the realm of politics not simply of secondary value but anti-Christian, for allegedly it was totally involved with violence.

Subsequently, however, a curious turn occurred in the attitude toward the Russian idea. The Eurasian trend appeared, at the origins of which stood, among others, Dostoyevskiy. In the last issue of his *"Diary of a Writer,"* he expressed the view that we are the children not only of Europe but of Asia as well. We are the eternal students of the Europeans and, at the same time, teachers of the Oriental countries.

Later, ever more persistently, the Eurasians emphasized Russia's Oriental features. According to them, Russia was the heir of both Orthodox Byzantium and Genghis Khan's empire. It was believed that all evil came from the West and that the alliance with the people of the steppes was beneficial to the country. The influence of the Polovtsy, the Tatars and other Asian peoples had saved Russia from Roman Catholicism and had contributed to strengthening the national originality of the Russian people.

The pitting of Russia against the West intensified. In this connection, ancient and medieval Rus was interpreted as an outpost of the Great Steppe in Europe, as the advanced bastion of the struggle against the West (L. Gumilev). Increasingly, features of political expansion became apparent in the Eurasian idea. It assumed a totalitarian shade. Russia's mission was becoming terrifying. Let us recall Blok's poem: "Are we to be blamed for the crushing of your skeleton in our heavy and tender paws?"

Therefore, in an effort to define the place of our country in the contemporary world with the help of the understanding of the Russian idea, we must firmly distance ourselves from efforts to justify expansionism under the pretext of Russia's particular "civilizing" functions.

**V.G. Khoros:** When we speak of Russia and the West we immediately fall into the old rut made by several generations of Russian writers, philosophers and revolutionaries professing various beliefs: people of the soil and

conservatives, religious philosophers and Marxists, populists and bolsheviks, and so on. We have inherited from them a number of ideological stereotypes and characteristic "patriotic" errors which have left profound traces in the social awareness, as well as myths which hinder the adequate understanding of the problem.

Let me briefly name such myths. The first: Russia means the West (today this has acquired a new popularity). The second: Russia means the East. The third: Russia is some kind of cultural bridge linking West with East. Finally, the fourth: Russia is an exceptional phenomenon, a puzzle, the fabulous sphinx. Remember Tyutchev: "Russia's mind cannot be understood.... One can only believe in Russia."

Naturally, myths never develop in a vacuum. Unquestionably, the various formulas must include a certain percentage of reality. In the final account, however, this is not the problem. The problem is that they are as much groundless as they are truthful. This is confirmed by unimplemented plans and strategies and the historical paradigms which were formulated by the makers of all sorts of myths.

Thus, we did not succeed in turning Russia into France or, as the Decembrist Andrey Rozen said, to "transplant France to Russia." Nor did Russia become the Pan-Slavic kingdom, the unifier of all Slavic nations, as the Slavophiles assumed. Constantinople was not taken, something about which Danilevskiy and Leontyev dreamed. Nor did Russia become a new America, something for which many Russian personalities called, including, amazingly enough, the young Hertzin. Finally, the formula according to which Russia is the transformer of the entire planet, for it is at the head of the world revolution, failed.

In my view, the first lesson to be drawn from the study of such utopian views is that we should firmly abandon the age-old Russian "messianism," from the concept that "Moscow is the third Rome" to that of the international revolutionary hegemony of the USSR, for discussions on this topic are quite sterile and paralleled, as a rule, by all sorts of incantations and ultrapatriotic assertions. This could hardly be to Russia's benefit.

Naturally, the topic of Russia's originality, which was raised by the Slavophiles, is important and demands a profound theoretical interpretation. However, let me reemphasize that we must not shut our eyes to appeals to the idea of messianism and the concept that "Russia will save the entire world" which is today, in practice, frequently converted into a variety of nationalism. Any nationalism is harmful and, at best, performs a certain compensatory role. It seems to me, however, that for quite some time we have already been mature enough, at least in terms of our suffering, to abandon such complexes and develop a more valuable concept of the world, which will help us to become an organic part of global civilization.

**E.A. Arab-Ogly:** I believe that it would be wrong to reduce the concept of the Russian idea to a harsh pitting of Russia against the West, and even more so of Russia against Europe. By analogy with the way Herzen characterized the Slavophiles and Western supporters, as two faces with one heart, we can say that in our country we have a Russian and a Western face but a single heart: European culture. This culture dates from antiquity. It is built on the ideas and values of antiquity and Christianity. It is founded on the rich history of the joint existence of nations, the age of Enlightenment, which was manifested in its specific forms in Western Europe and the Orient, and based on science, which knows no boundaries. If we speak of the Russian soul, it is not only Great Russian but Ukrainian and Belorussian. It is the soul of many nations, which it united within a powerful country. Consequently, the problem is not in the least to have the Russians, let us say, be like the British, the Ukrainians like the French or the Belorussians like the Dutch. All nations must remain themselves and, at the same time, realize and feel that they are European.

Today we understand that Europe has been sick for decades. Both its lungs—the Western and the Eastern European—are in a state of pneumothorax. Let us not argue about where it is manifested more strongly. What matters is that Europe has cured itself and is breathing freely with both lungs: Russian and Western. Our aspiration must be aimed at helping with all our strength Europe and Russia to breathe freely.

**Archpriest Vladimir Rozhkov:** It was absolutely rightly said here that a nation has its own soul. Therefore, as we consider the question of "Russia and the West," we must bring to light precisely the characteristics of the Russian people and their distinguishing features, come closer to their roots, i.e., we must include within our considerations concepts such as spirituality, faith, Christian civilization, and the church from the viewpoint of the specifics of the spiritual world of the people and differences in their religious faith. East and West are not simply some kind of official formations but states of the souls of the people.

The Russian church belongs to the family of Orthodox nations but has its own features, something which is inevitably reflected in the pivotal idea of the life of the Russian individual. Christianity, coming from Greece, was cast on the Russian soul and national traditions and, combined with the people's concepts and views about the world, pushed out the vestiges of paganism. Thus, having changed the world perception of the people, it rallied within the true faith the Russian and the other Slavic people, which is one of the distinctions separating Russia from the West.

Orthodoxy, as a spiritual state of mind, as opposed to the Western way of thinking and acting, developed its own way in which there was a different combination among so-called horizontal and vertical trends in the practices of Christian life. The vertical, related to the spiritual aspirations addressed directly to God and the people

addressing themselves to the Creator in their prayers, through the icons, is manifested most characteristically in Russian holiness. Inherent in the West is a more horizontal trend in which Christianity develops through philanthropy, worldliness, the opening of schools and education. However, this trend as well was supported by the Russian church. It was manifested in the monastic trend of seekers and nonseekers, which made it possible to expand Russia and populate its Northern latitudes, i.e., it was thanks to Russian holiness that new lands and new worlds of morality were discovered and settled.

The West is attracted by the spiritual aspirations of Russian sanctity. It perceives it as being closer to Christianity. This precisely could be one of the foundations for the rapprochement between Russia and Europe. It is precisely here that we should make use of the specific Christian ties among nations and concepts of Christian civilization. We are underestimating their major potential power in organizing a dialogue. This is particularly pertinent now, when our society has largely lost its Christian aspect.

We must also look at our sad past. At the turn of the century Russia opened itself to the Christian world thanks to the development of philosophical religious thinking. However, this process was artificially interrupted. In the 1920s, we once again presented ourselves to the West but this time as religious thinkers, as philosophers-theologians who had left the country not on their own free will. They took with themselves the treasury of thought, spirituality and morality of the Russian people and gave it to the West. Now we must return everything which was preserved by the Russian Diaspora.

I have a somewhat different point of view on the matter of Russian messianism. This is an idea which is deeply rooted in the people's consciousness. Its attractiveness is perhaps in the fact alone that it reveals the existence of a spiritual experience in Russia which is not to be found in the West and which the Russian person can and wants to share with other nations. This experience is comprehensive and unique. Let me mention simply the courage, the holiness of our church. It endured despite cruel persecution. Thousands of priests, bishops and monks and millions of simple believers suffered for their faith but preserved and increased spirituality and sanctity. This is the beginning, the foundation of the revival of the church and of the people themselves. We shall once again become a force of attraction. The West will begin to trust us and we shall offer to the world our culture and spiritual wealth.

The Russian Orthodox Church has good contacts not only with Europe but also with Asia. Our spiritual missions to China and Japan are known. In Japan Orthodoxy has found a particularly fertile soil and the Russian missionary Archbishop Nikolay, who preached in Japanese, left behind some 25,000 Orthodox believers.



Missionaries carried Orthodoxy to America as well. Their works were not lost and are manifested in the founding of an already independent Autocephalic Orthodox American Church. Unfortunately, we do not have good relations with the Russian church in the United States, which does not consider us a link to the political destinies of the people. We are being accused of allegedly helping the Soviet system to oppress the people. Naturally, such statements are absurd. One must abandon such concepts. Our clerical traditions call for great patience and greater understanding and serve the rapprochement among nations. Only thus can we fulfill our life's purpose. We are grateful to our foreign coreligionists for the preservation and spreading of Russian culture.

Obviously, I must say a few words concerning the problem raised by B.I. Oleynik. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is our blood sister. We have profound, centuries-old interpenetrating spiritual links with it, for Orthodoxy reached Russia from Kiev and it was through the Ukraine that spiritual knowledge was disseminated. Our relations are traditional and unbreakable, something which must be comprehensively taken into consideration in interpreting concepts such as "autonomy" and "autocephalism." Today the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has already taken the path of autonomy. Its synod has been granted a special status as an independent formation. However, we must not forget the mission of Orthodoxy, which consists of the unification of the peoples.

**A.A. Iskenderov:** The problem under discussion is complex for the fact alone that in the course of its interpretation we are always faced with the strong sweeps of ideology, politics and national feelings. All discussions on this problem in the history of Russian social thinking have been imbued with a polemical spirit of confrontation and the fear of passing for a false patriot or for someone who does not love the fatherland enough. That is why we must distance ourselves from ideological dogmas and political stereotypes, for otherwise we shall be unable objectively, on the basis of scientific positions, to bring to light which is today as well an unquestionably topical subject.

It is through the lens of such an approach that I suggest that we consider the views expressed by V. Klyuchevskiy. In particular, for a long time he stood on the positions of Normanism, supporting the so-called "Varangian Theory." Naturally, one could argue with him about assessments of various historical facts. In some areas he is not right. However, this is not the heart of the matter. It is important to interpret the effort to formulate the question of the appearance of the ancient Russian state on a non-Russian foundation and the effort to identify the initial period of interaction between Russia and the European world.

In his view, it was precisely at that point that their separate existence began. It marked the beginning of surmounting the existing gap in the social, economic and

scientific and technical levels of development. Russia frequently mechanically borrowed objects and features, considering Western Europe a store for things it needed and which, for a long period of time, it did nothing to improve. What it imported had no whatsoever noticeable influence on the self-awareness of the Russian people. To a certain extent everything remained static.

Therefore, there was a view according to which the essence of the Russian idea was reduced to borrowing, not affecting the way of life or the behavior of society and its members.

It seems to me that it was the 18th century that became such a divide. That century has not still been entirely and adequately assessed by history. It was precisely then that true reciprocal contacts and mutual influences between two or many more cultures began. This was followed not simply by changes but by the birth of a new Russian awareness. The Russian idea precisely indicates less a revival than a significant break in the self-awareness of the people and in their self-expression, manifested with the new thinking. The problem of Russia's historical destinies and of what will happen to Russia as a result of exposure to other cultures arose in its full magnitude. Furthermore, after the French Revolution events occurred in the world the nature of which could not leave Russia in its previous condition. Two roads opened to it: preserving backwardness or mastering everything that was new and progressive. However, was this to take place on its own or on a foreign basis?

Let us also recall that the 18th century was the century of the Russian Enlightenment. Yes, its ideas came from Western Europe. However, the country was ready to accept them, for certain specific prerequisites already existed in the minds of the Russian people, in domestic social thought and in the Russian way of life. The manner in which these ideas were implemented is a different matter.

In this connection we must clearly realize that there is no single nation in the world which has not felt the greater or lesser influence of other nations and nationalities. However, there is no mechanical combination of different national cultures. One can observe only that which has been created by global culture, only that which pertains to global general cultural values. In this case as well, in the final account, it would be futile to attempt, under the slogan of autonomy, to preserve prejudices which have been discarded by the global community and to preserve some features of our own culture forever, alienated from the rest of the world.

At the same time, efforts at accepting anything which comes from abroad, indiscriminately, are dangerous. Thus, the age of colonialism convincingly proved that the uncritical and imposed borrowing of anything coming from Europe was very damaging. There was a destruction of national structures which were natural to the African nations, and the development of national thinking was obstructed. A role of consumer of culture,



adopted ready-made, and not created domestically does not make it possible for a third world country to reject dependency.

To us as well this problem has not been entirely eliminated although it exists in a somewhat different aspect. It is a question, for example, that under the conditions of a social renovation we are looking at the West and are trying to adopt a great deal of what it offers, occasionally without taking our own history into consideration. The result may be a curious symbiosis of backward capitalism with poor socialism. This, however, would be madness and not progress. Therefore, in this case I support precisely greater Russian autonomy.

Nonetheless, what does Russian autonomy mean? How can we express its national characteristics in the shaping of the new Union? One thing is clear: without a nation and without a national way of thinking we shall not last long. Naturally, all of our theoretical developments and all practical solutions must stem from a national foundation and rely on the multinational factor.

#### Universal Human Values Are the Guideline

**E.A. Arab-Ogly:** Our country can be strong and freely united, whether as a federation or confederation, with one condition: if we eliminate from our way of thinking, regardless of how presented, concepts such as aliens, limit setters, native and Russian-language population, with consequent rights and fears for one's destiny; if the Baltic idea is not being pitting against the Russian idea in a confrontational way or the Ukrainian against the Tatar or any other; or else, in general, pitting the national against the universal human idea. We do not need to be alone. We need human unity as a prerequisite for a painless development of both our own and global history. We must apply universal human values in interacting with people of different nationalities both within the country and in the international arena.

The problem of Russia and the West in its both internal and external aspects is considered by us, above all, within the context of European civilization. However, this does not presume in the least the erection of artificial, separating and insurmountable barriers between West and East and the deliberate elimination within Russia itself of Eastern traditions in favor of Western trends of historical development. Conversely, the task is to look at Russia and at other countries within the context of the entire world and, therefore, from the viewpoint of the binding link among different civilizations and cultures.

Such a link is the universal human values and imperatives of the way of life which historically affect nations. When we, in Russia, look at the West, we are aspiring by no means toward Westernization. We want and aspire for universal human values to find a nutritive ground in our country for their blossoming, in order to illumine our lives and Russian reality with new more vivid colors.

The current radical renovation of our society prepares the domestic soil for planting the seeds of universal human ideals and traditions. However, this soil could be plowed in different manners. The good farmer is aware of the thickness of the fertile stratum and will not sink his plow in such a way as to bring to the surface sterile rock. Yet that was the case in our history. The aspiration to destroy the old world to its foundations buried the cultural chernozem under the rock and the clay. Nonetheless, it did not perish. Consequently, the task now is to reach it, to clean it from various accretions, i.e., to restore the universal human and not some kind of Western values and formations.

What is relevant in our case? In my view, the main thing is to achieve the separation of the powers, including the one between the "worldly" and the spiritual, in all areas of social life. This also is a value of any civilized world, in the modern understanding of the term. Would it be fair to consider it a specific Western tradition and value on the basis of the fact that in Western Europe it assumed a more clearly manifested nature and more developed outlines? By no means is this the case.

Or else let us consider a value such as representative democracy. Was it considered important exclusively in Western society or that we should aspire to it through our servile attitude toward it? Naturally, no. This is a universal human achievement, the achievement of millennia of world history. Its origins and characteristic forms of manifestation may be found far from Europe, in medieval Japan. There too city states existed. Such examples are numerous, and may be found in the histories of societies on all continents.

In discussing today problems of commodity-monetary relations, the introduction of a market economy and parliamentary forms of government, strengthening glasnost and pluralism of opinion and asserting tolerance in the perception of other cultures and religions, i.e., problems of the priority of these and other universal human values and not the values of individual Western countries, it would be wrong to view Russia as a concentration of authoritarianism, autocracy and imperial consciousness. Such things occurred in other countries, in the twists of the history of Western and Eastern cultures. Let us recall Nazism and totalitarianism in 20th century Germany, or the imperial ambitions of European countries toward nations in Asia and Africa. Therefore, when we reject antihumanitarian manifestations we are rejecting not any kind of "Eastern" models; instead we are returning to the humane individual, to a humanistic society, to anything which is truly human, and which existed and exists in Russia and in Russian culture.

Visit the Russian Museum or the Tretyakov Gallery exhibiting the famous paintings by Bryullov or Ivanov on ancient Christian topics. Do they represent the way of thinking and feeling of the Russian person alone? Look at the paintings of Surikov and Repin on themes of domestic history. Could they be classified as a non-European or a semi-European perception of life? What

about Chaykovskiy, Glinka or Rimskiy-Korsakov, do they belong to Russia alone? Such a one-dimensional approach would be hardly accurate. All of these are manifestations of general European culture. They are creations of the universal human spirit, interwoven with national cultural traditions, which, precisely, is what opens to the country the gates to a single civilization, which opens a window to both West and East.

**Archpriest Vladimir Rozhkov:** Since we are discussing universal human ideals and values, let us particularly single out the permanent significance, the humanistic role of the church in their penetration within the awareness and behavior of believers and people with different conceptual guidelines; this is not only because today religion or the use of respective symbols have become fashionable even when such fashion is not necessary at all and is merely insulting to religious feelings. Such sad facts were justifiably mentioned by N.B. Bikkenin here, in particular when he noted that everyone has begun to refer to the Bible so frequently and out of place as was the case in the past by quoting from the *"Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)"*. This is because religion and the church are inseparable parts of the content and functioning of culture and a moral attitude toward man and nature and because universal human values cannot be even imagined outside the Christian values which gave them life.

What is the origin of this modern fashion? The authority of the state has declined and a mistrust of the party is rising among a significant segment of the population; a crisis in the Komsomol is obvious. The main thing, however, is the lack of spirituality in society and a spiritual-moral emptiness in many people who do not believe in anything. No other development was possible, for decades the religious feeling was being uprooted and the soul of the people was being desecrated by closing down churches and mosques, abusing them, by the elimination of priests and the bureaucratic interference of the state in church affairs.

By uprooting, sometimes through barbaric methods, religious faith, the "worldly" was essentially being pitted against both national and universal human principles of thinking and behavioral standards. The national-historical roots of culture were being eliminated and the sacred rights of nations to a free religious life were being violated. Spiritual foundations of the Russian people, whose origins can be found in its sanctity, features such as love of neighbor, tolerance and selfless help to the needy, were slowly eliminated from daily practical life. There was virtually no place for compassion within society.

For a long time education was based on the formula: "Man is a proud noun." Yet, it was by no means proud. The observance of an abstract postulate cost our society dearly. Indeed, man became one-sidedly proud and arrogant. Under the conditions of a spiritual crisis he became harsher, manifesting an egotistical attitude toward nature and the animal world. Suppressed by

material and spiritual lack of order, he was imbued with malice which alienated people from one another. He is displaying a strange egotism toward his past but, at the same time, an indifference toward the future.

Intoxicated by the appeal "All For the Sake of the People and All for the Good of the People," we get carried away by huge projects, appealing to the masses (in today's television and radio marathons), forgetting the individual, his uniqueness and his fragile soul. To simply wish great happiness to a person is not enough. One must instill respect in his inner world and show a kind of specific human participation in his destiny. How many elderly, sick, lonely, and rejected people, people seeking help, instruction and the consolation of a good word do we have in our country? Where are the forces of goodness, compassion and charity?!

I believe that a restoration of spirituality in our nation, returning it to universal human ideals and traditions and recreating its national awareness and unity would be impossible without the Russian Orthodox Church. The church has a great moral potential power for the fullest possible revelation of the historical possibilities of the Russian person. It can provide healthy food for the mind and for the morality of the people, the young in particular, who are attracted by the surrogates of Western culture. It gives an answer to a person who thinks about the meaning of his life, the objectives of society and the trends of its development. It is only through the merger of all spiritual forces within our society, including the church, that we would be able to find accurate solutions to the problems which face Russia.

**N.B. Bikkenin:** Important to our country, at the stage of transition from one condition to another, something which naturally triggers a sharp demarcation and polarization of opinions and aggravation of the clash of interests, threatening with a division the multinational state is consolidation, unification based on the platform of a constructive perestroika of society by all citizens, regardless of their professed views. Naturally, under the condition that they stand on progressive positions and favor the democratic and nonviolent resolution of disputable matters. I would like particularly to single out this fact in characterizing the existing new attitude of the communists toward religion and the processes occurring within the church itself and relations among different confessions. There are common moral and ethical principles and values on the basis of which we could develop a fruitful cooperation.

However, here is something that worries me. In supporting their own views, some critics of the faults of society, which we are increasingly leaving behind us, artificially and demagogically pit Marxist views and concepts of universal human values against the humanistic ideals of social development. They even blame Lenin for all criminal actions, for forsaking the ideals of democracy and human freedom and rights and for all the sins which were committed over the 70-year history of existence of Soviet society. If you will forgive me an

analogy, no one blamed Christ for the Inquisition and for the war between Catholics and Huguenots or Mohammed for a great deal of unseemly actions committed under the green banners of Islam. Therefore, we must always be objective in our views and judgments. We must control the emotions with our reason, when it becomes a question of reaching the truth; we must display a considered approach, i.e., we must be truly guided by universal human principles and standards of thinking and behavior and not trigger in our opponents a legitimate irritation which could develop into unnecessary confrontation.

**A.S. Panarin:** I share the pain and concern expressed by Father Vladimir and his overall assessment of the role of the church in shaping a certain spiritual condition in the people. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that the orthodox church as well did not by itself adopt the rights of man and the values of individuality and the uniqueness of individuality as the imperatives of a contemporary civilized society. This was not accidental. I believe that any church, like any culture which has not experienced the Reformation retains within itself a theocratic temptation to ascribe to a spiritual power the status, the power of statehood, and to correlate the city of man with the city of God not only in the moral area, and to build on earth on a mandatory basis something similar to the professed ideal Heaven.

To a certain extent a road to human rights and to the humanism and uniqueness of the personality was opened by the Western church represented by the powerful current of Protestantism. The new church firmly emphasized that on earth there is no infallible authority standing between God and the layman. When it proclaimed that there is no one who can singly, as the ultimate truth, interpret the will of God and that in that sense a professor at the Sorbonne and an illiterate shepherd are in the same position in the interpretation of the holy scriptures, and are equal in their likelihood of absolution, it protected precisely human rights and even the humanistic aspect of spirituality.

This idea, whose origin was Protestant, brought in our country, at the turn of the century, a reformist religious-philosophical trend which became a significant symptom of faults in the development of orthodoxy and of Russia. One of the major theoreticians of this orthodox reformism, in my view, was N.A. Berdyaev. He convincingly proved that we must surmount theocratic distortions in our thinking and practices and the effort to entrust with the interpretation of the holy scriptures a certain final authority, be it the church or the state and, on this basis, build essentially an abstractly desired heaven on earth. If such reformist movement had not been interrupted, we may have possibly avoided also the temptation of totalitarianism.

It is self-evident that we must also blame Marxism in the aspect in which it assumed in our country and adapted itself to our local conditions. In my view, the ideological shepherds provided their own interpretation of the

socialist idea, favoring an unrestricted aggressive atheism, formulating insurmountable doctrinal obstacles on the way to universal human aspirations and values. In this respect concepts related to the view of the formative progress of society played a special role.

What prevented and is still preventing us, from the ideological viewpoint, to establish contacts with the West and, in general, adopt the idea of the priority of the values and traditions accepted by all mankind? It is the principle, the way of self-determination of our society and our country in the world. The moment we consider ourselves as belonging to a certain superior system which must be strictly followed by the rest of the world, at this point immediately our isolation from the other societies and nations and the ambitious aspiration to become pioneers become apparent. The paradox of this formative approach is the denial of the unity of historical time and the integrity of the global community and of contemporary civilization. They imply two different evolutions and incompatible worlds (the familiar stipulations do not solve the problem), two different ways of life and two aspects of man which are substantially different from one another. At the same time, this implies a rejection of the cultural and other varieties in the world, for within the limits of a single system differences are insignificant and become leveled off or else are deliberately removed.

Incidentally, this leads to the fact that many of our compatriots accept all that is taking place currently in our country as the provocation of foreigners, as some kind of export of something alien which is inconsistent with the spirit of the national idea, i.e., a nation which has accepted its social-historical exclusivity has been unable to recognize itself in the abstract universality and, consequently, cannot identify itself also in this formative feature.

A vulgar formative approach is poorly verified through practical or empirical experience, for it has the effect of a reversed image. If we seriously speak of the formative advantages we should believe that Cuba, Vietnam, not to mention our country, following the new and "progressive" historical path for 70 years, are substantially ahead in a few aspects of the truly important development of Western countries, which should immediately undertake the corresponding restructuring of their society. Are we ahead? Are we ahead in economics, health care, science and technology or education?

This is one of the obvious inconveniences of the formative approach. However, it suffers from a mass of other shortcomings as well. Thus, for example, one of its essential features is negating the true historical nature of events. According to our theoretical views, each system has a certain evolutionary code which simply develops and is implemented as the destiny of one system or another. By removing it, we strictly identify society with individual aspects of historical dynamics (such as capitalism) and predetermine all the details of its future (inevitable failure). If we state that the formative code



means public ownership, according to the accepted logic, we imply that, as an escalator, it will lead us to the bright future. Therefore, history with its surprises, alternatives and the drama of its choices and temptations, of which there are more than enough, particularly during the transitional period of society, simply disappears.

Hence the necessary conclusion that the moment we proclaimed the new thinking as being the wisdom of the state we faced the task of converting it into a philosophical wisdom. In particular, we should essentially review the methodological and conceptual foundations strongly linked to the concept of "system." There is no other way if we wish to look at the world through the eyes of the unprejudiced person, and suitably evaluate the realities of today and be guided by universal human guidelines.

In my view, we shall be able to substantiate the universal human values by converting from a formative to a general civilization idea, although I realize that we do not have to this effect direct theoretical precedents and experience leading us to this idea.

What does it consist of? In the West, said idea was developed as part of the overall ideology of technical development and conversions. It was believed that scientific and technical progress and technology, as neutral and deideologized components of society, will create a homogeneous space for contemporary civilization within which opposite world outlooks and mental and behavioral standards will dissolve. In general, this will be a world with a technical dimension.

This, however, is insufficient. We must build a world in terms of a human dimension in order to eliminate the faults of the past. The decisive theoretical concept here, it seems to me, is a philosophical anthropology which is based on certain inalienable human rights.

The last concept itself is unusual in terms of the paradigms of our way of thinking. The question is frequently asked: What does inalienable human rights mean; in what kind of society could such rights exist? Let us think. Here is an example: our country joined the Vienna Accords, signed international documents and committed itself to making its internal legislation consistent with them. Consequently, this already provides something common, something developed by world history and acting as an imperative, reflecting the inevitability of a certain sum of human rights. In other words, we find here not only a sociological concept of man as a sum of social relations but an anthropological one in the fore-shortening of which we can determine the pertinence of the state and social institutions in terms of contemporary man or the need to replace them.

It is precisely this unity of the world in its human dimension that must be taken into consideration in the course of our practical activities. When the production process is taking place for its own sake and the policy of the state is pursued here again for its own sake there is indeed a lack of human dimension in both. Therefore, our entire perestroika is nothing other than a search for

a new dimension in economics, politics, culture and society as a whole in order to become part of the global civilized community.

**H. Vada:** In my view, today in the course of perestroika in the USSR, we are not engaged in seeking a fictitious updating of the old but a real reformation of social life and a comprehensive reunification with the contemporary world, for the values to which you are aspiring today—autonomy of the individual, a civil society, a parliamentary state, the separation of powers and many others—are the elements of a Western civilization of most modern times, as well as of global civilization. It is on this basis that one can and must restructure above all the economy in order to make it autonomous and viable.

However, simple Westernization and comprehensive Europeanization and repetition of the path covered by the West are, in my view, insufficient and, actually, also impossible in terms of today's Russia, perhaps simply because an equivocal attitude toward the West has always been a characteristic feature in its history. While being its teacher, the West was also its opponent. Therefore, having experienced several real revolutions from above with outside influences, Russia took its own way of combining Westernization with anti-Westernization.

Let me remind you of a few historical facts. In the reforms carried out by Peter the Great, the European modernization of state and society was based on strengthening the serfdom law in its typically Russian variant. In the reforms of Aleksandr II the liberalizing of society was accompanied by tying the peasants to the land through the institution of the Russian community. Finally, the country's industrialization, as the Stalinist revolution from above, was carried out with the help of an authoritarian and essentially anti-European system of state socialism.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the West has already reached its postindustrial development stage. The ecological limit of economic growth has been reached. Is it necessary to repeat the past? Hardly. In this respect, the dialogue between contemporary Westerners and sensible Neo-Slavophiles in defining the guidelines of Russia's progress is not only useful but also necessary. It is regrettable that because of anti-Semitic trends shown by some Neo-Slavophiles this dialogue finds itself in a pitiful state. Yet it is a dialogue which is essentially an irreplaceable instrument for determining the guidelines which one should aspire to adopt under the conditions of the further democratization of society, without losing its multinational features.

A blind duplication is impossible also because Russia means both West and East. Russia means Eurasia. Thus, even V.I. Lenin, the founder of your Soviet state, as an individual and by virtue of his origins was, in my view, the symbol of Eurasian Russia.

This feature of the country was seen and realized by many Russian historians, politicians and cultural personalities. For example, the noted historian Mikhail

Gefer pointed out Russia's twin nature, claiming that it was a world of worlds. Here the Christian Slavs live side-by-side with and adapt to the Islamic Turks. Russia is Eurasia House. Obviously, it is no accident that A.D. Sakharov, who acutely felt the need for the perestroika of this house, suggested that it become a voluntary union among sovereign republics of Europe and Asia.

The model of the European Economic Community would be hardly suitable to a Eurasian home. That presumes a homogeneousness of society, cultures, religions, living standards and high level of development of an interdependent coexistence. Nor could the United States be chosen for purposes of analogy, for that too is a different world where a variety of immigrants from different national origins but equal in their basic status, coming from other countries, have gathered under the same roof. The same applies to Japan as well. Contemporary Japan is not a simple formation. Here a characteristic combination of Western with Oriental culture is successfully taking place within an ethnically homogeneous society within the limits of an island country, and an island mentality which, unquestionably, contributed to social stability and to fast economic progress. Furthermore, it even strengthened homogeneity, which hinders the communication between the Japanese and people of other nationalities such as, for example, the Koreans who live in the country. The Japanese are excessively nationalistic and it is no accident that internationalization has become today's slogan.

Unlike all such models, Russia is made of heterogeneous ethnic groups, covering a wide range of aspects of life; it is an alliance of people who live not only in their own age-old national territories but also on the lands of other numerous ethnic groups, a land which has become their homeland. As a world of worlds it is closer to the entire world in this sense as well, as the house of mankind. It is only the old principle which integrated various nationalities within the empire that has lost its power and that a new one, humane and democratic, must be asserted. Finally, if the present painful search for peaceful coexistence and rich mutual aid among the different ethnic groups ends on a positive note and brings stability to this part of the globe, all mankind would benefit. The new Eurasia House will be Russia's beneficial gift to world history.

**V.G. Khoros:** I like the idea of Eurasia House. How to build it in reality? The path is not simple, but requires surmounting many obstacles. One of them, a rather serious one, is the traditional social modernizing of Russian society within the Procrustean Bed of the imperial model. It appeared spontaneously in the reign of Peter the Great and has been used for the past 300 years.

What are its basic features? The first is the selective borrowing of achievements of Western civilization, above all in the military area, in the area of military technology and equipment, and concentrating efforts in that direction while exporting raw materials and raw material resources. The second is the intensification of

precapitalist forms of exploitation. Even after it introduced contemporary technological methods which make it possible, for example, successfully to develop the production of missiles, the country did not abandon prebourgeois traditional ways and means of exploitation of man. The third is the steadily growing centralization of management, the bureaucratization of all structures and institutions in life. All of these features were present during all stages in societal developments for the past 300 years. Therefore, the main thing now is to abandon the existing model for it is strangling society and preventing the development of the vital energy of Russians, Ukrainians or members of any other nationality.

As to national revival, I support the idea that no development of contacts with global civilization should be imitative. Here the sole base must be reliance on one's own culture. The advantage of society is not that it is a clean slate, that it can begin from scratch. The experience from the involvement of different nations with the global community has indicated that the more developed prebourgeois culture is, the more organic are the mastery of the elements of Western culture and the values of global civilization. This is exemplified by Japan and South Korea and, in general, the entire Far East.

Take Russia. Until 1917, on the cultural level it was not ready for modernization. But what about Pushkin, Tolstoy and others? Yes, there had been brilliant minds belonging to mankind, people of highly developed culture. However, this was the elite, several thousand people in a multimillion state, an intelligentsia alienated from the people, which sought the way to the people and was unable to find it and which unsuccessfully tried to surmount cultural and social barriers. After 1917 matters became even worse. We destroyed even that culture. Consequently, the task for us is not simply to rebuild the home on its old foundations but to recreate it, to lay a new foundation for culture as a foundation for a progressive social development.

In our days a major historical cycle in Russia's life is ending. Aleksey Salmin, the political expert, compared in terms of its significance the present time with the situation which prevailed when Russia adopted Christianity, when a choice had to be made: East or West. Naturally, we shall not have a change in religious paradigms today. Now that we are nearing the end of the 300th-year cycle of Russian statehood, we must determine what will Russia be and, as far as I am concerned, unquestionably even from the geographic viewpoint. We are faced with a new cultural trial. If we soberly assess the future, there are two choices: that of the cultural, the national breakdown or some kind of new cultural synthesis, and perhaps Toynbee was right when he spoke of the existence of a Russian-Siberian civilization which is as yet to blossom. We would be pleased if such were to be the case.

**A.A. Iskenderov:** I support the civilizing idea in looking at the history of society. I believe, however, that we should not abandon the formative approach for, it is

alleged, it can yield nothing positive. I am confident that it will retain its methodological role and, with it, it would be both possible and necessary to make use of the civilizing principle in historical analysis. Yes, we acknowledged the concept of "civilization." The fact that in our science no proper attention was paid to it and that Western philosophers and historians, who preached exclusively this concept, were accused of a one-sided vision of the historical path of mankind, is a different matter. We must change a great deal in our own assessments, in our concepts concerning the development of mankind.

The approach which combines two principles, two ideas, is fruitful. In particular, this is because at some crucial times the concept of civilization is broader than the socioeconomic system and makes it possible to identify the common ties in the development of mankind and to describe them more accurately. The civilization principle is convenient in explaining the processes of the birth and establishment, reciprocal influence and interpenetration among different cultures and popular ideas within the framework of a specific formative period of society and leads to interpreting universal human values. However, the concept of formation opens the opportunity to study the latter from the social viewpoint, for it would be erroneous for the main slant in the interpretation of universal human values to be separated from the moral foundations of the individual. We must define the structure of society and the social qualities of man. We would thus better understand why scientific and technical progress is so greatly outstripping social progress and why the development of technology frequently clashes with universal human values and with a humanistic attitude toward nature.

I believe that it would make sense to use the two approaches also in the study of national problems. Are we not fettered in our understanding of the national features, linking them to a specific system—capitalism? I recall numerous discussions on the topic of defining what is a nation and what are its system-forming features. Nonetheless, I do not understand: Were the Russian people not similar to us in terms of their various features in the 16th and 17th centuries, when capitalism did not exist as yet and when they did not conceive of themselves as Russians, as a specific entity? In order to achieve national unification should they have to mandatorily wait for the middle of the 19th century, when Russia took the path of capitalism? Was it only then that the national idea appeared, which made it possible to oppose the external world and apply pressure on neighboring countries? Could it be, nonetheless, that by adopting a somewhat broader view we could approach such things from the positions of the principle of civilization? Perhaps it is precisely here that we acquire the possibility of understanding more thoroughly the correlation between universal human and national traditions and values and their sources and the time of their appearance, i.e., the possibility of identifying the more

profound and more ancient roots of national self-knowledge and self-expression? Would this not enable us to understand better contemporary interethnic processes?

### The Future Lies in a European Home

**E.A. Arab-Ogly:** In my view, Professor H. Vada suggests absolutely accurately that we not suppress Russia's national, cultural and religious heterogeneity, which determines not only the distinguishing features (including the Asiatic ones) in the shaping and development of Russian society but also the characteristic nature of its ties with the world and involvement with the humanistic values of contemporary civilization, within which East and West are combined. I believe, however, that nonetheless Russia is trying to build not a separate Eurasian home but to become part of a European civilized community. Today its future lies in the creation of a European home in which it should assume its proper place. This is not a slogan governed by political circumstances, issued by a Soviet president, the purpose of which is to reassure the population of Europe on the eve of the Second Helsinki Conference. It is a choice affecting the destiny of Russia, based on the entire historical experience of its existence.

Perhaps, in a certain sense, in the case of some of our republics such a guideline may appear not entirely clear. However, they should pay attention perhaps to the fact that Turkey as well, where the number of Muslims is greater than in our country, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, is also aspiring to join the European home. Russia does not pit the European home against the Islamic Conference. It is simply a form of sharing universal human values.

At the same time we must take into consideration that in addition to the age-old and the new 70-year confrontation between East and West, which we are now surmounting, the danger has arisen of a growing division of the world into North and South. Mankind is worried about the possible erection of a new human "Berlin" wall separating nations, fraught with the aggravation of global contradictions. For that reason we must not pit one home against the other. Let there be many beautiful homes on the same "human" street, not separated by fences of hostility. The people will pleasurably spend their time on the peace-loving boulevard, admiring various styles of buildings making a unified architectural ensemble. In this sense as well the idea of a European home does not conflict with the idea shared by the rest of mankind.

Naturally, in creating something new we encounter a variety of difficult problems. Our search is within the context of the historical radical changes which occurred in Europe: the unification of Germany, and the now-familiar changes in the societies of Central Europe, from Poland to Yugoslavia, the process of perestroika in the USSR in which, in particular, the movement for self-determination of republics triggered the aspiration of the



Baltic area to become part of the European home separately. Would it benefit the rest of us by "demanding a separate apartment?" Would it not be better to solve the problem jointly?

A European home does not presume having countries enjoying a special status or second-rate nations, countries which should pay a special entrance fee because of their past. All of its members must be equal. This must be a home equally precious to all. Therefore, we must not complicate the processes of renovation in the Eastern European countries with any kind of demands for redeeming their guilt to, shall we say, the Russians or the Germans, or to the West. Helsinki-2 must not become a new Versailles Peace Treaty with victorious and defeated countries.

Naturally, if we wish to enter a European home we must create a certain economic, legal and cultural space consistent with the idea of a general democratic unification. In this connection, it seems to me that unless we resolve, unless we give the right to life to private ownership in our country, we shall lose not simply the possibility of creating a contemporary state. We shall fail to create the conditions and prerequisites for the establishment of new yet globally accepted economic, political, legal and cultural-moral relations on the basis of which the European countries are structuring their cooperation. Despite the very favorable disposition of the West toward us, the process of entering the European environment would be slowed down and perhaps may prove impossible altogether.

**A.A. Iskenderov:** The idea of a "common roof" for all European nations is, in itself, splendid, for it is the idea of strengthening the peace and organizing a new cooperation which would take into consideration changes in the balance of interests and the balance of forces. We, however, are people of extremes and frequently forget the realities of our present. We have already described this idea as having become accepted, failing to see that, for the time being, it is only a general idea. There is not even a "zero cycle" for this single home. We are unfamiliar with its possible bearing structures, outlines and completion deadlines. Yet we are already promoting the fast organization of a unified area.

We like the idea and we are dedicated to it to the bottom of our souls. We are willing to review everything in our own home in accordance with the ideal design. Could we be confident that others are equally loyal to it and is there not in this case a circumstantial approach taken by our future fellow tenants? Is there a real movement toward one another or is it that one of the sides is following a parallel but independent course? To what extent is it possible to achieve a rapprochement and will our presumed partners walk their own distance of the way or will everything take place at the expense of our one-sided concessions? It is precisely that which should concern us if we wish to become truly equal tenants.

By looking at our internal development through the lens of the external surroundings we are committing a gross methodological error. The establishment and the progress of any people, of any nation, of any country, begin with the resolution of their internal problems with their own forces. No external factors, however favorable they may be, will ever replace the need to identify the internal factors. No foreign policy can resolve any one of our domestic problems. History has already taught this lesson to the highly developed countries. Our society is clearly short of such an understanding.

The trouble is that in aspiring toward renovation, we frequently reject the positive past. The opinion exists that if we introduce private property everything will be in order in our country and we shall immediately reach the level of the highly industrialized countries. I do not believe this. For whose sake would this be? For the worker? Who in our country can, who can really work on the basis of a contemporary capitalist private ownership? No one! On the level of a craft yes, on the level of people's artisan industries, yes; on the level of, let us say, contemporary Japanese production, no. Therefore, shall we start, as in the Middle Ages, with developing the production forces of society to the level of contemporary requirements? Hardly. In resolving socioeconomic problems we must comprehensively take present-day realities into consideration.

One of them is the following: the common home can be described also as a materially prosperous family. Are all its members identical, equal in everything and in all circumstances, taking into consideration the fact that they can be men or women, with younger and elder brothers and sisters, with sick and healthy members, and so on? Therefore, we shall be equals in the European family only after we become economically strong. I believe that if we were to take the path of private ownership we shall not gain this necessary strength soon. In other words, let me reemphasize that our presence in the European home does not, in itself, guarantee the solution of our domestic problems.

In this sense, let us go back to the problem of East and West. Today there may be an intensification of the trend toward so-called "Eurocentricism." In that case we must adopt a considerate approach. What does this mean?

If the world would rotate exclusively around the European axis it would lose a great deal. It would not accomplish all that which man and the human community are capable of accomplishing, for this "axis" is limited both in terms of time and space. However shocking this may sound to the Europeans, the idea of Eurocentrism is both historically and socially limited, for there exists global problems and global interests, there is a global way of thinking and, in the final account, there are universal human values. If the human mind once again stops at purely European affairs and objectives we would paralyze its development. That is why, while expressing our support of the idea of our European home, we must realize that this is only one of the forms,

one of the stages in the movement toward some kind of general, universal human ideas.

It is at this point, as we look at the West, we must ask ourselves the following: What would be the correlation between the European and the socialist idea if we were to remain supporters of the socialist choice, of the ideas of socialism? What should we abandon and what should we retain in safeguarding our right to have our own vision of the world, society and man, reflecting the expectations of the toiling masses?

**B.I. Oleynik:** Naturally, in resolving the problem of organizing and intensifying cooperation with the West, we must not export, along with goods, our own souls and equate, for instance, petroleum with ideology and with our attitude and the ideals and principles we profess. They are not object of commerce. We cannot exchange them for wheat and sausages. To a certain extent, however, we have already fell into a psychological dependence, losing our spiritual balance and inner dignity and, as a consequence, our respectability.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to realize that in the reciprocally acceptable entry of the USSR in the European home it is not only we but also the sensible forces in the West who are interested. However, there is a fear in the West: Would our country export to Europe its own internal instability and imbalance in the way people of different nationalities understand their own common interests which frequently turn into an open clash, and thus destroy the "European tower?" The West fears our internal difficulties more than we do. It has not become accustomed to us. How many experiments have there been in the country in which, in the space of a single hour, we rejected our own past? How easily we destroy that which we have create with our own hands. That is why the country must enter the new home only as a stable entity, in a state of spiritual and emotional harmony.

Let us consider the problem of the structure of the USSR. A certain order must be introduced here. We must formulate corresponding laws which will ensure the total sovereignty of the republics. On the basis of what principle: a federation or a confederation? I believe that it must be based on the federative idea, which ensures the long and firm alliance among nations, for a confederacy is a collective phenomenon: people join forces to carry out an important but not a permanent project; they have agreed to follow temporary rules of required cohabitation and, once the project is completed, they disperse without concern for one another. This is an action by individuals unrelated by a common past and caring little about their own future.

However, there must be a true federation of sovereign republics, for now they are equal in their autonomy and, in the best of cases, in territorial size. We need a new Union treaty signed not by individual self-contained republics, defending their own exclusive interests, but by

all the peoples inhabiting them, for today many autonomous formations would like above all to dispense with the guardianship of some Union republic. Furthermore, such a treaty must take into consideration the interests of the people who live outside their national formations.

Frequently far-fetched debates break out on the matter of delegating rights to the center and redistributing rights and obligations among republics and autonomous areas. Dangerous people have appeared whom I would describe as national careerists. They exploit the national idea and try to satisfy their own groundless demands for assuming some kind of place in the history of the nation. Speculating on the vaingloriousness of people who do not realize their truly national interests, they simply try to score points in the struggle for influencing the masses, corrupting them, dividing society and thus leading it to the catastrophic brink of interethnic explosion. Naturally, a country in such a state cannot enter the European home.

**S.A. Baruzdin:** The question which was raised in the course of our discussion on the correlation between the idea of the European home and the socialist idea is perhaps basic to determining the future destiny of Russia. In this connection we cannot ignore our more than 700-year-old modern history.

October 1917.... Whatever our feelings may be toward it, one cannot deny that it had a tremendous impact on global developments. Some were inspired by the idea of the Russian Revolution while others were frightened. In the final account, it is we who are to blame by distorting, through our practices, the noble objectives of socialism. The Europeans feared that by following the logic of the inevitability of the new social system and relying on the export of the revolution we would impose upon them our own negative experience. Paradoxically, despite all the difficulties of our movement, the capitalist world learned a great deal from us, and even, strange though it might seem, in the area of solving social problems and asserting the rights of the toiling man.

World War II.... In the eyes of the world public opinion, Russia rose to unparalleled heights. The Europeans saw that the embodiment of the Russian idea brings good and the liberation of the peoples. The victory over fascism would have been impossible without the self-sacrifice, tolerance, endurance and courage of this internationalist nation. However, once again the then actual export of revolution to the Eastern European and some Asian countries erected a barrier of alienation between Russia and the West.

April 1985.... It is gratifying that, finally, we began to look at the world realistically, that we changed our attitude toward the capitalist countries and, in our foreign and domestic policies, moved toward universal human ideals and values. The idea of the European home was born in Moscow. The world was offered the new thinking.

However, in my view, at this point we immediately threw ourselves into the other extreme: into the enthusiastic and voluptuous praise of almost anything Western. Dull-witted political journalists in the mass information media, which are exerting the most powerful influence on the people's awareness, undertook to ingratiate themselves with even our former compatriots who had had an aggressive hostility toward the country which had chosen a path of development which did not suit them. Frequently such people likely describe our history and life in exclusively dark colors, ascribing to the Russian people primarily negative features. Is this the path to the European home? No, and again no! This, in particular, is being written and spoken even by major writers of the Russian Diaspora, such as Arkadiy Lvov, Vladimir Maksimov and other cultural personalities, who left the homeland not on their own free will.

Alas, many among us turned out spiritually and morally unprepared for the radical changes of the initiated renovation of society. This included a mental inertia, lack of basic practicality, Manilovite phrase-mongering, laziness, manifested in distancing ourselves from specific participation in determining the destinies of the country, and simply lack of standards—faults which had been mentioned by the cleverest people of Russia as early as the 19th century. We must decisively eliminate such faults, so that changes for the better become irreversible and so that we can appear in the eyes of the world in our true national colors.

**V.G. Khoros:** We are entering the European home, as we are the Asian and the global homes, as unequal partners from a lagging country. We must not nurture the hope that we shall quickly join the European community. Without substantial Western aid we shall find it difficult to come out of the ditch in which we fell by alienating ourselves from the world in decades past. In particular, I am referring to a wide exchange of students and teachers, training abroad engineering and technical cadres and managers, and the training of highly skilled workers at enterprises of leading companies throughout the world, joint production of a variety of items, use of Western technologies, etc. The fact that such aid should not be a gift to a poor relative and create a feeling and mentality of dependency is a different matter. All of this can be achieved only on a mutually profitable basis.

**A.S. Panarin:** The problem under consideration is not reduced to the dilemma of Russia's capitulation or no capitulation to the West. The secret is, specifically, that the idea of a European home is not purely one of foreign policy. It is also a profoundly domestic idea, an idea of perestroika. It would be mistaken to formulate the problem as follows: we shall first renovate ourselves and then assume a proper place in Europe. No, we shall never restructure ourselves that way. The processes must develop on a parallel basis; furthermore, the unification of Germany is becoming part of the European context.

The analogy in the destinies of the two nations in 20th century Europe—Germany and Russia—is striking.

They separated themselves from the European community almost at the same time, in the search of a separate way of development. They similarly experienced the horrors of totalitarianism. In order to get itself out of it, Germany had to experience a crushing defeat in the war and a collapse of its economy before it could take the path of democracy. Russia had to experience a crushing economic defeat before starting the process of converting to a civil society and a law-governed state. To both countries the process of reunification with European civilization meant and means not the pragmatic borrowing of equipment and technology but, above all, the establishment of a democratic society and the organization of a comprehensive cultural dialogue with other nations and, above all, the true spiritual renovation of man.

**E.A. Arab-Ogly:** In concluding this discussion, let me point out that many of the problems raised here have been little studied because of their complexity, despite the fact that they have been topics of close attention for many decades. Naturally, we shall part with an understanding that any definitive conclusions would be premature. We have merely touched upon a problem and opened the way to its further discussion.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

#### **Perestroika as Revolution; Past Experience and Attempt at Forecasting**

915B0002C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 32-41

[Article by Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya, candidates of economic sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics]

[Text] Forecasts are unrewarding, particularly in social life and, even more so, in such an uncertain and unpredictable times as ours, when concern and worry about the future are imbuing the entire society, from top to bottom. The situation is becoming tense. The proceedings of the steady string of congresses, sessions and conferences held by high governmental and party authorities reflect the steady worsening of contradictions and instability. Is there, nonetheless, some pattern to all this? Are any whatsoever substantiated projections possible? In answering these questions, let us risk to make the following claim: our development has a quite clearly traceable internal logic determined by the fact that our present period is a revolutionary one.

Naturally, such a formulation of the problem leads us to the study of historical experience, for a view of the past, free from emotional evaluations, enables us to see, in the present as well, what is hiding behind the struggle among so many platforms, slogans and temperaments. Two great revolutions—the French of the end of the 18th century and the Russian at the start of the 20th—provide rich data for the interpretation of this problem. The choice is understandable: it is precisely they that give us



models of revolutionary processes which developed to their own logical end and did not suffer any defeat at intermediary stages. It was precisely France and Russia which experienced revolutionary upheavals in their pure aspect, so to say, not complicated by a struggle for independence or other national-cultural factors. Essentially, these same patterns were manifested in other revolutions as well, although with greater modifications.

We are aware of the entire conventionality of historical analogies and it is not definitely not this method that we have chosen as the basis of our analysis. History is merely providing us with examples which conform the reality of the patterns which stem from the overall logic of the struggle waged by the social forces in any society. As to conclusions drawn in the nature of a forecast, let us immediately note the essential difference between them and weather forecasts. In this case it is a question not of the probability of the advent of any given event but of alternatives which appear in the development of *perestroika* processes.

To this day the question of the revolutionary nature of the changes which were initiated in 1985 remains debatable. In answering it, we must take into consideration two different circumstances: first, the revolution is not a short splash of popular activity; it is not a single explosion and an act of power grab. It is a lengthy and complex period of radical reorganization of social relations. Thus, the French Revolution took the entire last decade of the 18th century, while the revolutionary process in Russia, which was initiated in February 1917, ended only by the turn of the 1930s. This is not a question of semantics. It is only through the study of the revolution as an epoch that one can not simply describe a disorderly change of events but also single out the inner logic of development of the situation and define the laws according to which it changed.

Second, the currently developing process of renovation began as a "revolution from above." This, however, does not mean that in terms of its essential features it should be basically distinct from any other revolution although, unquestionably, the fact that the masses become involved in active political efforts later introduces certain modifications. The status of the political leaders in the revolutionary process proves to be conflicting. They become characteristic symbols reflecting (in a concealed form) interests which clash or interact within society and the correlation among social forces which develops at a given moment.

This does not mean that the ordinary mind accurately perceives the conflicts among political leaders as reasons for the contradictions within objective reality. Under the circumstances of a "revolution from above" as well the fundamental principle applies: a revolution is a real correlation among social forces. Therefore, in itself the fact that one political leader or another leaves the higher echelon does not eliminate the real contradictions. A change in the actual role of "conservatives" and "radicals" at the higher levels of authority is possible only

when the correlation of forces within the society has changed in favor of the former or the latter.

Nonetheless, we see as the main proof of the revolutionary nature of the present the fact that the development of events follows the same stages and takes place in accordance with that same inner logic which has been characteristic of most revolutions known to history and can be particularly clearly traced in the example of France at the end of the 18th and Russia at the start of the 20th century. In both cases the revolution experiences four basic stages in its development.

The first is characterized by a broad unification of heterogeneous social forces in the struggle against old obsolete relations. On the surface, there is a sharp social conflict, characterized by a high intensity of passions and with a priority assumed by destructive over constructive tasks. At the same time, by virtue of the widespread dissemination of concepts concerning the impossibility of retaining the old order and its obsolescence and instability and also as a result of the demoralization of the defenders of the existing system, the illusion of national consensus and of the ease and absence of conflict in the conversion to a new condition appear. Those who initiate a movement for radical reforms usually have no idea how far the process may go. It seemed to them that, having broken with the most obvious and clear but by no means fundamental attributes of the old system, they could come out of it and leap to the bright future. Subsequently, this illusion remains and influences the interpretation of existing processes even when the objective foundation for its existence has already been destroyed.

However, life goes on. The second stage of the revolution begins: the stage of differentiation and gradual polarization of social forces consistent with the positive programs which reflect their objective interests. The prospect of the aggravation of contradictions within the only recently united opponents of the old order is manifested with increasing clarity, and the outline of new changes becomes apparent. At the same time, the frank defenders of the past, demoralized and dispersed at the beginning of the revolutionary cataclysms, begin to rally. Occasionally they are supported by the more moderate proponents of change, who believe that the revolution has already accomplished its purpose.

Gradually a confrontation between two basic trends in the development of the revolution becomes clear behind the facade of complex and painful processes of separation among the former allies and the unification of recent opponents. This process could assume a variety of forms: a gradual radicalizing of society, when at each new stage there is a division within the previously united ranks of supporters of progressive changes, and the ever-growing strengthening of progressive and conservative flanks which pressure the center from both sides and which essentially define its policies. A situation of actual twin power develops, in which neither of the basic social forces is able systematically to implement its will. The

conflict between these forces and the constantly changing balance between them make the situation during that period extremely unstable.

The development of the second stage indicates that it is precisely the struggle for power that becomes the main feature of the confrontation. The question of power which, one might have believed, had been resolved during the first stage, reappears on the agenda in a much sharper aspect. At the same time, as the political situation worsens, economic difficulties increase. The threat of economic catastrophe becomes a decisive factor (or even a catalyst) in the further development of the revolution.

The aggravation of the entire set of socioeconomic and sociopolitical contradictions, as a result of this stage, leads to a deep crisis in the development of the revolution. An open clash between opposite forces occurs in one form or another. The "center," which until recently seemed a reliable buffer between the political opposites and a guarantor of the gradual implementation of changes, breaks down visibly and disappears from the political arena under the influence of polarization processes and because of its own helplessness. A critical moment appears in the development of the revolution, when it is still possible to turn it back, to restore the old order and to the rule of the forces against which the popular movement rose. A sharp turn to "the right" or "the left" takes place, along with a conversion to the harsh implementation of a consistent and decisive policy, whether progressive or conservative.

It is obvious that our development has now reached precisely such a point. The "rose-tinted period" of perestroika (the first 2, 2.5 years) is behind us and is currently bringing back very conflicting memories. On the one hand, there is an amazing social atmosphere: a general upsurge, expectation of fast change, and enthusiastic adoption of any, even most hesitant steps toward glasnost and openness. On the other, there are clashes related to concepts of the possibility of solving all problems "frontally," through clear and "simplest possible" methods, such as the anti-alcohol campaign, the struggle against unearned income, and slogans calling for acceleration. Both directly stem from the characteristics of the first stage in the development of the revolution.

Also behind us are the initial steps of demarcation, when the CPSU Central Committee appeal to the Soviet people in connection with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution claimed that "the Central Committee appeals to the courage of the Soviet people. The breakdown of ossified forms, methods and customs is not easily accomplished. One must struggle for perestroika and perestroika must be defended." This is followed by "dear comrades! Our entire society must be on the same side of the barricade." However, the time when we were "on the same side of the barricade" quickly went into the past. Polarization processes increased very rapidly. Positions were defined and the need for making a choice became obvious.

Inevitably, the demarcation was bound to lead to the aggravation of social conflicts. Appearing initially (starting with December 1986) in national and religious forms, they gradually assume an increasingly clear sociopolitical coloring. Qualitative changes in the nature of the revolution take place. From a "revolution from above" it becomes a broad popular movement. The growth of the national self-awareness leads to the establishment of mass political organizations in the Union republics. Gradually, organizations are founded as the direct reflection of the economic and political interests of the different social forces. A division within the party occurs as well, including among the rank-and-file party members. Such processes, which took place in 1988-1989, made it increasingly clear that now it was no longer the political leadership that had "instilled" perestroika in the masses, but that its very pace, direction, breakthroughs forward and retreats in the course of the process of reorganization and the strength of the positions of the various political leaders are determined by the overall social situation in the country. The worsening of the economic situation and the inability of the authorities to cope with the intensification of crises phenomena begin to play an increasingly important role in the progress of the revolution. This encourages the fast conversion in the development of conflicts from local economic to political demands, while the economic demands themselves become politicized.

Whereas initially the eroded social structure and the lack of adequate means of expressing the interests of the various strata and groups did not allow political processes to adopt corresponding institutionalized forms, the completion of the second stage is characterized by the shaping of political forces which openly proclaim the struggle for power as their objective. The until recently weak and dispersed organizations, fronts and movements, with a wide range of programs, begin to rally within quite powerful coalitions, drawing to them some members of the CPSU, the Komsomol, the trade unions, and so on, and exerting an increasingly strong influence on social life.

Active processes of unification of radicals and conservatives take place within the party and society. The role of these two wings gradually increases.

Polarization leads to the gradual erosion of the social base of the centrist compromise line. The course of pacifying opposing forces becomes increasingly unrealistic. Despite the entire external logic, essentially no one is satisfied with moderate and gradual change. Consolidation is taking place, not around the central line but around the political opposites. Indicative in this respect is the difference between the superior legislative authorities of the USSR, which were established in the middle of the second stage of the revolution, and the RSFSR, which reflected the characteristic features of its completion. It is not exclusively a matter of the type of parliamentary phenomena, such as the shaping of factions, guaranteeing minority rights, and options which, in the first case, had to be fought for, while in the second they

were already accepted as self-evident. What is striking is the specific nature of the deployment of forces within the Union and the Russian higher authorities. Actually, at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies there was no "center" to play such an essential role among Union legislators. On basic problems the votes are almost evenly divided between the extreme positions, with insignificant advantages benefiting one side or the other.

Yet another feature of the fact that the second stage of the revolution is nearing completion is the relevance of the problem of a strong authority. Fear of extremes in the revolutionary process and of the establishment of an antiperestroyka dictatorship increases. At the same time, suggestions are made to introduce authoritarian rule for the sake of the salvation of perestroyka. The conversion to a presidential system of government is an entirely logical step under such circumstances. Shall we be able to avoid extremism in the further development of perestroyka? We would like to hope so, although historical experience in this case is not very encouraging.

We shall not look at the example of revolutions which, at that stage, were defeated. It is obvious that in our case such an alternative would be the equivalent of a national catastrophe. If the revolutionary process continues to develop, it will mark the beginning of the most acute, harshest and most dramatic of its stages. In France, it was the Jacobin dictatorship; in Russia it was the coming to power of the bolsheviks. In both cases a strong authority replaced democracy.

It is precisely this stage in the revolution that is usually implied when there is talk of the destructive consequences of revolutionary upheavals and the pernicious role which revolutions play in society. Indeed, during that period the old economic, political and ideological systems are definitively destroyed, so that their restoration in their former aspect becomes practically impossible.

However, at this point it is the most profound contradiction of the third period of the revolution that emerges on the surface: the clash between the tasks of destroying and building. The point is that the revolutionary explosion, the main in which the people's masses always play the main role, should clear the grounds for the new owner, who can ensure the further progress of production and assume responsibility for it. The interests of this social stratum, which gradually takes shape, inevitably clash with the moods of the broad masses as well as the utopian slogans of their leaders. A conflict breaks out between the motive forces of the revolution and its "trend setter."

We are not claiming that the contemporary development of events will precisely duplicate the experience of previous revolutions, for perestroyka, nonetheless, remains a specific process, a reform revolution. What is particularly important, however, is that already now the foundations are being laid for the success or failure of perestroyka as an integral revolutionary process. In the

final account, everything depends on the resolution (less legislative than factual) of the question of ownership. Whatever upheavals we may have to experience, sooner or later this problem will prove to be crucial.

In seeking confirmation of this view let us once again turn to history. It is precisely the French and Russian examples that show the different alternatives in the completion of the revolutionary process, based on the solution given to the problem of ownership. They have been described as "Thermidor" and "the great change."

On the surface, both appear like a defeat of the revolution or its retreat. Furthermore, many were those who tended to consider the assertion of Stalinism as a Thermidor-style coup. Essentially, however, these were diametrically opposite events.

The French Thermidor is an example of resolving the contradiction between the motive forces of the revolution and its "trend setter" (the new owner who expresses the objective targets of said revolution) in favor of the latter. As a result, society proves capable of undertaking the solution of constructive tasks, having gradually eliminated the threat of an economic catastrophe and converting to the revival of the national economy. This marks the beginning of the fourth stage of the revolution, the period of gradual dampening of popular activities and strengthening of the new owner. Although upheavals and cataclysms are still inevitable at this point, they no longer lead to changes in the nature of the power. Now the struggle is waged between socially similar forces. The people's masses become tired and their activeness diminishes. Gradually, the situation is stabilized and the revolutionary age approaches its end.

The "great change" demonstrates the opposite option in the resolution of this contradiction: the "trend setter" of the revolution is swept off by the force which should have only cleared the ground for it. The result is the shaping of new power structures triggered by the direct motive forces. On the surface it may seem that in this case the ideals of the people may be reached most fully, for the motive forces are the people themselves. In reality, something else takes place, for several reasons.

First, whereas the tasks involved in destroying the old social order are realized by the people's masses quite clearly, the outlines of the new society appear quite vague. Interwoven with them is the aspiration toward a total negation of anything which existed previously, based on the principle of "precisely the opposite" (which, let us point out, never results in a new quality but can only change the external manifestations and superficial features of the system) compared to the psychological stereotypes and traditions which prevailed in the preceding period. As a result, instead of a breakthrough, a system develops which is essentially quite similar to the one which the people tried to reject, regardless of the new ideological clothing it may don and the political aspects it may acquire.



Second, even in the age of the French Revolution it had already become clear that a "country governed by owners is considered civilized; if the country is ruled by nonowners it is in a primitive state." In other words, it is precisely the existence of an owner interested in the progress of production forces that ensures social economic and political stability. In the final account, the political power serves the interests of that same owner, for which reason it is incapable of obstructing economic progress over a long period of time.

If the revolution does not lead to the assertion of a true owner, his functions must necessarily be assumed by the political power itself. The system is turned upside-down: it is not the imperative of economic development that determines policy but, conversely, all sorts of economic sacrifices may have to be made for the sake of resolving current political problems. The real owner is replaced by a fictitious one. The growth of economic and political power leads to the shaping of a particular social stratum possessing inordinately broad and virtually unlimited opportunities to define the ways of development of the country as a whole and of any one of its parts. As a result, its activities become absolutely uncontrolled including by the popular masses themselves although it was its most active representatives and spokesman for the interests of those same masses for whose sake this stratum was initially established.

The social system which has come to power as a result of the "great change" is the bureaucracy which forms the party-governmental management structures and holds the monopoly of power. It is not a bureaucracy which, although determining to a certain extent the development of society, is in the final account always subordinate to the interests of the owner. It is a bureaucracy which itself becomes a pitiful semblance of the class-owner, in the sense that it does not have the motivations of the owner, for its interests are not directly related to the development of the object of ownership, which is the national economy, but are limited to its own expanded reproduction, strengthening its position and status and acquiring an increasing amount of economic and social privileges. Therefore, under its domination no conditions are secured for the effective and dynamic development of the economy and, therefore, for enhancing the living standard of the people. Having won formally, the motive forces of the revolution in fact find themselves enslaved by a narrow social stratum with no possibility of improving their economic situation and without any hope of progress and freedom. However, we must bear in mind that the enhancement of this stratum was the result of a long "search for an owner" after October 1917.

When the bolsheviks came to power, their objective was the radical restructuring of the entire nature of social activities and their aspiration to make everyone both a working person and an owner. From the economic viewpoint, the "introduction of socialism" seemed to them to have brought to its logical end the state-monopoly system by developing a national economy as a single factory functioning on the basis of the state

ownership of the means of production while the working people performed ownership functions. The solution of this problem called for nationalizing the basic means of production, coordinating the management of the state economy by a single center and the comprehensive participation of the working people in the administration of local affairs.

In this connection, special hope was put on worker control. Life proved the utopian nature of such plans. The worker control authorities did not assume the status of a subject of social ownership and expressed interests which were local (of a specific enterprise), current and essentially consumer-oriented. Sharp clashes among working people in different enterprises and areas were inevitable. The administrative system, structured "upward" (enterprise factory and plant committee-oblast factory and plant conference-All-Russian Worker Control Council) was incapable of satisfying the public's interests, making possible "only a compromise among group interests, manifested above all in the factory-plant committees."<sup>1</sup>

Nor did it become possible to solve the problem of ownership by creating a single center which would represent the common interests of the proletarian economy and will administer "downward." Instead, a constant struggle was waged within the central apparatus among departments on how to divide the common pie—the already scant resources of the national economy. The rapidly blossoming bureaucratism and steadily declining public production efficiency left no illusions concerning the existence of economic motivation among the working people. The reality of their alienation from the means of production was manifested most clearly of all in granting the country's political leadership the right to apply, on a broad scale, noneconomic coercion to work (labor armies and labor mobilizations) as a normal instrument for the solution of economic problems.

However, a system cannot exist without subjects, the bearers of the motivations of the owner. In that sense, a radical turn was inevitable and it took place in 1921. The conversion to the NEP took place under the blows of widening peasant uprisings and the volleys of the Kronstadt guns, and there was little doubt that had Lenin been slow the authority which had prevailed in the Civil War would have collapsed. Events similar to Thermidor would have taken place. However, it was thanks to the political flexibility of the leader that the Bolshevik Party was able to retain its power and even gradually to strengthen its position.

Essentially, the NEP constituted an essentially different (compared with the "war communism") approach to the ownership problem: the formation of forces which could ensure the solution by the revolution of its constructive problems. The emphasis was on the creation of independent economic subjects in the private and governmental sectors, the coordination of whose interests should have occurred on the market, albeit under governmental control. In Lenin's view, socialist and other economic forms

would have competed with each other and proved their possibilities through their actions. Understandably, under such circumstances the threat of a "quiet" Thermidor appeared—of the economic victory of the private economy which, inevitably, would have resulted in a political victory. Sharp protests were voiced against the "excessively active" application of the principles of the NEP. The suggestion was made of pitting it against a "communist reaction," and the danger of a Thermidorian degeneration was energetically emphasized. The leader of the revolution as well considered the idea: "Thermidor? Soberly speaking, perhaps, yes? Will it? We shall see" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 403).

In practice, the processes of the establishment of the owner experienced significant difficulties. A situation developed in which the political system was forced to rely on an economic system alien to it. Conversely, the bulk of the economic subjects could not stably operate without a political guarantee of their stability. The official line toward the nongovernmental economy constantly fluctuated and the independence of state producers, codified in the Decree on Trusts, remained largely declarative and was being steadily curtailed.

The economic policy toward the peasantry, which was at that time of essential significance, had a negative influence on the positions of the rural owners. Any peasant who moved ahead and was able to increase labor productivity and, on this basis, his own income and accumulations (to purchase fertilizers, equipment, and so on), was automatically classified a kulak with all stemming consequences. Incentives for accumulation were undermined among the prosperous strata, and labor incentives were undermined among the other strata. An active army of lumpen elements was taking shape in the countryside, interested in "black redivisions." The state authorities tried less to resolve the truly grave problem of agrarian overpopulation than to actually encourage the lumpen mentality with slogans claiming that the poor peasant were the support of the Soviet system. Similar processes occurred in the cities as well, where administrative measures were used in an effort to block real competition between the private and the government sectors. Any efficient private enterprise was considered "a threat to socialism," and, therefore, punishable.

This situation could not last. It led to regular crises which were resolved by restricting the market and strengthening governmental interference in the economy. Nor did it allow the shaping of social forces able to oppose total statification. The steady blending of political with economic power inevitably led to the prevalence of a system similar to "war communism" and, at the same time, contributed to the strengthening of the social forces which would support the coup which was being prepared—hired workers, alienated from ownership, and bearers of a lumpen mentality. The routing of the NEP under such circumstances was inevitable and marked the end of the revolutionary process initiated in 1917. A new system of relations was established in the

country, the economic and political structures of which were closely interlinked. In other words, the political system was consistent with the interests of the quasio-owner and the conflict between them was excluded. Society paid a high price for this and, actually, is continuing to pay for it. The profound disproportions in our development, the inability of the economy to accept scientific and technical progress and the underdeveloped nature of economic motivations are essentially the consequences of the "great change," or the lack of the real personality of the owner.

Therefore, if perestroika is to continue as a revolutionary process, it must go through yet another two stages and experience, in the course of it, two critical moments. The first is quite obvious, for we have already seen its acute symptoms. Its nature is entirely clear. What awaits us in the future: a reactionary withdrawal or a painful transition to the market which forms the economic base of democracy? The alternative is clear: society will either accept the hardships of a dynamic development or else a catastrophe awaits us. The time left to make a choice is getting shorter.

However, even assuming that perestroika can gradually surmount this crisis, by no means would all essential problems become resolved. Naturally, it is quite difficult today to project the shapes and modifications under which the "Thermidor"—"great change" will be manifested under our circumstances. The danger exists of mixing the participants in the social confrontation, characteristic of the third and fourth stages of the revolutionary process. Nothing would be simpler than proclaiming organizations such as the United Front of Working People as being the social forces of the "great change." However, this would be wrong: the victory of such movements would mean essentially the restoration of preperestroika administrative-command mechanisms. As to the choice which is facing us in the final and fourth stage, it is more difficult and more exacting and its social forces are still insufficiently differentiated.

Nonetheless, let us try to advance a hypothesis. It is obvious that not only the suggested variants of a transition to the market but also the variants within the market economy itself are by no means identical. Two different approaches are becoming increasingly clear. An aspiration exists to make the market socially just and socially acceptable to the large population masses as much as possible. In that case strict control over income differentiation, which would not allow any legal accumulation of capital in private hands and large private ownership involving the extensive use of hired labor, becomes inevitable. All market mechanisms will adapt to the domination, in one form or another, of a collective ownership supplemented, on the one hand, by the state sector and, on the other, by individual and small private producers. On the surface, such a variant seems to be most consistent with the interests of the working people,

preventing the extraction of unearned income and contributing to the application of self-management principles in production. In our view, however, in the long range the choice of such a way of development would be unproductive.

To begin with, it does not ensure maximally favorable conditions for economic progress, for ideological principles stand on the way to selecting the most efficient, flexible and dynamic economic forms. Therefore, in this case there is an inevitable restriction of market competition and, thereby, incentives for development and for the steady mastery of scientific and technical achievements.

Second, the collective form of ownership itself has most grave internal faults. The most important among them is the orientation, above all, to current, short-term and consumer interests and the lack or drastic decline of internal incentives for accumulation. This has been confirmed by the experience of a number of countries in Eastern Europe and we have no reasons whatsoever to ignore it in our country. Therefore, such subjects of market relations, lacking strategic motivations, should in any case be supplemented by an administrative "super-structure," which would impose upon them alien long-term objectives. However, these objectives will, as in the past, develop not an economic environment but a bureaucratic stratum which could pursue its own policy to the detriment of the objective requirements of progress. Instead of a self-organizing and self-developing economic system, once again we develop a certain intertwining of bureaucratic with market control, unable to ensure a high economic efficiency and dynamism in the development of society.

Another possibility for the shaping of the new system exists as well: not to erect artificial barriers blocking the development of market relations, to consider admissible all forms of ownership and to provide maximal scope for their development. In that case economic efficiency alone would prove the worth or worthlessness of a given form of ownership and the question of the admissibility of any one of them will be solved not in the "corridors of power" but in the course of the competition process. It would be stupid under our circumstances to idealize the consequences of this option, whether economic or social. Obviously, it will lead to a strong social differentiation and, initially, the development of a monopolistic and speculative practice. However, there also exists the real likelihood that, in the future, the subjects of market relations will be established as the bearers of a long-term, a strategic motivation, interested in innovative activities. At that point society will have the opportunity to come out of stagnation and to create prerequisites for fast and dynamic progress.

Will such future benefits be worth the entirely real social cost which will have to be paid by a market economy with such a choice? The answer to this question by the most active part of society will essentially determine our future. For the time being illusions related to collective

ownership and to a conversion to a market without any serious social losses remain exceptionally strong. However, it is time to get rid of them.

#### Footnote

I. I. Stepanov. "Ot Rabocheho Kontrolya k Rabochemu Upravleniyu v Promyshlennosti i Zemledelii" [From Worker Control to Worker Management in Industry and Agriculture]. Moscow, 1918, pp 10-11. "Instead of a 'republic of soviets' in the republic we rely on worker associations.... We consider a practice which reminds us of the dreams of anarchists about autonomous production communes" (ibid., p 11).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

#### The Communist Idea in the Context of Global Civilization

915B0002D Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 42-51

[Article by Vladimir Samchenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, Krasnoyarsk]

[Text] The concepts of socialism and communism have been the focal point of attention of all mankind for no less than 150 years of history. It might seem natural to expect that within that time a certain clarity in their interpretation would be attained, even despite the lack of unity in the assessment of the respective phenomena. However, whereas in the past some may have nurtured illusions concerning such clarity, it was unlikely that they retained them in the crucible of perestroika. Today interpreting the concepts of socialism and communism becomes more difficult than ever.

The definition of concepts is by no means a scholastic exercise but a protection from many errors. This has long been known. In the social sciences, however, we must take into consideration the fact that by no means is everyone dreaming of saving mankind from false concepts. Furthermore, not everyone has a reserve of common sense which will enable him, whatever the situation, sincerely to wish to surmount his own errors or excessive political passions.

Our question also presents objective difficulties, for concepts which indicate the long-term objectives of society are greatly determined by the social conditions which, in comparison with these objectives are strictly limited.

The founders of Marxism emphasized that to them communism "is not a condition which must be established; it is not an ideal which reality must take into consideration," but strictly an "actual movement which eliminates the present condition" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 3, p 34). Reminding us once again that it is "not a doctrine but a movement," Engels wrote: "Communism, in as much as it is a theory, is the



theoretical expression of the position of the proletariat in that struggle (against the bourgeoisie—author) and a theoretical summation of the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat" (op. cit. vol 4, pp 281-282). The authors of this definition could be accused of anything one may think of but not of theoretical doctrinairism. However, they cannot escape the blame for something else, for a class preference for a concept which, in principle, should reflect the long-term development of the entire human society

However, under circumstances in which the objective was still beyond the historical horizon, this was the only possibility of avoiding groundless utopianism while, at the same time, ascribing a certain positive content to the target, for any negative views ("not a condition," "not an ideal," "not a doctrine," "destruction of the present condition," etc.) cannot, by the rule of logic, be considered actual definitions. On the other hand, to speak of a movement without speaking of targets and results, is not dialectics but relativism; it is not the view of Heraclitus but the position held by his luckless student Cratylus. This is the origin of the famous Bernsteinian formula according to which "the movement is everything and the end objective, nothing." This "formula" has never lost its popularity among a rather significant segment of Marxists and today it is experiencing a true revival. All of this proves, yet once again, that "filling" blank spots in the definition of communism with the cement of class solidarity was unable fully to replace the live fabric of the concept.

If we look at the theory of the two stages of the communist system, the essence of the differences was a change in the methods of distribution (initially according to labor and later according to need). This change was directly related to attaining a certain level in the development of production forces, which would guarantee the absolute surplus of supply over demand. However, the acknowledgment of the direct connection between the level of production and the type of society is a characteristic of "technological determinism." Marxism subjects it to basic criticism, acknowledging the key role of the "middle term" of the historical process—changes in relations of ownership of means of production. On the other hand, the dialectical concept of the unlimited development of society presumes that need will always outstrip possibility and will "urge on" production, for remaining on its scientific positions, Marxism should have acknowledged the inaccessibility of absolute abundance and the need of changing, in converting to "total" communism, the form of ownership established under the aegis of the working class in the course of the socialist revolution.

Eventually, given such prerequisites but already within the official ideology of victorious socialism, a positive economic definition of communism was finally provided, something which even Marx had not dared to do. According to this definition, communism is a social system with a single (read, only—author) national ownership of means of production. As was to be expected of

governmental ideology, this formula was nothing but the idealized and absolutized trend within socialism itself, which is traditionally proclaimed precisely as being a system with a primarily social ownership of means of production. In Latin, "socialist" precisely means "social," while "communist" means "common." Despite the great similarity, they are by no means one and the same. "Social" can be only something **abstract-common**. It could apply to the sum total of individuals without applying to each one of them separately. The **specific-common** calls for applying it precisely to all of them together and to everyone individually. In the light of this, a system which has exclusively a social "single national" ownership of means of production is not communism but merely an abstract and frightening "specter of communism."

It is not surprising that the contemporary crisis of socialism struck above all at the traditional concept of communism as the bearer of the socialist ideal in its complete, extreme and abstract form. The concept of socialism, conversely, is still preserved precisely thanks to its "nonideal" nature and compatibility with a retreat from the extreme demands of the doctrine. It has become fashionable to claim that "true" socialism, in general, has not been built as yet. Its defenders proceed not from the historical realities or the economic nature of socialism but from ideas concerning its "shape," which crowds the imagination of the makers of the socialist revolution. Furthermore, subconsciously, since childhood, the belief has been instilled by official propaganda that socialism can mean only all that is good, while that which is not good is no socialism whatsoever.

In order not to engage in futile arguments, let us suggest to the supporters of this "flexible" definition of socialism a temporary compromise: let us consider a system in which everything that can only be good be described as "goodism," while, nonetheless, retaining for the concept of "socialism" its traditional meaning. This would be fully consistent with the etiology of the word and would accurately express the nature of the real socialist society from its appearance to its contemporary crisis.

Essentially, the Marxist communist doctrine of socialism does not imply "goodism" at all but, conversely, a quite imperfect social condition which bears the "birthmarks" of capitalism and which is merely the transition to real communism. Its ideal is communism, which is beyond the limits of socialism as such; that socialism is "true" only to the extent to which it serves this ideal and considers itself a transition to a higher social quality. It is only under such circumstances that it could be considered a form, albeit not as yet perfect, but precisely a form of a communist society. The moment socialism stops in the course of this aspiration and begins to work "for its own sake," it becomes immediately apparent that it is merely nothing but the first negation of capitalism, based

on the laws of dialectics and always officially and actually dependent on what is being negated (see also the article by Z. Mlynarz, *KOMMUNIST* No 5, 1990, pp 103-104).

In terms of such an objective content of socialism, we find precisely such a "coarse," as yet incomplete communism, a "communism... in its first (!—author) form," which is "merely a summation and completion" of private ownership relations and "commonality expressed as universal capitalism;" it is "merely a form of manifestation of the vileness of private ownership which wishes to assert itself as a positive commonality." That is what Marx wrote in 1844 (see op. cit. vol 42, pp 114-116; see also the article on the criteria of social progress in *KOMMUNIST* No 7, 1990, pp 52-53). Indeed, one-sided-social "communal" ownership (whether collective or state, it makes no difference) is nothing but a transformed variety of private ownership in the economic and not the bureaucratic-juridical meaning of the term "private." As such, private ownership presumes the existence of individuals or groups deprived of the ownership of means of production and the consequent right to dispose of their own product. In a society of real socialism this situation tends to reach its logical limit: all or almost all individuals in this case are deprived of production ownership, the right to which is held only by an abstract juridical person, such as the community at large or the state as the "spiritual essence of society" (Marx).

Official ideology conceals the abstract nature of ownership behind the idea of the "belonging" of every working person to this "collective" or "nationwide" ownership. According to it, the "conscious" individuals must consider themselves something like multiple Siamese twins linked by their heads, their hearts and, partially, their stomachs and totally divided only below the belt. Naturally, this presents an impressive picture. However, such "Siamizing" is only the poetry of socialism in the same way that unity in Christ is the poetry of Christianity. Speaking in "scornful prose," such involvement of the worker with public ownership is no less imaginary than the church's partaking of the body of Christ. "If there are many owners of a property who do not know what part they own, no one owns it," is an old truth of Roman law. One cannot say that the claim that the socialist state "is we" was entirely wrong. However, it was right, once again, only to the extent to which the state aspires to the building of a communist future.

This subjective impetus was linked to socialism at the time of its revolutionary assertion and was an entirely real factor in its history. As time went on, however, with the natural slowdown, it increasingly yielded to the economically determined objective imperfections of socialism. This retreat ended during the period of stagnation and it was ideologically confirmed by the official acknowledgment that socialism is a distinct long-term stage in the development of society. In this case the interests of the bureaucracy played their role; to the bureaucracy the stagnation of socialism was equivalent

to the perpetuation of its own social rule. Such an essentially self-seeking bureaucratic distortion of Marxism has still not been eliminated.

However, socialism cannot prove any unquestionable advantage over the bourgeois system other than the advantage of the necessary level of development of mankind. If it is true that monopoly capitalism is a decaying capitalism, this applies, above all, to socialism as an extremely monopolized capitalism. Hence all the "strange and monstrous" features of real socialism. The essence of this monopoly is not found in state monopoly itself and one cannot eliminate it merely by eliminating this monopoly. As Marx noted, it is found in the monopoly of the community, as being the only capitalist here, i.e., in the lack of any individual productive ownership. The state is only the superstructure, which is always secondary. Centralized governmental management of economic, political and spiritual life is merely an adequate form of the manifestation of the communal monopoly, a standard in the life of socialist society. This society consists of people who have been economically "alienated," for which reason they are politically and spiritually dependent and poor. As such, it is incapable of self-management and well-intentioned efforts to introduce democracy within it lead only to the rule of ochlocracy and kaceraty (from the Greek "ochlos"—crowd—and "kacos"—bad) and, in the final account, to anarchy. Anarcho-syndicalist socialism is always an unhealthy, immature or decadent socialism. For the time being, "socialism with a human face" exists only in the imagination, in its (theoretical) depiction but not in reality. In reality, our society, still unable truly to reject the monopoly of the center and the tyranny "from above," has already begun to tyrannize itself "from within," with economic difficulties, bloody internecine fights, and outbreaks of crime and moral decay.

The development of society does not follow the criteria of progress but the laws of dialectics. In other words, it does not follow a straight line but a spiral in which each new loop is preceded by a period of greater or lesser decline. This equally applies to the historical place of socialism in general and to its contemporary condition in particular. The final stage prior to the reaching of the desired truth always seems the least satisfactory. It is precisely this level that directly rejects the higher truth.

Marx himself sincerely hated alienation and perfectly realized that "producers may become free only by owning the means of production." Within that historical situation, however, he was forced to note that "...they can own the means of production (they, the producers—author) in only two forms:

"1. In the individual form which, as a general phenomenon, has never existed and which is being increasingly pushed out by industrial progress;

"2. In the form of collective, material and intellectual elements, which are created by the development of capitalist society itself...."

Hence the conclusion that "socialist workers" must formulate "the end objective of their struggle on the level of an economic return to the collective ownership of all means of production," and the revival of this "archaic" form (op. cit. vol 19, pp 246, 408).

At this point we could direct at Marx the same admonition which he, in his time, addressed at Hegel: the insufficiently consistent following of his own revolutionary method. For dialectics presumes not simply a restoration of archaic forms but, in the final account, the synthesis of the new with the old. This can be approached only on the basis of the law of negating the negation, relations between which in our official ideology have always been tense. The "father of the nations" did not acknowledge it and, under his rule, this law was not even included in philosophy textbooks. Starting with 1923, and to this day we find a distorted translation of Engels' characterization of this law: "Too general," instead of "exceptionally general," as had always been translated until then. In 1986 the translation was somewhat improved: the term "most general" was used. In a separate edition of "*Anti-Duhring*," in 1988, once again we returned to the canonized expression. According to what Engels truly said, it is "extremely general" or "universal ('ein ausserst allgemeines'), and it is precisely for that reason that it is an exceptionally broad and important law governing the development of nature, history and thinking (see Marx and Engels, "*Werke*" [Works], Bd. 20, S. 131).

That same law, which presumes a "spiral" development would enable us to make use of a historical analogy in order better to understand both our own time and the future synthesis. Social thinking has long noted the obvious similarity between socialism and the Asiatic production method. Marx described as "Asiatic" precisely that form of production in which the owner of the basic means of production (in antiquity this applied above all to land) could only be the community but not the individual (see op. cit., vol 46, part I, pp 462-464). The same applies to any "model" of socialism, although it may be interspersed with a different system. Metaphorically speaking, the Asiatic production method means socialism of the agrarian age; in turn, socialism is the Asiatic means of production of the industrial age.

Although the "Asiatic" relations may have remained unchanged for millennia in some countries and areas, as a whole the world did not interrupt its development. According to Marx, the next progressive step is the production method of antiquity. The form of ownership of the land in antiquity was a "synthesis" of communal ownership, serving the solution of common problems and was the property of any citizen, who had full management rights, providing that he belonged to that specific community. It was precisely **all citizens** and not some citizens, as is the case in bourgeois society. Such a harmony between the individual and the public ensured in the epoch of the classical city-state the greatest blossoming of the individual and of citizenship in the entire history of antiquity, which we admire to this day, along

with a cultural and political life of society. Suffice it to mention here Athens of the sixth-fourth centuries B.C. and Rome in the republic period in its history, whose achievements, to this day, are the glory and pride of all mankind.

If socialism dialectically "repeats" the Asiatic production method, it would be logical to assume that it will be replaced, in the final account, by that same "repetition" of the age of the ancient city-state with its "quasiancient," "synthetic" ownership of means of production. It is easy to see that it is only such a form of ownership that is consistent with the concept of communism in its age-old meaning as a specific commonality, for in this case the right of ownership is extended not only to all people put together but also to everyone individually. For the first time the very concept of nationwide ownership assumes a real meaning, for it is only economically independent individuals who, in their totality, can efficiently control the use of public property for the benefit of the entire people. This benefit means the happiness of all and the happiness of the individual is a principle of such a social system rather than the happiness of two-thirds as some currently fashionable theories claim. It is only in such a society that the alienation of man from his social and inner creative essence is totally eliminated and, as the "*Communist Party Manifesto*" stipulates, "the free development of one" becomes a "prerequisite for the free development of all."

This alone suffices for such a society to be acknowledged as truly communist. Actually, the essence of communism is not to deprive the individual of the right to private property and to make all property national. According to dialectics any "either-or" (either strictly social or strictly individual ownership) is a feature of immature thinking or of immature reality. Mature communism does not deprive anyone of the possibility of appropriating the social product. It merely eliminates the possibility, through such an appropriation, to enslave alien labor," the "*Manifesto*" reads. Free enterprise demands a free market, which is truly possible only if individuals are able to satisfy their basic vital needs also outside the market, with the help of personal means of production. In that case any cataclysm affecting the market does not threaten the existence of the individual and the social guarantees given the individual do not question the natural development of the market.

In such a society the strict dependence of individuals on the position they hold in the social division of labor is eliminated. Also eliminated is the economic clash among classes as a constant source of antagonisms. This does not require any property or class equalizing which threatens to convert society into a "stagnant swamp." It is only in such a society of free people that true self-management is possible, which is incompatible with the proletarianization of working people under capitalism and under socialism. It is not in vain that the Athenian system is to this day considered by many people an unsurpassable model of democratic governmental structure. It is only within a "synthetic" society that true



collectivism is possible, for collectives will take shape as free contractual alliances without the burden of economic inevitability or political coercion. As has been justifiably pointed out, the principle of the social contract lies precisely in the legislative acts of antiquity, as they operated in the period of the classical city-state (see KOMMUNIST No 6, 1990, p 11). Finally, in such a society the rational resettlement of people throughout the earth, which is a foundation for resolving the ecological problem while preserving the blossoming urban culture, is attainable. Let us bear in mind that the city-state was essentially a city-state of farmers.

We must mention separately the communist principle of distribution according to need. In its traditional understanding, it creates insurmountable theoretical and practical difficulties and its utopian nature remains almost universally acknowledged today (see KOMMUNIST No 4, 1990, p 17). However, it has a "rational kernel": the idea of the free satisfaction of individual needs without anyone "from above" or "from the side" to dictate or limit the extent of such satisfaction. In that aspect, this principle is implemented precisely within the "synthetic" society which offers everyone the possibility of satisfying his demands to the desired extent, having first satisfied the main need of the free and creative individual: the need for means of production.

The "synthetic" society also has the most important "philosophical" feature of communism. It is the feature of universality, the source of which is the combination of extreme opposites—individual and public ownership of means of production—which makes coerced formative changes unnecessary. Naturally, this will not be any kind of unchanging, problem-free, utopian-ideal status. Mankind will by no means be ideal and infinitely developing thanks to the universality of reason but will exist within the framework of the same biological species. Thus, the "synthetic" society will develop without limitations and change while remaining on the same universal economic platform with its different variations, similar to the racial, ethnic, regional and age variations of man.

Today the scientific and technical revolution is already formulating a "social order" for the "synthetic" restructuring of society. The prediction made by Marx is coming true that a time will come when the main force of public production will be not the accumulated materials but live scientific thinking. It is precisely this that, in the final account, determines the crisis of socialism as primarily being the "kingdom of labor." The role of personal initiative, enterprise and inventiveness increases drastically. The dynamism of the economy removes entire groups of traditional skills; the latest technologies keep replacing each other like waves of colorful music. Not every person who may be, generally speaking, able to work will be needed by such a society on a daily basis in the course of its further development, and not always will even a talented person be equally useful to that society. At this point we can no longer ensure the social protection of life and of human dignity through the old socialist method of universal permanent employment in

public production. The only reliable guarantee for our protection could be the ownership by everyone of means of reproduction of his own life. It is only the developed area of such possession that could protect a dynamic society from a malignant fever as the need arises to take from or give to society labor and other economic resources of individuals. Alas, all of these achievements and trends of the scientific and technical revolution must be acknowledged as being less our own than created by contemporary bourgeois society. Bourgeois society was successful precisely because, realizing our problems, it abstained from total monopolizing and was able to protect the creative potential of individual initiative. In bourgeois society the process of technical advancement of the personal productive activities was not blocked; at the same time, not without our influence, it moved quite far forward in the area of socializing the economy. Within it as well processes of a "synthetic" nature have already been initiated.

It is possible to conclude that, in general, Marx was right concerning the future replacement of socialism with a higher form of communist society. As to what precisely such a form will be and how we shall convert to it he "did not as yet clearly see through his magic crystal." This is not astounding. What is astounding is that his scientific thoughts nonetheless went beyond the historical horizon. The fundamental conclusion in Marx's main work, the first volume of *Das Kapital*, reads: "...Capitalist private ownership... is the first negation of individual private ownership based on individual labor. However, necessarily capitalist production initiates a natural process of its own negation. This is what negating the negation means. It restores not private ownership but individual ownership, based on the achievements of the capitalist era: on the basis of cooperation and common ownership of the land and of means of production produced through labor" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 23, p 773). It would seem as most natural to interpret this conclusion precisely in the sense of the future synthesis between individual and public ownership, particularly if we bear in mind that socialism, by virtue of its objective-economic content, is closer to capitalism. In his time, Engels interpreted individual ownership in this Marxian statement as ownership of consumer objects exclusively, but not of means of production (see op. cit., vol 20, p 134). This is not confirmed by the text of *Das Kapital*, and clashes with common sense. Why would Marx be discussing here consumer ownership which is always secondary and, furthermore, with no stipulations, link it to productive ownership? We do not know whether Marx himself objected to Engels' view on this matter. As in other cases Marx, the brilliant scientist, outstripped Marx the ideologue.

Yet another important argument in favor of continuity exists: the *"Communist Party Manifesto"* does not demand a "single nationwide ownership." Even if this is a pure accident (which I do not think to be the case) it would be no sin to make use of such an opportunity to ensure the renovation and consolidation of society and

to build bridges across the threatening precipice of social cataclysms. Having "repeated" the Asiatic production method, we now found ourselves facing the possible "repetition" of the ways leading to its crisis. The separation of producers, which is in itself inevitable and progressive, frequently led the ancient Oriental societies to their self-liquidation through an endless, avalanche-like economic and political splintering. History does not give us examples in which the former Asiatic despotism yielded, as a result of such a crisis, to a democratic "agrarian socialism" with a human face. To block the breakdown and to "freeze" society in a condition of semi-decay could be achieved only by taking measures involving an incomparably harsher despotism. Thus, the Chinese emperor-unifier of the 3rd century B.C., Qin Shihuangdi, in addition to various other cruel acts, eliminated virtually all Confucianists who were the ideologues of humanism and democracy (or, more accurately, of liberal separatism). This should provide food for thought to the supporters of "goodness."

In the course of the separation of the producers, socialist "ownership of all" naturally gravitates toward becoming the "ownership of everyone," and, at the same time, the idea of individual productive ownership remains initially alien to socialist society. Therefore, such a conversion could be spontaneous only through the ever greater division of public ownership itself and the escalation of group egotism. It is incomparably more dangerous and treacherous than individual egotism. It is an open secret that separatism is manifested in our country already no longer in national but also regional relations. This is occurring while the level of economic and political integration throughout the world is rising....

Yet, in order honorably to come out of the crisis, one should "merely" take to their logical end the initial trends of perestroika itself: raising the producer to the level of securing an independent life support of individuals, and the development of socialist principles to the level of replacing socialism with its own ideal, communism, on the basis of a synthetic economy. This "merely" is also a complex matter. However, to us this path is necessary and promises to give true freedom to the citizens and to consolidate society. Finally, it is simply dictated by the contemporary trends in the development of production forces.

This can be accomplished only together with the progressive social forces of our time. Marxism has always considered as its calling to contribute to the liberation of the proletariat on the basis of the social activeness of the working people themselves. However, the proletariat in bourgeois society and the working class under socialism develop a state of natural balance with the social environment. This leads to the appearance of a new proletarian detachment, the **socialist intelligentsia**, i.e., a sum of producers and distributors of the spiritual product who, like other citizens of that society, cannot own adequate means for the reproduction of their life. On the surface, the intellectual in our country has become even more proletarianized than the worker: removed through

official propaganda even from the mystical "participation" in national means of production, he is also removed from the real distribution and social privileges. For that reason the intelligentsia is described not as a class but as a "stratum," and the very definition of the intelligentsia remains to this day a problem for official ideology, for each spiritual production is considered as somewhat ephemeral. The wages of the mass strata of our intelligentsia are an area of numerous and universally known anecdotes and bear no comparison to the market value of the manpower of the same type in contemporary society. Suppressed by the condition of its life, the majority of our intelligentsia do not even dream of coming out of this system of hired slavery through its toil. The socially belittled status of the intelligentsia and its state of oppression caused by bureaucratic arbitrariness and the steadily declining prestige of intellectual labor are among the main reasons for our growing cultural, technical and economic backwardness. To tolerate this in the age of the scientific and technical revolution means clearly to doom the country to a sad future.

The scientific and technical revolution and the crisis of socialism awakened the intelligentsia. Lacking **material means of production**, it found itself the sole owner of today's most important **means of material production**: talent, knowledge and spiritual experience, which are inseparable from the personality of their bearer—the intellectual. Under our very eyes the intelligentsia is converting from a "class within itself" into a "class for itself," and already now has become an active and authoritative force of perestroika. Most of it has a critical attitude toward real socialism; however, real socialism is merely the immature fruit of the communist doctrine, at one point grafted by the intelligentsia itself to the trunk of the labor movement. Mature communism, however, is flesh from the flesh of the intelligentsia, for the nature of the fruit is determined, in the final account, not by the nature of the trunk but the nature of the graft. The intelligentsia is the creator and main bearer of a contemporary scientific and intensive technology which is demanded by a "synthetic" economy and which alone can guarantee its stable development. The harmony of antiquity was imperfect and of short duration precisely because of the limited nature of extensive manual farming as the production base of the city-state. The spiritual property of the intelligentsia is the matrix of the "synthetic" form of material ownership: it is also individual in its use as well as social in its nature. It is only this type of social structure that is consistent with the needs of the intellectual for individual independence as a prerequisite for efficient creativity and high level of socialization as a prerequisite for the development of the mind.

The alliance of the working class with the intelligentsia does not violate the basic principles of the communist movement. "...From the viewpoint of the fundamental ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development stand above those of the proletariat..." V.I. Lenin wrote,

bearing in mind the proletariat as a working class. Today it is precisely the interests of the development of the intelligentsia that are the most important in terms of the normal development of the entire society. The dialectical continuity of our class orientation is preserved, for the socialist intelligentsia is, albeit a separate, nonetheless a detachment of the proletariat. Furthermore the worker, as a living person and not a social function, aspires toward individual independence. What is there to say about the peasantry: suffice it to recall that the "classical" city-state was a peasant democracy. Honest employees and officials will also find their place in a highly socialized "synthetic" society.

Furthermore, a free alliance with the intelligentsia does not mean in the least identifying with it and serving strictly its narrow class interests. The fact that our party was a vanguard party was not the reason for its trouble; the reason was that it was *insufficiently* advanced and that it linked itself too firmly to the destinies of one segment of society. A true and consistent "vanguardism" is entirely compatible with "parliamentarianism." An end must be put once and for all to the class prejudice of the communist movement, for an accurately understood communism is the quintessence of universal humanism. Its purpose is to build a society in which there will be no routine class nomenclature and a bureaucratic nomenclature developing from it, impoverished proletarians and unrestrained exploiters, rural "soil" limitation and a modern "groundless" intelligentsia. Nor would there be any "subservient East" and "wild West." There will be, as Marx predicted, a single "socialized mankind." It is precisely the "synthetic" form of ownership and it alone that resolves the dispute, which is thousands of years old, between the "Eastern," which is one-sidedly social, and the "Western" which is one-sidedly individualistic system of political values. By heading the movement toward this type of social system, we would thus implement the old prophecies concerning the historical purpose of Russia, consistent with its geographic location between East and West and the synthetic "East-West" nature of its spiritual culture.

In 1923 V.I. Lenin called for a "radical change in our entire viewpoint on socialism" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 376). Our own time already demands a radical change in our entire viewpoint on the concept of communism as a whole. What is true communism: Is it the one which was made up by utopians at the dawn of the industrial revolution or the one which glimmers in the future of the scientific and technical revolution? Is its prototype to be found in the dark primitive ages or in the brilliant civilization of antiquity? Is it a regulated or a free communism, open to all mankind or else separated from it with a "Chinese wall" or an "iron curtain?"

It is obvious to those who have chosen the right answer that the contemporary "gravediggers" of communism are actually burying nothing but its abstract "specter." This answer will be valid only after it has completed its historical role and prepared for the birth of the true, the

specific communism which will be absolutely consistent with its name, humanistic vocation and dialectical scientific foundation.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SOCIAL PRIORITIES

### Education in the Time of Change

915B0002E Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 52-60

[Article by Anatoliy Zotov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor at Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, and Vladimir Tykheyev, candidate of technical sciences, docent at the East Siberian Technological Institute (Ulan-Ude)]

[Text] To emphasize that our educational system is in a pitiful condition may seem like trying to open an already open door. Everyone knows this or, to use fashionable terminology, a consensus exists on this point. With some kind of enthusiasm for self-scourging, the press is quoting data on the horrifyingly low coefficient of intelligence of Soviet youth and the fact that in terms of the level of education of the population we turn out to be somewhere at the tail end of the list of the developed countries in the world. However, to bemoan our own spiritual weakness and find a scapegoat is not the point.

According to the U.S. Department of Education and National Scientific Foundation, most Americans are on the way to scientific and technical illiteracy in the full meaning of the term, while the curriculums of American schools are behind the Russian, Japanese and West German. At the same time, equal concern about their own educational system is being expressed by West Germans and even the Japanese, who clearly do not share the viewpoint of their American colleagues, according to which everything in those countries is okay. We have referred to foreign complaints concerning the diseases of education by no means for the sake of drawing the reassuring conclusion that in their countries as well not everything goes smoothly but in order to change an already customary way of thinking. It is time to realize that the evolution of the educational system in its content (and, therefore, its crises) is in the contemporary world a very natural phenomenon, not to say a healthy one. It is only in an unchanging social organism (a concept based on a contradiction), structured on the basis of a perfect system, that no differences arise and, in general, there are no problems. There is simply one unbreakable unity.

A complex system can operate as something composed of simple subsystems, which can function by themselves, without the need for constant correction on the part of the whole, if the whole is in good health and the program is being implemented. This is true, in particular, if a



developed production technology exists and no particular need to change it is necessary (plentiful raw materials and steady demand for the output), at which point the task of education is reduced to the reproduction of manpower as a quasipermanent "human factor." The school must help the future worker to master a certain clearly defined sum of knowledge, skills and habits as codified in stable textbooks, curriculums and teaching systems. Anything else is surplus; to say the least, it is the personal matter of the student and not of the teacher; in terms of the educational system, at best it resembles an architectural volute in a house in a mass residential district or on the building of a factory. If we accept as axiomatic that labor is the main thing in life and that man's leisure time is no more than a period of relaxation and recovery of strength for new labor exploits, essentially the organization of education is a patch on the structure and needs of the production process. In this system everyone deals with his own job, every cobbler should stick to his last and everyone should receive according to his due.

However simplistic this rough diagram of social rationality may seem today, it is hardly possible to deny that, for a long time, it regulated our thinking and was considered a canon in practical activities. This is confirmed also by the nomenclature of positions and standardized tables of organization as well as the list of worker professions as approved by the authorities and the standard requirements concerning tests, "minimal" curriculums and the institution of school inspectors, who zealously saw to it that the teacher may not depart even from a single line from the curriculum or a letter in the textbook or the prescribed way of teaching a lesson in the classroom. This also included the aspiration to put all school students in a standard uniform and have an identical haircut.

Today everything is different and no aspiration to stability, even if it is inherent in the human soul, would change anything. What matters, however, is not only the quality changes by themselves, which are taking place throughout the world, but also their pace. It is precisely the latter which makes change a factor of daily reality. Their symptom is the conflict between the school and life: curriculums and production facilities for training are becoming catastrophically obsolete; the student acquires half his training while already on the job.

It may appear that the solution is simple: update curriculums from time to time, criticize docents coming to their lectures with notes yellowed with age and show concern for better material facilities. Here is the question: Is an organic synchronizing of the development of production and changes in training possible? If diversification in production activities is natural, would this not lead to an infinite number of training specializations?

Clearly, any simple decision in such a style is a pursuit of futility. The solution lies only in a conversion to continuing education which does not end with a high school

diploma, a certificate from a vocational school or a university degree, and abandoning the concept of professionalism in the traditional meaning of narrow specialization.

All this, one could say, is well-known: our vocational schools and VUZs have long been engaged in training general specialists. However, essentially such an "ideology" is something quite well described with the saying: "Same old cabbage soup, but watered." Is this not the origin of the notorious "reduced level of training?" What does "reduced" mean? When we hear this, coupled with information on the reduced intellectual standard of the Soviet person, an apocalyptic picture of mass stupefaction of the people arises. Fortunately, however, the situation is not all that simple.

If we were to measure the volume of information absorbed or, one way or another, mastered by the new generation, it is no lesser than the one in the past. Conversely, the overloading of students and the excessive difficulty of curriculums are by no means a myth. The root of the problem lies not in the quantity but the quality of information: mastering the skills of verbal and written counting, for example, is no easier than learning how to use a calculator and learning how to draw is not simpler than acquiring the skill of using a plotter. The question is only the level of technology which will result from the use of the former or the latter. Unquestionably, the modern physician would find it easier to work with a computer than to read thick volumes of history of diseases. However, it is not merely a question of this. Now, in order to catch up with our time, we must see in an unusual light the hierarchy of the knowledge which is part of the educational structure which is offered to the person beginning an independent life. The main thing is to single out the knowledge which is needed always and everywhere and the skills which are just as universally useful. Unless this is done, this baggage becomes a useless burden. Worse, available knowledge will begin to demand of the subject of activities qualities consistent with the level on which it was based in the past. This situation is similar to the one which, until recently, prevailed in our country with mass factory production of clothing and shoes: there was a surplus of everything but there was nothing to wear....

One could object that we speak rightly a great deal about the vital need we have for broadly trained engineers and scientists whose work meets world standards. The problem, however, is that objectively our industry does not need in the least such engineers and scientists, for in its case the technology and knowledge of our contemporary technicians are more than adequate; furthermore, it is unable to absorb the new technology, for it lies beyond the capacity of the human factor employed in industry.

In principle, the breaking of this magic circle is possible only by upgrading the "awareness" of the responsible officials, making as a standard of life (and, desirably, of morality) the growth of the technical standard of the production process, or else the creation of a market. We

shall not get here into the details of the argument between supporters of a controlled market and defenders of a socialist planned economy, for strange though this might seem, the theme of education in both contexts will be roughly the same: suffice it to consider as a given the variability and diversification of the production process.

The undefined (or not quite defined!) nature of the future makes unattainable the ideal of the outstripping development of education in the sense of training today the worker for conditions in which he will have to function 10 to 15 years hence. What binds the totally defined present to the largely undefined future? What is it that grows from the present into the future in such a way as to run both through the former and the latter?

The skill of operating a machine tool lasts perhaps slightly longer than the technical idea which was embodied in that same machine tool. The habit of reading, however, remains unquestionably valid throughout one's lifetime, even in the age of radio and television and even though it is experiencing certain difficulties, for why does one have to read if advertising has become audio-visual? However, what matters is literacy in the broad meaning of the term, and whether it is literary or computerized becomes a secondary matter. For the time being, language remains a prerequisite for communicating among humans, for which reason it is the basis of humanistic and technical culture and a means of socialization. Good knowledge of the language and of contemporary linguistic developments is the most basic of all knowledge. It is a subject of education with the greatest claim to "perpetuity."

The variability of our life as a whole (and of production technologies in particular), one may think, could make all other subjects ephemeral with the exception, perhaps, of physical culture, assuming that we consider it a subject. Indeed, many are the citizens in our country (despite the very conservative nature of our technology) who know, from personal experience, that 10 years after their graduation their graduation work is no more than a museum exhibit. Does this mean that 5 years spent in a university have been wasted? Not entirely.

If you were a good student you could have obtained something more durable than a sum of specific knowledge in specialized subjects. Furthermore, you would acquire the habit of independent work with publications and tools and the ability to experiment or, in short, the skill of engaging in information and research activities (albeit on the precomputer level). In other words, in addition to passing examinations and tests and writing term papers, you have gained the skill of learning. This quality, which has been acquired among others, turns out, in a variable world, precisely to be the most important one! Training habits make it possible to go into a new professional world relatively quickly if one is able to learn and relearn uninterruptedly, to the extent to which the practical experience acquired in school has trained the human brain and hands precisely on this level. Not all secondary (and university) subjects develop the skill

of handling information and the ability to learn and research equally and in all respects. As V. Mayakovskiy wrote in the poem "Vladimir Ilich Lenin," "I look at billiard balls and he looks at chess—which is useful to leaders." The fact that in the array of secondary and higher school subjects there are neither billiards nor chess changes nothing: drafting develops one type of quality different from mathematics, while literature, unless reduced to the description of "characters," develops thinking; as a rule, students who show excellent grades in language studies turn out to be good computer programmers.

It is in this light that we should amend the concept of the growing importance of the basic sciences in any type of education, technical in particular: the concept of "fundamental" in the educational system is somewhat different from a similar concept in terms of the correlation between basic and applied science. Here the extent of application assumes priority while the correlation between the general and the specific in the content of the knowledge, conversely, is suppressed and, in frequent cases, is totally insubstantial. Roughly, one could put it this way: in education, a subject which, on the surface, does not coincide at all and even does not fit the content of future knowledge may turn out to be fundamental, such as the example we gave with language, the training in the fine points of which leads to the development of the skills for mathematical programming. It turns out that the occasionally ridiculed wish to acquire "any kind" of higher education is not all that stupid. The American experience proves that workers with degrees in literature, law and art master high technology better than not only their coevals with practical experience but even diplomaed specialists in engineering professions. The concept of "fundamental" is manifested in its details above all as separating the foundations of knowledge into primary and secondary. Primary are the universal forms of communication and the mastery of any knowledge and its interpretation: ordinary language, the language of information and the language of science. They also are the material bearers of any other possible knowledge.

The secondary one is the multi-tiered set of specific meaningful knowledge which could become the key to the resolution of a number of socially significant problems. No specific problem is presented by connecting the primary with the secondary foundation: the secondary cannot exist other than in the forms and matter of the primary. It is a matter only of the extent of the wealth and adequacy of its content.

This approach enables us to avoid a division within the system of professional training in the face of a threatening growth in the number of professions and specialties, as well as hasty overspecialized technical VUZs, the moment an innovation is introduced in the area of technology. At the same time, it eliminates the obstacle which hinders interdepartmental contacts among students. Disparities in diplomas, and differences in the sets of subjects which were studied and completed are no

longer fictitious. What matters only is that in the sense of educational foundations such sets would be of more or less equal value. If we were to stop opposing the development of such a form of education we would finally acquire a sufficiently dynamic cadre training system. The VUZ would become an organization which would produce not specialists for specific technologies which are becoming obsolete but people who can achieve constant advancement.

One of the remaining problems related to specialization training is one we encounter in the teaching of a foreign language in nonlanguage teaching VUZs or teaching mathematics to future engineers: the educator must be familiar in general terms (and slightly more than that) with the specific subject which his students will have to deal with. Otherwise he will leave up to them the difficult work of making the form "fit" the content. It is precisely this task that they may find excessive. In frequent cases a student with excellent grades in mathematics is unable properly to formulate in mathematical language the engineering problem in the special subject in which he has been so successful. Abroad various attempts have been made to resolve this problem, above all by organizing a system of preparatory training after graduating from secondary or high school and through various retraining courses. Naturally, this is useful. However, the radical solution of this problem is possible within the framework of another one, which we shall discuss below.

The use of this system will make it possible to train cadres in various areas. Nonetheless, it does not pertain to the "school-life" dilemma. In principle (and in a good approximation of the principle in its real application) the school could remain a "world within itself," somewhat modeling the most important features of future life. However, this is, so to say, "playing at life."

If we take into consideration the increased complexity of our practical work and its derived trend toward extending, almost to infinity, the incubation period in the development of the "acting man," it would be hardly possible to consider this most simple system as optimal: today the demand of putting a sensible limit to the time needed for training for life is becoming increasingly categorical. We cannot ignore it. It is necessary to include the school in real life (to the extent to which this is possible) and to abandon unattainable efforts at initially equipping the student with knowledge over his head and then, heavily armed, to launch him in life. We must help life and school to "grow" within each other and the more varied means we use to this effect the better.

This concept does not eliminate in the least the other one: that of providing a basic education on all of its levels although it may seem that this would clearly exclude the need for basic knowledge. Basic knowledge merely provides the details and establishes an organic link with specific activities: not those fabricated, not "models" in the realm of education but real features of

real life! It is thus that fundamental knowledge operates directly not only as a foundation for the other—"applied"—knowledge but also as a foundation for practical action and for the practical skills which are developed within them.

Our country has quite a good experience in such work. Unfortunately, this experience was not popularized to the extent to which, in our view, it deserves.

Let us recall that in the 1920s the Soviet educational system developed in the direction of an increasing application of the labor principle. As early as 1922 it was estimated that the RSFSR had 100 basic model schools to which farms or enterprises were attached. A clear example of this was the Commune imeni Dzerzhinskiy, headed by A.S. Makarenko. Much less known is the experience of the higher school. In his memoirs, Academician M.A. Lavrentyev refers to the "State Electrical Machine Building Institute imeni Ya.F. Kagan-Shabshay," which, between 1920 and 1934, achieved brilliant results in combining training with work. The training of highly skilled engineers at that institute took 3 years, as follows: 4 days a week work at the plant and 2 days attending 10-hours of classes, which were extended also to 2 workdays, for 3-4 hours daily. The overall study load was 3,100 hours and no more than 200 to 300 hours less than the contemporary machine engineering institute which takes 5 years of training. In slightly over 1 year the students performed various worker functions. Subsequently they were assigned to engineering-technical and, in some cases, even managerial duties. The plant career, like the training, was specially planned. As a result, Lavrentyev writes, the leading positions at the main electrical engineering plants were held by its graduates. They were head-and-shoulders above graduates of classical-type VUZs not only in terms of practical experience but also theoretical knowledge.

We shall describe an experiment which was conducted over a period of several years by the regional scientific research laboratory on higher school problems, using the facilities of the East Siberian Technological Institute. It deals with continuing professional training in "Heat Supplies and Ventilation." In the experimental curriculum (which, traditionally, covered a 5-year period) each course constituted a single complex of social, general technical and specialized disciplines, interrelated on the basis of inner logic as well as common purpose, that of providing skills and knowledge consistent with the level of training.

The first year, the objective was for the students to acquire a worker skill of fitter in the manufacturing of heat, gas and water supply systems. The second, they worked as fitters in installing and servicing such systems. The third taught the students technician's skills (junior engineer). During the fourth the students were given basic engineering-research training. Finally, the fifth year provided specific engineering specialization, taking



into consideration the nature of the future work of the graduate (based on his assignment).

In accordance with the results of the examinations in the first and third years, the students were issued a qualification document; at the same time these examinations were also competitive tests for advancing to the next course. The failed students were assigned to production work with the diplomas of fitter or technician. After further training and a second examination, they could pursue their education at their institute by correspondence or on a full-time basis. With such a system, which ensures the competitive nature of the training, entrance examinations become unnecessary and enrollment of first year students is based on the outcome of a talk the purpose of which is to determine the attitude of the high school graduate toward his chosen specialty. One can also take into consideration secondary school grades, vocational training, etc.

In the course of their training, the students build sanitary engineering systems at new construction projects or reconstruct existing ones using the brigade contracting method.

During the first stage the specializing department chooses a construction project, signs a contract and organizes a brigade. In the second, in practical training and design studies, the student learns about design cost-estimate documentation, makes corrections and sees to it that the necessary equipment and materials reach the construction project. During the third (production practice) the student brigade makes the parts and elements of the system in the enterprise's shops, assembles the parts and carries out the installation operations at the project. Senior students, training as foremen and engineers, control all the various operations. The team leaders are third-year students while the fitters-assemblers are students in the junior courses and high school students. During the fourth and final stage the student brigades carry out the launching operations, draw up the technical documentation for the systems they have installed and deliver the finished project to the customer.

Naturally, even as an experiment, this type of training (study-work!) requires certain changes in the "context:" it is desirable for the possible "geographic space" to provide an adequate work area. The enterprise's management must share the "ideology" and the way of thinking which of educators. It is presumed that tables of organization, curriculums and plans must be drafted independently and not issued on a centralized basis. Need we also mention the fact that, to say the least, subordinating the elements of this system to different departments is undesirable? (This applies to secondary, secondary technical and higher training.) Hence important problems of legal and financial independence. Understandably, all of this means simply that under the conditions of the administrative-economic system the success of such experiments greatly depends on the

personal opinion and support of decision makers. Generally speaking, it depends on accidental circumstances with lucky combinations. It is here that, as in a drop of water, our entire contemporary situation is reflected....

The organization of education under the conditions of a variable and varied way of life should have at least three levels of freedom. The first would guarantee a basic education which would make it possible to acquire further knowledge as required by circumstances. The second would be the adaptability of the structures and forms of work in the VUZ to the special circumstances of the area and the profession. The third would be the freedom of research for the teaching staff and the right to academic (as well as financial) autonomy on the broadest possible scale.

Under those circumstances, the "education-production" system becomes self-developing; it no longer needs a rigid administration and the pursuit of, generally speaking, other structures of social life which are external and, therefore, alien to it. What this system needs, what it urgently requires, and what it expects from the center is information support, for it is excessive and much to the disadvantage to each individual cell of this complex organism to resolve information problems, even more so given the lack of modern information networks and equipment. Under the new conditions, the USSR State Committee for Public Education (and the corresponding administrations of sectorial ministries) must totally abandon its administrative functions (including controlling and financial). This means that they must either convert into a center for information management or else be closed down as superfluous.

Universities must play a special role in the future educational system. Their role should not be technical in the least, although that form is, unquestionably, progressive. Technical universality within a given educational institution simply leads to the fact that the future engineer, having acquired a broad general scientific foundation (which is possible, naturally, providing that the basic disciplines are the same for all students and not turn out to be "dispersed" on the basis of specialization and as applicable to the nature of the department or the school).

Unquestionably, the universities must be centers of culture. Modern society, not excluding the developed West, is largely a "production-economic" culture. Having surmounted the primary, the "animal" form of dependence on nature by converting it into our workshop, we also develop quasinatural production-technical systems which, in turn, subordinated their creators to their own logic of functioning and growth. At this point we are only half human. The dissolution of man within production and social roles is no more than a conversion from blind dependence on natural forces to the first derivate of this dependence, the system of production relations.

Culture means a way of life of man as the creator of himself. The university could be (and, historically, has

partially been) a means of developing a universal culture. This is possible if its life is not strictly related to specific and temporary social assignments. The university must not be engaged in the reproduction of manpower. Its role is to shape and develop what is human in man.

The classical universities in Europe were largely centers of culture, for they had a variety of contents and forms of training. They were guided by their own statutes which were distinct from governmental laws and legal codes. That is precisely why they were able to create cultural variety. Unquestionably, the studies of nature, culture and man himself, which were made in the medieval universities neither were nor could be absolutely without stipulations. However, such stipulations did not turn—in the case of prestigious universities—into a rigid dependency (whenever that happened, the university "lost face"). Autonomy made it possible to go beyond the limits of the present and contributed to the appearance of the shoots of the future.

As society became dehumanized the classical university lost its shape: initially art was expelled from it; subsequently, the humanities became "sciences," structured in the manner of the natural and even technical sciences. Philosophy—the core of university education—did not escape this fate: it became "scientific" and even in Western universities was reduced to the theory of knowledge (methodology) and the history of science.

The interpretation of intellectual activities as a type of labor also defined the aspiration to restrict the area of knowledge only to the useful sciences and to ignoring individualities. Individuality was considered an obstacle in the important matter of training mass specialists. Today we are harvesting this crop: culture, expelled from the universities, either died or (which is one and the same) became a "counterculture" assuming most primitive and wild shapes.

Today the revival of the university is on the agenda. Humanizing is first among the various aspects of this, not in the sense of increasing the share and role of the humanities ("the antinatural" sciences, to use M.V. Keldysh's expression) departments, although this too would not be bad. We must shift the emphasis in the "appearance" of our graduate. He must be not a "specialist in..." but, above all, a highly cultured person. Modern culture is not limited to the arts or to history, philosophy and literature (which is within the reach of the "quasitechnical" disciplines, through impersonal information). It also includes the natural sciences, for science and technology are the most important elements and instruments of culture.

It is difficult to avoid the averaging approach to the student (even if some among us consider this a shortcoming) and, at best, an orientation toward the average student. Adopting an individual approach, not to mention the aspiration to make every deviating individual meet the standards, requires time and organizational and

technical facilities which we do not have. This is regrettable. The main thing, however, is our failure to consider a shortcoming the fact that we are not training originally thinking people.

If we wish to have universities as "generators of culture" and not factories producing specialists on an assembly line basis, they must be, first, different, distinct less in terms of departments but of "schools" (including scientific schools); second, they must be aimed above all toward "pure" science (and art), toward knowledge which may seem not to have any direct practical value (naturally, unless individual talent is considered a value); third, they must provide any one of their students the possibility of covering the individual curriculum with a minimum of mandatory subjects (furthermore, to the extent to which such subjects are not taught in secondary school). The level of success of the training process would not be a test grade (one can evaluate quantitatively the volume of information and not the quality of culture. It would be interesting to know the grade which a computer would have given Einstein had computer examinations been invented prior to the creation of the theory of relativity). A university diploma must be no more than a reference of attended courses if no original research project has been defended.

The university should not be aimed at the high school graduate: its doors must be open to anyone who realizes that a "tooth abscess" does not make a man more beautiful, to use the term which the notorious Kozma Prutkov used in describing narrow specialization. In no case should a university be financed on the basis of the principle applied to a cost accounting enterprise. However, supporting a university is not contraindicated, whether the money comes from an enterprise or a private individual, for if society wishes to preserve a high level of culture it must support it as a basically nonprofit organization.

To repeat, over and over again, the university must be free. Not only should it not obey any educational administration but, furthermore, it must be governed strictly by its own bylaws and managed by a scientific council. Any other variant would block it from becoming an agency of cultural development.

The crisis in education which we noted at the start of our discussion is, therefore, less a crisis of education in general than a crisis afflicting an obsolete system and a structure of education as a form of activity which has separated itself from other forms. The reason is the conversion of society to a qualitatively new phase of development, a phase of quality changes in all forms of activities, related to high production technologies and the need for a flexible and responsible behavior in the sociopolitical area, in the face of global problems.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Geographic Aspects of New Thinking

915B0002F Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 61-70

[Article by Vladimir Kotlyakov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and USSR people's deputy]

[Text] For many decades, expecting no kindness from nature, we have been taking from it all we should and shouldn't. Nature is answering with degradation, bordering on catastrophe. Suffice it to violate or seriously to change any one of its components a chain reaction begins in the other. And unless we block such "reactions" on time, degradation processes will gather strength, at which point it will be very difficult to prevent the conversion of previously blossoming areas into technogenic deserts.

By the end of the 20th century, mankind began to realize the finite nature of its existence. The realization of a possible doom as the result of a nuclear war was a shock. However, today the ecological danger is no less terrible. The irreversible degradation of the environment leads to the degeneracy of mankind. The course of historical development demands of society and every person on earth to develop new thinking on the global scale.

In the 1980s we spoke only of the advancing ecological crisis on our planet, based on symptoms such as the shrinking of the area in vegetation, which changes the interaction between the surface of the earth and the flow of solar energy and worsens the gas exchange; dried and eroded territories; exhaustion of deposits of useful minerals and traditional sources of energy; environmental pollution; finally, violation of the quasi-stationary condition of natural ice, with a number of negative global consequences.

Today there is no longer any doubt that such a crisis has ripened, expressed in a drastic worsening of living conditions in both some parts of the world and throughout the earth. The anthropogenic contribution to the circulation of carbon, nitrogen, phosphorous, and sulfur became equal to the natural circulation and, in some areas, became even higher. Most of the earth's surface is being cultivated and, frequently, irreversibly transformed by man.

The destruction of forests and desertification are progressing rapidly. The speed of deforestation exceeds 4 million hectares annually and the area of the moist-tropical forests, which are the richest genetic stock of the planet, has already been reduced by one-half. During the time of recorded history, as a result of accelerated erosion and other negative processes mankind has lost nearly 2 billion hectares of productive land, i.e., more than is being cultivated today, which is 1.5 billion hectares. At the present time desertification is affecting 5 to 7 million hectares annually.

Such processes are active in our country as well. In the USSR, in particular, as a result of the development of water resources, some 2 percent of the country's territory has been lost (flooded, salinized, heated, drained). Another about 6 percent are in a state of crisis. If we maintain, not to say accelerate, the pace of Soviet economic development, the specific economic load on the territory of the European part of the USSR by the year 2010-2020 will prove to be 3-3.5 times higher than it is presently in the FRG and 2-2.5 times higher than in contemporary Japan. How to shift this load, how to prepare a territory for it are questions the answers of which largely depend on geographers.

The central problem is the pollution of air, water, soil, and nutritional products. The mechanisms for the spreading of pollution are governed by geographic laws and the laws of atmospheric circulation, global and regional circulation of moisture, local pollution concentrations, related to the topographic features and the location of cities, and the laws governing the geographic division of labor. Understanding the mechanism of the origin of and protection from them is impossible without knowledge of the basic laws governing the development of the biosphere and geographic systems.

The tasks and place of geography in the discussion and resolution of ecological problems, as is the case with strictly ecological problems, have not been as yet fully understood by geography. Yet the concept of harmonizing the interaction between society and the environment calls for viewing the nature of the earth and human society as a single system with a special feature: its spatial organizational system, which is studied precisely by geography.

The force of geography lies in the equal existence, reciprocal influence, and even intertwining of two of its basic branches: physical (natural) and socioeconomic (social) geography. This characteristic is precisely what allows geography to study the most complex problem of human ecology in its entirety.

As early as the 1950s the prevalent opinion in geography was that by applying its specific ways and methods, it would be able to understand sufficiently profoundly the laws governing the development of the environment without addressing itself to the problems of human society and civilization. In the 1960s, however, the situation began to change. Man not simply lives within nature but gradually replaces its natural elements and objects with artificial ones. The main object of geography—the geographic cover—no longer exists in its primary aspect in the same way that, for all practical purposes, there no longer are natural landscapes and natural geosystems. All of them have been changed by man to one extent or another, and today we are dealing with natural-anthropogenic and natural-technical geosystems.



The problems of the interaction between society and nature have their philosophical, socioeconomic, bioecological, geographic, and technological aspects. We have introduced the concept of social ecology as the science of the environment surrounding society. It is being said that this science is studying "secondary" nature, which includes that which man has created: cities, dams, canals, road systems, etc. The existence of this "secondary" nature, created by man, is precisely the reason for the appearance of the ecological problems facing society.

Social ecology singles out within the environment artificial elements and analyzes them against the background of and in connection with the natural elements and processes. In some cases, social ecology is beginning to act also as a kind of ideology: behavioral models, guidelines, and concepts aspiring to the role of conceptual outlooks, which must be immediately adopted by mankind if it wishes to avoid an ecological catastrophe, are being offered in its name. Ecology, conceived as ideology, is sometimes pitted against Marxism which, allegedly, is short of ecological realism.

It can be claimed that all problems encountered by civilization in the course of its interaction with nature are, essentially, ecological. At the same time, however, they also are social, for they trigger, above all, socioeconomic difficulties. They are based on geography—scarcity of energy and natural resources and the worsening of the environment in specific areas.

For a long time excessive ideologizing which, actually, was inherent in all aspects of our life and a reflection of the rule of the class approach over universal human values, was a major obstacle to the development of geography in the USSR. The indirect result of this was the unnecessary and frequently scholastic theorizing, separated from specific sociocultural and economic problems affecting the country, and the virtual self-distancing of a wide range of geographers from resolving the pressing problems of environmental protection as well as ethnocultural and ethnic problems.

Ideologizing was manifested in geography in a variety of aspects. It caused terrible damage from the 1930s to the 1950s, in the course of the struggle against various "idealistic" trends. The basic concepts of geography were proclaimed to be scholastic; man was pitted against nature in all possible ways. Anthropogeography and demography, which closely cooperated with geography, were routed; political geography was strangled at birth.

The deintellectualizing of science was the consequence of this approach: Initially, Soviet geography began drastically to fall behind world standards in a number of areas. The adoption of pseudopractical projects and falsely understood relevance resulted in the abandonment of standards in scientific work and contributed to the alienation of geography from the family of basic sciences. The results of studies of this nature were merely

the supplying of "information" going to the centralized management, and recommendations concerning specific projects.

Not so long ago we considered the Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, ministries, departments, and regional authorities or even individual design institutes of the Gosstroy or the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources as the spokesmen for social ideas and wishes. Today it is self-evident that these organizations were not alone in issuing social instructions. In the future we shall have to structure our plans on the basis of the variety of social interests, propose and analyze alternate solutions and make wider use of open debates on topical problems.

The condition of the environment largely depends on human activities. Obviously, the future promises the strengthening of this trend. This justifies V.I. Vernadskii's assumption that the "nature-society global ecological system can no longer develop spontaneously. It requires some streamlining and regulatory actions which would guarantee the survival of nature and mankind, something which can be ensured only if we understand the complex interweaving of processes in the global and regional macroanthropogenic geosystems.

The future global "mind" cannot be purely "technocratic" or primitively "scientific." Inevitably, it must be based, first, on the imperatives of humanitarian thinking and, second, on a thinking that is specifically geographic and adapted to the individual features of the earth as a planet and to its individual zones, regions, and landscapes. Any whatsoever sensible choice of managerial decisions would be impossible without a rich knowledge of the dynamics of natural processes, their anthropogenic transformations, the territorial distribution of resources, population and production dynamics, and the limits of resistance of natural, technogenic and social territorial systems and their spatial combinations.

Currently, given the inevitable radicalizing of the processes of perestroika, we need not only a radical change in our approaches to the science of geography but also changes in the disproportions which exist in our country between natural-historical and social trends in geography. In the past we explained the broader development of social geography abroad above all in terms of the market, profit, competition, and social inequality. Now, however, the growing role of socioscientific studies has become obvious in our country, for one of our main concerns is the creation, on a new basis, of a federation, a multi-tiered economy and different forms of ownership, commodity-market relations, and a drastic enhancement of the social trend of the economy.

On the one hand, the profound geographic substantiation of already passed legislation and, on the other, the geographic prediction of the consequences of the application of new laws require significant attention. As of now we must study the possible ecological, social, and

political-geographic consequences of the laws which have been passed on ownership, the land, and local self-management.

At the present time the need for territorial and not simply departmental approaches to the planning and management of the national economy is realized absolutely clearly. As a particular type of spatial grouping of resources, today the territory becomes a more valuable resource compared to natural physical resources. Natural resources can be replaced or their loss can be compensated for, one way or another, whereas a territory is both an exhaustible and a nonrecoverable resource. It cannot be replaced by anything. Such a territorial approach and the aspiration to link sectorial with regional planning are impossible to accomplish without the help of geography. However, even such a resource-economic approach to territory is insufficient. Any territory is an arena of human life with human social, cultural, national, and spiritual interests, needs, and attachments.

Numerous examples of inefficient and even faulty economic organization of territories and use of nature convincingly prove that many dangerous negative consequences could be reduced or eliminated with the help of already existing knowledge and with the active civic stance taken by geographers. For the sake of fairness we must point out that in a number of cases the persistence of scientists helped to prevent dangerous projects, such as the building of the Nizhneobsk hydroelectric power plant and the Caucasian Pass Railroad. Let us also recall the desperate yet unsuccessful efforts of geographers to influence high level decisions on the large-scale development of the virgin lands and the building of polluting enterprises along the Baykal. However, science also approved of short-sighted decisions which contributed to ecological difficulties, such as the excessive expansion of irrigated areas, which led to the drying out of the Aral Sea, and the building of major canals which degraded the land, as well as the building of the Leningrad Dam and other similar installations.

These are different times and the attitude toward the views of science is different. The tasks, however, are becoming increasingly complex. The solution of many pressing ecological and social problems is impossible without laying stronger foundations for long-term forecasting, modeling multicomponent geosystems and spatial interconnections among them, and conducting studies on the macroregional and global levels. Particular attention must be paid to the study of interrelated geographic systems, interregional interactions in particular, which would include atmospheric changes which go across national boundaries, the flow of border river basins, various types of migrations, etc. Particular attention must be paid to such natural processes, for the situation within our federation and in neighboring countries is changing and we can no longer rely on neighborly "forgiveness."

The need arises to intensify the theoretical and, particularly, the methodological potential of domestic geography, which would enable it and geographers in a number of developed countries to formulate and resolve most difficult multicomponent problems concerning the environment, the territorial aspects of socioeconomic development, and interrelationships among natural conditions, economies, and the culture, health, and social well-being of individuals. Furthermore, we have the pressing task of actively involving the science of geography in resolving numerous practical problems of the reorganization of society during such a difficult and event-saturated stage in its development.

In my opinion, some of the main problems in contemporary geography, which give priority to universal human values and the humanistic foundations of the interrelationship between society and nature, are the following four:

**1. Organization of the geographic cover and its components, and internal and external interactions between natural and social structures.**

We are now dealing with complex integral geosystems with interlinked natural processes and all kinds of human activities. The geographic system has developed new targets, some of which global: petroleum films on the oceans, aerosol clouds in the atmosphere, synantropic animal and plant populations, and mutants. New processes and flows of matter have developed in the geosphere: anthropogenic geochemical migration, erosion, desertification, etc. New mechanisms of intercomponent interaction have developed, which are not only locally disseminated (anthropogenic water and biological circulations) but also new ones maintained by man through a chain of connections.

Hence the task arises to create, on the basis of the classical concepts formulated by V.I. Vernadskiy, A.A. Grigoryev, and L.S. Berg, but also on the basis of new and empirical data and new methodological approaches, a theory of the structure and development of the geographic shell under contemporary socioeconomic, scientific and technical, demographic, and ecological conditions. Particular attention should be paid to the geographic aspects of global contemporary problems, in particular the study of disproportions on the local and regional scales, the formulation of recommendations for their prevention at the precritical and preglobal stages.

The evolutionary analysis of the geographic cover presumes the study of its development within the range of the microcycle of a duration of some 100,000 years (the latest interglacial followed by the glacial and postglacial epochs). Attention should be paid to the fact that, proceeding from the latest views on the theory of catastrophes, the universal concept of cyclicity proves insufficient to predict the "natural" future awaiting us. It is very important to define the place of the contemporary epoch against the background of long-term periodical climatic fluctuations and to study their reasons and the

functional role within them of the "atmosphere-land-ocean-glaciation" natural system. One of the urgent tasks is, on the basis of paleographic, historical, and instrument observations, to learn how to separate and, subsequently, to individually study and forecast natural historical and anthropogenic factors affecting changes in the geographic cover.

## 2. Territorial organizations of social life and dynamics.

Currently awareness is growing of the single nature of universal human problems. Greater attention is being paid to large-regional studies and projects—European, of the Asian-Pacific area, and the North as world phenomena—i.e., to territories which particularly urgently face problems of economic and political integration and expansion of international cooperation. Interest is being shown in geopolitical models of the past and the present. Geographic substantiations are being developed of the economic foundations for integration, the establishment of new markets and active changes in the territorial division of labor, the reconstruction of the economy, and the development of new territories.

Interest in the social aspects of life, problems of the social inequality among areas, ethnic problems, the role of religious faiths in the ethnocultural differentiation and regional conflicts is increasing sharply. Finally, today we are abandoning the thesis of the uniqueness of the development of our economy. The possibility and urgent need has appeared of mastering the theoretical foundations of global socioeconomic geography and of engaging in specific comparative-geographic evolutionary studies, which enable us to provide an objective assessment of the place of the USSR in the world community, to better understand our features and to anticipate the future.

The development of the market will be inevitably accompanied by changes in the territorial structure of economic areas, in the formation of which economic instruments, replacing administrative-command principles for the structuring of territorial-production complexes, will assume an important role. All of this will require the accelerated study of previously neglected spatial differentiations and integration among market processes and the effectiveness of combining various forms of ownership in different areas.

Whereas Western geography has participated, for quite some time and very constructively, in regional planning, programming, and management, in our country, in the majority of cases, regional economic-geographic studies had remained quite abstract and their results were in the nature of recommendations to departmental administrative authorities. Today there are reasons to believe that with the acquisition of economic local autonomy the possibilities of regional planning in the USSR will become more realistic and interest in economic-geographic studies more concrete.

Turning the economy and social policy to face the interests of man raises with unparalleled urgency the

need for the development of a strong social geography. This is an area in which we have fallen particularly behind the theoretical and empirical standards attained by global science. Today we have no idea of the picture of spatial differentiations in social well-being or lack of same: levels of population income and expenditures, the nature of housing facilities, availability of durable goods, level and typology of crime, alcoholism, and drug addiction, standards of medical, cultural, and consumer services, state of the population's health, etc. We must not forget that such studies should not only cover the population as a statistical sum but also assess the quality of living conditions of the individual social strata and groups.

We must also consider the re-establishment of political geography in the USSR. We are currently laying the foundations of a Soviet federation and local self-management, which exclude the old "regional aspects for the implementation of political decisions." New forces are emerging in the political arena, political activeness is rapidly growing, and a multiparty system is taking shape. Under circumstances influenced by acute international conflicts, the economic crisis, and increased parochialism, we face the real danger of a threatening destabilization in the country. Geographic studies of such socio-political problems should help us to understand the situation prevailing in the individual areas in all of its specific aspects and identify its deep roots.

## 3. Natural and socioeconomic reasons and mechanisms for the appearance of global and regional geoeological problems.

The possibility of optimizing interrelationships between society and nature depends on surmounting the major contradictions which have appeared and are growing between the natural and social components of the contemporary geographic cover. Publications frequently mention the need for achieving harmony between society and nature. Clearly, this situation could be described as the type of the inevitable changing of nature by man, which would allow nature to safeguard the possibility of reproducing conditions agreeing with the existence of man himself as a biological species. However, is it possible to achieve such a condition, at what cost, and with what restrictions?

The solution of the problem of harmonizing the interaction between society and nature is related, above all, to optimizing relations between the natural and social components of the landscape. Like any optimizing of several interacting variables, it will require the formulation of optimization criteria on the basis of which limitations will be set for the admissible values of the variables. How to determine such criteria? If we proceed from the strict requirement of preserving (or restoring) human health (which is already a topical problem in many countries and in many parts of our country), it is necessary to limit the economic variable, i.e., to slow down the pace of economic development with the existing technology for the utilization of nature or else to



change the technology itself. This will necessitate tremendous economic and other social resources.

Said contradiction faces our science with the most important strictly geographic problem: To what extent and via what means in the use of nature does it become possible jointly to develop nature and society strictly through their efficient territorial organization?

Ecological problems face the science of geography with many other topical problems as well: to assess negative and positive results of the interaction between society and nature in the specific areas, to draw up forecasts for changes in integral geosystems and formulate scientific recommendations for their control, to study and predict the consequences of the implementation of major economic projects, and to seek ways of preserving the resource and environmental reproduction capabilities of geosystems.

The wrong tendency exists of reducing the range of such problems only to bioecological tasks. The real ecological approach should be based on the study of the spatial structure of the natural environment, i.e., to be the subject of geographic studies.

Let us consider, as an example, land water resources. It is very important to approach the hydrological and weather systems as a complex system of water reservoirs, water flows, ground water distribution and the regional fauna and flora, and to consider it together with other components of natural-technical geosystems which affect water resources.

At that point the management of water resources should be based on the study of a broadly understood hydrological system and the management methods should consist, above all, not of huge redistributions of the stock but control over processes in local hydrological systems—filtration changes, irrigation rates, forest reclamation, economical use of water, adaptation of the economy to surfeit or lack of water, changing methods for the treatment of water, banning harmful discharges in rivers and developing receptacles for such discharges, etc.

The difficulties related to the solution of these and many other problems are related to the underdeveloped nature of principles needed to define the stability of geosystems, the methods for the comprehensive evaluation of the anthropogenic influence on the natural component, and the criteria and methods applied in assessing the quality of geosystems in accordance with the living conditions of the people. This is a very complex problem. The point is that the criterion of "admissibility" of anthropogenic loads on the natural component are set by society. However, even if we were to determine the size of admissible loads, this in itself would not resolve the problem. The main thing depends on the decision about accepting such standards or not. This problem is resolved on the basis of target stipulations and the possibilities of society at the specific stage in its development. Furthermore, in the case of vast territories, the problem of defining "admissible" anthropogenic loads

no longer makes any sense. They have been changed to such an extent that we should seek ways of returning them to a condition acceptable for human survival. Let us recall the ecological catastrophes of the Aral and Chernobyl, 80 percent of the plowed lands in some areas of the European part of the USSR, the 25,000 ponds and water reservoirs in the Dnepr Basin, and others.

The root of the problem is found in the ecological nature and biospheric compatibility of technologies. Obviously, society faces in its full magnitude the problem of changing priorities in its development targets. The ecological imperative takes first place. It will lead to restructuring the targets of social development on the basis of the coevolution of nature and society, i.e., to an ecological revolution.

Hence the task of geography's participation in the formulation of approaches to the shaping of a "new" nature, acceptable in terms of human life and the development of society in specific areas and, at the same time, consistent with the criteria of stability of the entire biosphere.

One of the primary tasks in the solution of this problem is zoning the territory of the USSR on the basis of the resistance of geosystems to the influence of local combinations of natural and anthropogenic factors and the creation of concepts and methodologies for charting maps of grave ecological situations for the country at large and its individual areas.

A special task is that of identifying the factors and mechanisms which govern the shaping and interdependence of regional and global geoecological problems. We must assess the influence of the changes in the natural environment in individual areas on earth on global biospheric changes.

#### **4. Development of geographic foundations for the theory of nature utilization and principles governing natural-anthropogenic geosystems.**

One of the topical tasks of geography is active participation in the formulation of ecological technologies for the use of nature. To this effect we must sum up the experience in efficient utilization of nature, acquired by different areas on earth throughout recorded history. For example, this applies to the experience in the utilization of biological resources by northern nations, terrace farming in Dagestan, the system for reproducing the fertility of the soil through agriculture in the Baltic area, the different sociocultural restrictions limiting the use of nature, etc. It is not excluded that, although uncoordinated, such methods could be used in a future system of ecological or, as we frequently say, rational utilization of nature. Also important is to master the experience of the advanced countries in shaping a new environment in which the contradictions between the socioeconomic and the natural geosystem blocks will be reduced to a minimum.

Unfortunately, in our country the stress generated by regional ecological problems is not abating. Such problems imply a situation in which changes in the natural environment in one area or another threaten the health and life of the people, the development of the economy, and the ability of natural complexes to act as resource and environmental reproduction systems and as guardians of the genetic stock.

Each regional problem is unique. It requires individual studies and planning the individual array of steps to prevent, eliminate, weaken or compensate for undesirable changes. We must define ways of solving the most pressing ecological problems for the individual parts of the USSR, such as the Extreme North, Central Asia, the basins of the Aral, Caspian, and Black seas, the BAM zone, and others.

The gravest problems of the Aral Sea area and many other parts of our country indicate that the time has come to introduce both in science and economic practice the concept of areas of ecological disaster and areas of ecological catastrophe. An area of ecological disaster should be a territory in which natural processes and ecological ties have been violated so extensively that its degradation is becoming severe, for its population is being deprived of the possibility of living normally and engaging in economic activities. An area of ecological catastrophe is a territory the degradation of which becomes irreversible and makes human existence here impossible. At the present time the Aral area is one of ecological disaster. Urgent steps will have to be taken to prevent it from becoming an area of ecological catastrophe.

In order to understand the origins and mechanisms of ecological problems in the individual areas, we must reinterpret the place and role of man in the contemporary natural environment. This is no simple matter. We must remember that our traditional concepts were shaped on the basis of Siberian and Central Asian areas and developed on the basis of pursuing extensive economic management strategies. In such strategies the leading category was the concept of "developing the territory," while nature was presented with an anonymous mass of people—"labor resources"—who were to master nature by, as we wrote, "distributing production facilities and population."

Another threat is that of the territorial expansion of our "monopolies"—the numerous ministries. Let me cite one example: A movement is spreading in the European part of the country to ban the nuclear power industry. It may be assumed that the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, allowing for a likely reduction in the building of nuclear power plants in the European part of the USSR, will try sharply to increase such construction in the northern parts of the country. The high percentage of temporary new settlers and low population density, added to an insufficient development of information facilities, would make lesser opposition voiced by public opinion to ecologically dangerous projects more likely.

Therefore, it is extremely important to formulate as of now a just legal system which would protect the interests of the permanent population of these areas, particularly the small ethnic groups of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. In general, the North is part of territories in which the level of social life is directly dependent on the condition of the environment which, in frequent cases, becomes catastrophically worsened as a result of arbitrary attacks mounted by departments on the brittle northern nature. Let us add to this that whereas to the bulk of the population scientific and technical progress brings, as a rule, a new quality of life, the small nations frequently have to suffer as a result of it. However, the progress of mankind cannot be achieved at the cost of the privations of individual ethnic groups. We must formulate a system of measures which would help us to extend the goods of civilization to the northern peoples but, at the same time, would protect them from the undesirable manifestations of the scientific and technical revolution.

One of the necessary links in the long-term strategy for the preservation of the earth as a living system is the study of the way society perceives the occurring global and regional changes and defines the possibility of regulating them either by adapting to them or by combining one with the other.

The comprehensive geographic forecasting of the utilization of nature is important in itself. We must reduce the extent of vagueness in assessing the future condition of natural-anthropogenic geosystems and determine the range of possible albeit unlikely conditions, and determine the limit of influence on nature beyond which consequences resulting from changes within it become equally likely.

In analyzing geosystems, we frequently speak of problems related to controlling them. It would be perhaps more accurate to speak not of controlling but, by analogy with the economy, regulating their changes less with controlling than "guiding" influences such as, for instance, steps to rebuild forests, stop desertification, etc. Such "guided" steps should also include the currently drafted set of laws for the protection and restoration of the habitat and the utilization of nature.

As indicated by the practical experience of the last 20 years, scientific forecasting and evaluation of, let us say, the future of the Aral and Caspian seas, and pollution in cotton growing areas fell substantially behind, relative to the increased gravity of such problems. In practical terms, this means that we moved blindly.

One of the reasons for the growing ecological degradation is the concept of the extensive development of the national economy and the sway of departmentalism and actions of incompetent officials which in the past erected bastions of the administrative-command system, legal rightlessness, and the economic poverty of soviets of people's deputies, which are the constitutional masters of the country.

Any further progress by Soviet society is impossible without radical changes in ecological policy. I am confident, however, that ecological problems cannot be solved without radical political and economic reforms. Here as well the geographic aspects of new thinking will play an important role, for they are capable of making a contribution to ensuring a stable ecological future for the country.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## ECONOMIC POLICY

### Exploitation: How To Understand It Today?

915B0002G Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 71-78

[Article by Georgiy Chibrikov, professor, department of economics, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov]

[Text] Currently a serious review of the theoretical concepts which characterize the historical destinies of capitalism is under way in economic publications. So far, history has known two forms of its transformation. The first was the October Revolution and the institution of socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia. The second has been the evolution of the developed capitalist countries toward a so-called universal prosperity state.

A rare opportunity has appeared for comparing the efficiency of these options. It is true that such an evaluation is hindered by the fact that these processes occurred not "with all other conditions being equal." The October Revolution took place in a country with an average level of capitalist development, where over a long period of time the experiment was carried out on an isolated basis. It was accompanied by major expenditures for modernizing the national economy and defense, and the difficulties in the building of socialism were used to limit consumption by the working people. The democratic framework was curtailed as well. The main tragedy, however, was that a situation which had degenerated through the functioning of the party-state bureaucracy, triggered by exceptional circumstances, began to be presented as "real" socialism, both domestically and abroad. Naturally, such a model of socialism led nowhere.

We must point out that assessments of the results of the evolutionary transformation of capitalism are by no means uniform. There are those who claim that socialism has already been built precisely in the developed capitalist countries. Others, while remaining on traditional grounds, insist that a revolution is mandatory if socialism is to occur. Efforts are being made to compare the condition of contemporary capitalism with some kind of ideal situation without exploitation, poverty, unemployment, hunger, market and money.

Are such extreme viewpoints one-sided? Considering our poverty, it may appear that socialism has indeed been built in the highly developed capitalist countries and that the cherished ideal has been attained. However, we must not shut our eyes to a number of unsolved economic, social and political problems, ignore them and fall into a state of euphoria as we look at store shelves.

In reality, naturally, no socialism exists for the time being either in the capitalist or the self-proclaimed socialist countries. Nonetheless, which group of the two is presently closer to it?

Generally speaking, we should make clear that pitting some countries against other and absolutizing differences in economic and political systems are harmful and can lead society into an impasse. It is particularly important to understand this now, when a strange situation has developed, in which capitalism has not as yet exhausted all possibilities for its development while socialism has been unable to prove its superiority.

A difference does exist between capitalism and socialism. However, its manifestations and scale are not fixed. This can be seen in the evolution of the forms and nature of exploitation under capitalism. For quite some time, it was instilled in our minds that capitalism and exploitation are inseparable and that socialism is free from that evil. Today such views have been questioned as has, actually, the very concept of exploitation. Furthermore, a kind of change seems to have taken place in viewpoints: efforts are being made to prove that it is precisely under capitalism that there is no exploitation whereas under socialism it exists in its full magnitude. Such conclusions are based on computations of the share of wages in the gross national product, which is 60 percent in the United States and about 40 percent in the USSR. The share of personal consumption in the GNP [gross national product] in the capitalist countries ranges from 56 to 76 percent, compared to 45 percent in our country.

Unfortunately, for the time being, economists have not made a scientific study of the problems of exploitation in the light of contemporary data. As we know, Marx believed that exploitation means the appropriation of the added value, of labor without equivalent. In his "Critique of the Gotha Program," he rejected the theory of the "unreduced labor income" under socialism. Indeed, before the product goes to individual consumption, we must subtract amortization, accumulations, reserve or insurance funds, and expenditures for social needs. In this connection, the question arises as follows: Why are withholdings from the overall social product under socialism not considered exploitation, while withholding some of the value which is created above the value of the manpower is? All societies must accumulate, for otherwise scientific and technical progress comes to an end. State expenditures for maintaining the administrative apparatus, the army and the police are used to strengthen the power of the bourgeoisie and the external attributes of exploitation. Expenditures used to meet



social needs—education, health care and science—exist both under capitalism and socialism.

The traditional definition of exploitation may have been accurate for the first half of the 19th century. At that time, combining within a single person the capitalist-owner and the production organizer was typical. It was on the basis of this figure that the exploitation process was analyzed. Its theory was formulated by Marx regardless of the stockholding form of capital. Furthermore, he assumed that stock holding enterprises do not participate in equalizing the overall rate of profit, for they yield, after expenditures, either high or low dividends. Marx classified increased share holding capital as one of the factors which countered the law according to which the profit rate showed a tendency to decline.

This was explained by the fact that in the first half of the 19th century stock exchanges were still secondary elements in the capitalist economy. They were used for trading state securities but their volume was low.

However, already during the second half of the 19th century the active conversion of enterprises in industry, trade and banking into stock holding companies was undertaken. In the 1980s, although quantitatively there are more individual enterprises and partnerships—more than 12 million as compared to 3 million corporations, i.e., 12 percent of the total, the latter are already superior to the former economically as well. Corporations account for more than 90 percent of the sales of goods and services. In 1988 the market value of the stock on the stock exchanges in the capitalist countries totaled 7.8 trillion ecu.

The traditional interpretation of exploitation essentially pertained to individual capitalist ownership. Naturally, on the eve of the new millennium, we must refine the concept. Contemporary data provide sufficiently strong arguments to question the inviolability of the assertion that the rate of added value is the precise manifestation of the extent of exploitation of hired labor by capital.

Indeed, to what extent does the appropriation of added value constitute exploitation of man by man? As we know, it can be divided into three branches: it is spent for accumulation, appropriated by the state budget and consumed by the capitalists. The first two, unless they exceed socially accepted limits, i.e., the satisfaction of human needs, cannot, strictly speaking, be classified as exploitation. As to consumption by the capitalist, Marx himself acknowledged that this part cannot be entirely classified as exploitation, for the capitalist almost always acts as production organizer and manager and, naturally, must be compensated for such work. He believed that such compensation should be interpreted as the salary of a highly skilled employee. The balance of the added value, which is appropriated by him for being the owner of the capital, is, clearly, the income from exploitation.

Exploitation unquestionably exists, whenever the capitalist earns income not as production organizer but as capital owner. Here is what Marx wrote on this subject:

"The conversion of an actually working capitalist into a simple manager handling someone else's capital, and the owners of capital into pure owners, strictly financial capitalists, even if the collected dividends include a percentage and an entrepreneurial income, i.e., the entire profit... even then this entire profit comes only in the form of interest, i.e., as a simple reward for being the owner of capital, which thus is entirely separated from any functions involving the actual reproduction process...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 25, part I, p 479).

Under contemporary conditions, exploitation is manifested most clearly in the course of the process of appropriation of dividends and interest earned on capital. This includes profits from various manipulations on the stock market, company mergers and absorptions.

To deny that exploitation exists under capitalism means to fall into the other extreme, which totally voids the question of the possibility of changing this system. The result is an apparent purposeless struggle for reforms, not to mention revolutionary change.

The current widespread view is that stock holding societies are a way of avoiding exploitation. Let us try to analyze the accuracy of this claim. Big financial capitalists quite frequently use their own capital to control a great deal of other people's capital. In the majority of corporations the owners of the controlling block shares rule. Theoretically, this should amount to 51 percent of all shares. In practical terms, however, as a result of the dispersal of the shares, a control packet may consist of 5 to 10 percent, and sometimes even less. Generally speaking, the size of the controlling number of shares may vary greatly. For example, in the second largest U.S. conglomerate, the CCR, the controlling group owns from 13 to 98 percent of the stock in 23 affiliated companies. The Walhi Concern is a pyramid of corporations. The holding company owns 66 percent of the stock of NL Industries, 52 percent of the Beroid Petroleum Service, 100 percent of Amalgamated Sugar, 100 percent of Medite Fiberboard, 83 percent of Sibra Fast Food and 100 percent of Hardware Division. The data indicate that some financiers prefer to hold a substantial packet of shares which gives them absolute effective control over the company. Others try to do with relatively little capital. This is the case of those who diversify their securities portfolio, thus spreading the risk of capital investments among several corporations. It is true that diversification holds the threat of losing control to so-called raiders, who are aggressive buyers of blocks of shares. In 1986, the Italian financier P. Guardini owned 1.7 percent of the stock of Montedison, the chemical giant. As a result of a purchase of stock in October of that same year, with the help of de Benedetti, the manager of the Olivetti Company, his share increased to 21 percent, making him the unchallenged owner, replacing the previous one.

Substantial efforts are being made in the developed capitalist countries to increase the number of shareholders. In the United States there were 12.5 million stock owners in 1950 and 47 million by 1985. In England approximately 20 percent of the adult population own some stock. It is believed that spreading the stock among the population strengthens the capitalist system and helps to surmount the alienation of blue- and white-collar workers from ownership.

A special program for spreading stock ownership among blue- and white-collar workers—the ESOP—is used in the United States. L. Kelso, who founded the program, substantiated the need for it as follows: "Capitalism cannot survive unless the ownership of capital becomes more evenly distributed throughout the economy." The mechanism of action in this case is quite simple. ESOP started by buying up various companies and then selling their stock to blue- and white-collar workers, thus recovering its cost. Every year, a worker or employee can purchase shares of stock not to exceed \$30,000.

In 1987, ESOP owned 1,500 companies with a personnel of 1.5 million. They included Avis (12,500), which is a car-leasing company; Hals Trust (private hospitals), with a personnel of 23,000; Amsted Industries, which is a diversified processing industry company with 8,300 employees, and others.

Can we consider socialist enterprises which are bought out by workers and employees? Marx quite cautiously assessed cooperative factories: antagonism between capital and labor is eliminated within such factories. However, it is not eliminated in the least on the scale of the society. For that reason, Marx wrote that as an association workers are their own capitalists in a cooperative factory. According to the traditional view, the profit of the enterprise is the result of the exploitation of the overall worker by the overall capitalist. The effect of the law of the average rate of profit leads to the fact that the collective of a cooperative factory (or stock company) either loses some of the added value (which goes into the common kitty, distributed proportionally to invested capital) or else earns some of the added value from the outside as a result of the process of equalization of profitability rates.

The question arises of whether the redistribution of some of the profit in favor of the cooperative factory could be considered as the exploitation of other workers by its own workers? No simple answer can be provided. The redistribution of profit is based on the need for the development of production forces. Without the distribution of the profit in proportion to the amount of capital, all incentives for scientific and technical progress would be undermined. Therefore, this process cannot be related to exploitation.

One thing is unquestionable: cooperative factories and stock owning companies belonging to the workers cannot essentially change the status of the worker in capitalist production. Competition forces them to follow the same

course of action as the corporations. Even the building of socialism in one or several countries does not introduce radical changes in the labor of the workers, for competition on the world market leaves very little room to maneuver for either system.

As capitalism develops, increasingly it is not individual stock owners but juridical persons who become the subjects of control: industrial and bank corporations, insurance companies, and investment and pension funds. In terms of value, institutional investors accounted for the following percentage of operations on the New York Stock Exchange: 1975, 16.6 percent; 1987, 51.5 percent. The same trend can be clearly traced in Japan as well. Here in 1950 individual owners in that country accounted for 70 percent of the stock and for only 30 percent in the 1980s.

The exploitation system seems depersonalized and anonymous. The traditional approach has been that the capitalist-owner opposed the actually functioning capitalist rather than the hired worker. Today, as a rule, corporate capital is handled by managers. They personify collective capital and appropriate the public ownership. In contemporary capitalism the situation is such that the possibility of managing the capital determines the position held by an individual within the corporate hierarchy. It is by no means mandatory to be a capitalist in order to hold such a position. Juridical persons, represented by managers, are pitted against physical individuals, who include not only capitalists but also workers and members of the petite bourgeoisie.

The dynamics of financial capital cannot be reduced merely to exploitation relations. Superficial and one-sided views on stock ownership and financial capital prevailed at the dawn of the Soviet system, when shareholding companies and stock markets had not been eliminated in the country. Yet it is through the dynamics of financial capital that relations and dependencies are established among enterprises and that the question of the reliability of procurements and marketing is resolved. The system of intertwining directorate operates along the same line.

Today as well, in the 1990s, when our government is seeking the creation of stock enterprises and the floating, purchase and sale of securities, society is displaying a cautious attitude toward this "new development," totally identifying it with exploitation. The most substantive argument against such institutions is the fear that stock could be purchased by the mafia, thus providing it with a real opportunity to legalize its "illegal" capital with a view to assuming dominant positions in the economy. Naturally, such a threat cannot be ignored. However, no one would even dream of stopping to sow wheat for fear of weeds. What would concern the farmer most would be how to get rid of the weeds, one way or another, and not be left bereft of food. The same occurs with stock. We believe that very simple rules should be introduced, according to which any given individual would be limited to a certain amount of stock purchases,

based on submitting a declaration on his income. Other steps would be possible as well. For example, the controlling block of stocks of strategically important enterprises could belong to the state. Naturally, even in an ideal system of operating stock holding enterprises abuses are possible. However, it is not they that determine the stock holding system in the least, although some hotheads are trying to accuse them of an entire array of economic sins in an effort to prevent the development of stock holding companies and a stock exchange.

Under the contemporary difficult conditions it would be difficult to find a simple answer to the question of exploitation, for so far no universal criterion for the presence or absence of exploitation has been found. One thing is clear: exploitation is not linked to any specific form of ownership. It is possible in cases of private, collective and state ownership as well.

Obviously, exploitation arises when the manpower is paid at a rate below value and when production does not ensure its normal reproduction. A proof of exploitation is the excessive length of the workday or the unrestrained growth of labor intensiveness. For example, one can claim with certainty that it exists wherever the worker is deprived of the possibility to obtain an education due to lack of time. Exploitation also appears in connection with the discrimination of workers by sex, age or national affiliation.

A major feature of exploitation is the fact that income from stock and interest paid on capital and profits from manipulation of financial capital determine the status of an individual or a group in society and become sources of enrichment. If they are a modest supplement to the labor income, dividends and interest encourage thrift or stimulate more efficient labor. They should hardly be considered a form of exploitation in all cases.

To some extent, Marx was trapped by fetishistic concepts on loan interest rates. It is true that the dynamics of financial capital require significant outlays of fixed and variable capital, materials and labor. Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the technical retooling of the financial system requires huge capital outlays. For example, at the start of the 1980s, the average investment per person employed in a commercial bank was \$16,000 in fixed capital, or three-fifths of the respective indicator for the entire U.S. national economy. Unquestionably, in this case labor costs increase as well.

Payment for borrowed capital is aimed not only at replacing the wear and tear of buildings and equipment, installations and current expenditures but also the payment of wages to the personnel and giving a profit to the financial capitalist. Under contemporary conditions, loan interest cannot be reduced only to the form of added value, for it includes the cost of servicing the financial capital.

We know that it was on the basis of dividing the profit into interest and entrepreneurial income that Marx derived the existence of capital as property and capital as function. The former, in itself, yields interest. The second creates entrepreneurial income, for it functions within the production process. As we already indicated, interest should not be reduced to added value and exploitation. Entrepreneurial income includes the cost of organizing the production process. Therefore, the question arises of the accuracy of distinguishing, under contemporary conditions, between capital-ownership and capital-function. Interest is not exclusively the result of capital ownership. Entrepreneurial income is not simply the product of the functioning of capital. It partially compensates for the labor of the capitalist-organizer or, in his absence, of the manager, the more so since capital-ownership, as described by Marx, earns not only interest but also dividends. However, the latter clearly appear as a result of the functioning of capital. Therefore, the classification into capital-ownership and capital-function becomes quite vague, which, incidentally, was pointed out by Marx in "*Das Kapital*," vol 3, chapter 27. Unlike entrepreneurial income, interest rates drop with the development of capitalism.

A comparison between the share of wages in the GNP of the capitalist countries and the countries with a socialist choice cannot be grounds either for concluding that there is no exploitation under capitalism or that it exists under socialism. It is obvious that a country in which labor productivity is lower should, all other conditions being equal, spend relatively more for the reproduction of manpower than a country with higher productivity. In the latter, however, the need for manpower is higher than in the former. An example of this is the United States, where higher labor productivity proved unable to surmount the growing cost of manpower. It might have seemed that the share of consumption in the GNP in our country should have been higher than in the United States because of lower labor productivity. However, such a level of productivity did not ensure a sufficiently high extent of the necessary manpower requirements. Therefore, to some extent (but not to some extent), this also determines the lower percentage of consumption in the GNP. We must point out that a comparison between the share of wages in the GNP is not very indicative because of differences in the conditions governing manpower reproduction.

The constant yet unconvincing claim that capitalism means comprehensive exploitation occasionally leads to unexpected results. Quite frequently one can hear the following: I would rather be exploited and earn higher wages, be fed, clothed and have a few other things. However, as a rule, such considerations ignore the work system applied at capitalist enterprises.

The Marxist classics did not pay much attention to the study of the economic management mechanism under capitalism. To begin with, their objective was to substantiate the need for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. Second, they believed that the rules governing



economic management under socialism will be radically different from those under capitalism and that socialism will surmount commodity-monetary relations, the market, the law of value and the commodity nature of manpower, and will develop, on a planned basis, a direct social production process aimed at the comprehensive advancement of the individual.

It was presumed that the working people, enthused by socialist slogans and the possibility to work for themselves and not for exploiters, will sharply increase labor productivity. This assumption proved unjustified in all the countries which had made a socialist choice. Conversely, moods of dependency appeared; incentives for labor weakened. Such moods are entirely explainable. Why make a socialist revolution? For the sake of working less and consuming more than under capitalism. The same trend was followed in the creation of greenhouse conditions for the development of production: lack of competition domestically and against foreign countries, absence of unemployment, dogmatic concepts concerning the nature of labor under socialism, and monopoly in production and sales. The inspiration provided by the idea of social guarantees led to moods of dependency, lack of initiative and other negative phenomena. A lowered labor productivity and exaggerated development in the production of means of production, which turned "socialism" into production for its own sake, limited the size of the consumption fund. In turn, this adversely affected the level of labor productivity. Therefore, the countries with a socialist choice found themselves in a vicious circle: the worse the people worked, the less they consumed and the less they consumed the worse they worked.

Had Marx written his main work today, the theoretical model of exploitation would have been presented differently. It is not a question of the extensive dissemination of stock-owning capital. Bourgeois economists assumed that the era of autocracy (which Marx described as the despotism of management) is a thing of the past. More than 75 percent of the biggest industrial corporations in the United States use new management methods: decision-making from the bottom up, which presumes the involvement of the white-collar workers in the decision-making process. This is the most noticeable change in organizing the management of capitalist production since the start of the 20th century.

Management tries to develop contacts with the employees. "Good managers are those whose objective is to stimulate the activities of employees for the good of the company by maximizing their involvement in management." In the British Imperial Chemical Industries Company, managers sit in their offices whose doors remain always open, thus indicating their accessibility to the personnel. Avis holds weekly discussions of production affairs in which anyone wishing to do so may participate. In the good old days, as a manager of Ford Motors said, the stricter a manager was the more he was valued. Today the emphasis is on cooperation. Consultation with the employees and involving them in the

decision-making process demands significant outlays in time and funds. Many corporations are adopting this system, in the hope of improving work efficiency.

However, autocracy has not disappeared; 62 percent of Japanese managers predict that the role of management in downward-decision making will increase. The popularity of group solutions in Japan has always been overestimated by Western economists. The Japanese have invariably emphasized that a group decision-making cannot be separated from strong leadership.

United Technologies, the British General Electric and the Japanese Kiotsera, which are companies with autocratic leaders, are continuing to prosper. An autocratic management style does not necessarily lead to failure. However, it is neither the only nor the predominant one.

For a long time Soviet economists dealt essentially with exposing the practice of relations between labor and capital, unforgivably ignoring the efforts of managers in the capitalist countries to develop a feeling of responsibility on the part of the employees for the future of the company and the quality of output. The scientific and technical revolution introduced substantial changes in the nature of labor and the attitude toward man as the main productive force in society. Meanwhile, work on the theory of exploitation fell behind practical developments. Surmounting the gap between theory and practice is important not only in criticizing capitalism but also in mastering positive aspects in labor organization, for without this the further development of our economy is impossible.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

#### What Deputies Vote For

915B0002H Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 79-82

[Article by Boris Sergeyev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The editors have received the following letter from V. Voronov (Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast). "I, a reader of *KOMMUNIST*, would like to ask a question with the hope of receiving an answer. The question is the following: In our 1990 Budget the expenditures part includes the item "financing foreign trade and expenditures for state, banking and commercial operations and free aid to foreign countries and other expenditures related to international relations." This item calls for expenditures of 26.4 billion rubles out of a total of 200.9 billion. This is a huge amount. I would like to know what this item means, and how to interpret it. It seems to me that even the deputies who voted for this 26 billion understood nothing...."

The editors asked Candidate of Economic Sciences Boris Sergeyev, a specialist in international financial and foreign exchange relations to an interpretation. Following is his viewpoint.

Of late, greater interest has been shown in problems of the aid provided by the Soviet Union to foreign countries and to problems of the efficiency of foreign economic relations as a whole. This is very natural, for the precise and complete information about the state of affairs in this area is greatly needed today, not only in order to realize the depth of the crisis in which our economy has found itself but also in assessing the activities of the government and the deputies which approve or, conversely, criticize its actions, for the more costly to us does every ruble spent by the government become, the more important becomes the study of the expediency and the strict people's control over all state expenditures, particularly those in foreign currency.

Let me immediately point out that this budget article of interest to V. Voronov is one of the stumbling blocks down the complex path of the development of glasnost in our domestic and foreign economic affairs. Numerous publications dealing with Soviet finances, which consider various trends in their organization and functioning (including some aspects of defense financing) frequently fail even to mention foreign economic relations.

Although lacking the full array of data, I shall nonetheless try to expand our concept of this "puzzling" item and raise new questions for, it is my deep conviction, materials already published raise more questions than provide answers.

Thus, the third part of the published expenditures part of the state budget is entitled "Foreign Economic Activities." Its expenditures part includes three combined items: financing foreign trade, which includes the cost of covering the cost of export and import differentials in prices and internal prices; state loans—budget expenditures related to the Soviet government's loans granted to foreign countries—and financing operations related to giving them free aid; servicing the foreign debt, which is expenditures for paying the interest on loans obtained from abroad and repaying the principal. The income part consists of income from customs fees, exports and loans granted by the Soviet Union and payments it has received for the training of foreign citizens, income tax paid by foreign juridical persons, etc.

Traditionally, we have become accustomed to consider the part on foreign economic relations one of the favorable items in our budget. The 1990 Plan calls for spending for such purposes more than 26 billion rubles in budget funds, which would yield income totaling 58 billion rubles. In other words, each ruble will turn into an income of 2.25 rubles. All of this may seem excellent. But let us not be hasty with our conclusions.

The first item is financing foreign trade, i.e., subsidies granted to our exporters and importers. Such subsidies compensate for the price differential between the domestic and world markets in export and import operations. If the domestic prices of exported commodities are lower than world prices, the income part of the

budget is increased; in the opposite case, it is the expenditure part that rises. In the financing of imports the opposite situation prevails. State income increases if the domestic price of imported goods is higher than the world price. If it is lower, this becomes an additional cost to the state budget.

Energy carriers account for the highest share of Soviet exports—more than 50 percent—and petroleum accounts for the overwhelming share of such exports. Its domestic price is about 25 rubles per ton. In 1989 the average export price was slightly over 100 rubles (in the CEMA countries it was somewhat higher while in the case of countries paying in freely convertible currency it was lower). This gap ensures the exceptionally high efficiency of exporting the "black gold" and also explains its leading position in the structure of our exports. With an overall volume of exports of crude oil totaling 127 million tons, the budget revenue is about 8 billion rubles. Let us add to this, further significant revenue from exports of petroleum products and natural gas.

As we know, starting with 1991, one of the options in the wholesale price reform is raising petroleum prices to 70 rubles per ton. Naturally, this will not cover development costs of new deposits of nearly 130 rubles per extracted ton, which would substantially reduce the financial effectiveness of petroleum exports. Another reason for concern is the noted lag in petroleum extraction, one of the reasons for which is disruptions of equipment procurements from Azerbaijan, where the bulk of the enterprises in this sector is located. No more than 10 to 15 percent of the contracts are being fulfilled. Naturally, all of this does not contribute to feeling optimistic in projecting future "high" income.

A similar situation is developing in the case of other types of raw material goods which are the foundations of our exports.

A significant percentage of foreign trade financing is used to subsidize machine-technical exports. However, for the time being it would be difficult for us to do without such expenditures, for otherwise we cannot earn the amount of foreign exchange which the national economy requires.

Consumer goods are the biggest item of budget revenue from imports. Although they account for an insignificant percentage of imports, particularly from the developed capitalist countries, the price differentials make it possible not only to compensate for the less profitable and, in some cases, even losing purchases of equipment, looked at from the viewpoint of the budget, but also to show a considerable profit. Thus, many of our goods are sold abroad at prices substantially below domestic costs. Thus, passenger cars are sold at approximately half their production costs; the prices at which watches and furs are sold are several hundred percent below production costs. The producer is compensated for this differential out of budget funds. Subsequently, these costs are covered by selling imported goods domestically. It is thus

that goods we consider exotic, such as oranges, grapefruits, coffee, bananas, or video recorders yield a five-to 15-fold profit.

In the area of imports, one of the major expenditure items is the subsidized imports of Cuban unrefined sugar. The amount of this subsidy can be judged on the basis, for example, that we pay nearly five times more per ton of Cuban sugar than per ton of that same unrefined sugar purchased on world market prices, based on trade agreements concluded with Brazil.

The next item is state loans and free aid to foreign countries. Last year, appropriations for such purposes amounted to 12.5 billion rubles. This year they have been reduced to 9.7 billion, of which aid accounts for 1.6 billion. However, to whom and for what purposes and in what amounts such funds have been granted are ministry secrets. We know, however, that in the United States, for instance, the congress must approve both the specific recipient and the purpose of the aid.

The sum total of debts owed the Soviet Union from foreign loans is 85.8 billion rubles. The biggest recipients are Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia, Poland, India and Syria. We also know that more than half a billion rubles worth of debts have been written off and that in the past 4 years alone payment of 17.4 billion rubles has been postponed. All in all, according to the specialists, repayment of approximately one-half of the funds owed is doubtful.

Not particularly convincing in this connection are statements by some senior officials to the effect that thanks to the aid program we are meeting many of our needs, including procurements of fruits, textiles and other consumer goods. If we must pay double the price for such commodities, out of the state budget, and five times the amount out of the family budget, golden oranges become truly made of gold.

At this point we should stipulate that, actually, the amount of aid granted to foreign countries was not mentioned at the Supreme Soviet session, although in an interview given to TRUD (21 January 1990), N.I. Ryzhkov pointed out that the parliament approved it to the amount of 9.7 billion rubles. In reality, as the budget itself indicated, this figure includes state loans and free aid. In addition to these figures, the aid indicator includes the cost of the technical assistance provided by Soviet specialists and, above all, the quite substantial benefits granted in the form of discounts and markups in export-import prices and beneficial transportation rates in the area of foreign trade. Hence the conclusion that the overall amount of the aid is somewhat higher.

The sums included in this item roughly correspond to the data made public at international fora by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. In 1989 it was reported that our aid accounts for 1.4 percent of the GNP. This matches precisely that same amount of 12.5 billion rubles included in the budget. However, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations have always stated that

data submitted to the United Nations are for accountability purposes only and do not indicate that said amounts have been taken out of the national income. Aid includes a variety of preferential prices for goods and services and other benefits, estimated not on the basis of domestic Soviet but world prices. From the viewpoint of international comparisons, this approach is normal. However, the way this "figure computed on the basis of global prices" is included in the expenditures column of the state budget remains a mystery. The various departments may have different views on the same problem. However, is pluralism in statistical indicators admissible? Therefore, the real amount of the aid is as yet to be determined and confirmed.

An equal number of contradictions are related to another item: foreign debt servicing. In international prices this concept includes payments of principal and interest. The amount of payments included in the 1989 budget was 5.3 billion rubles. For this year it has been assessed as 6.2 billion. All in all, over the past 3 years, payments for this item have increased 60 percent.

It is interesting to note that these figures given by the Ministry of Finance are roughly consistent with Western assessments but are approximately half those cited by the head of the government at the First Congress of People's Deputies.

Another feature as well is noteworthy. Such payments are made in foreign currency, the overwhelming share of which in freely convertible currency. Their amount is converted into rubles based on the official rate of exchange and as such is used in computing the size of the deficit and its share in the overall amount of budget expenditures. Yet, as today everyone agrees, the official rate of exchange is very unrealistic. In the case of some payments it is only 10 percent of the actual figure. In the currency auctions held by the Foreign Economic Bank, the ratio between the domestic and the foreign exchange rate of the ruble is 1:27. In terms of prices of computers, the ratio is 1:40.

Acknowledging the fictitious nature of the official rate of exchange means that it is necessary to reassess the actual cost of foreign loans to the budget. Thus, if we take as a basis the rate of exchange on the consumer market (1:10), the cost to the budget of servicing the loan would be 13 percent, which is equivalent to the cost of defense and is only slightly lower than the cost of social insurance and social security. Correspondingly, the state budget deficit would thus increase by 60 billion rubles.

Including loans obtained from abroad into the revenue part of the budget causes serious doubts. Such funds are a means of covering the deficit. Could one consider as income a 5-ruble note borrowed until payday? No, for it must be repaid. The same applies to a loan, for otherwise the absurd situation would appear: the more loans we use the better the budget will look. Global experience indicates that such funds must be subtracted from the revenue part and entered as deficit of the state budget, as



was done in the past with the state loan fund. In that case the amount of the state budget deficit would exceed 250 billion rubles, accounting for more than 25 percent of the GNP (as compared to 3 percent in the United States).

Meanwhile, the spiraling increase of foreign borrowing is continuing. Now, after 4 years since the Chernobyl nuclear tragedy, we should become seriously concerned with whether we have not crossed, under the atmosphere of universal secrecy, the line of a financial Chernobyl. This may look like a sinister comparison but the handwriting is quite familiar: we say one thing and do something else. Already now the amount of nonpayment by Soviet importers is assessed in the West at more than \$1 billion.

We must not, in this case, console ourselves with the fact that more is owed to us. To begin with, given the existing growth rates of borrowing, the situation could change quite rapidly. Second, the nature of our indebtedness and moneys owed us is entirely different. We repay our loans in convertible currency. Meanwhile, the overwhelming part of what is owed us is being repaid with deliveries of goods by debtor countries. Furthermore, as we pointed out, a significant portion of such debts is unlikely to be repaid at all. In terms of the indicator of repayment of credits we are in one of the lowest positions among creditors.

All of these examples indicate that given the lack of a realistic rate of exchange of the ruble, we cannot accurately assess what the various outlays in foreign exchange are costing us. Nearly 2 years have passed since data on the state budget deficit were made public and we are just as ignorant of the real extent of the crisis of our state finances.

Until the question of determining the rate of exchange of the ruble has been solved, perhaps following the experience of some Eastern European countries, we should estimate the amount of national currency which must be invested in order to earn one dollar. In this case we must take into consideration all expenditures, including the ecological. Another way is possible as well: to remove all foreign exchange expenditures and income from the budget and have two budgets: in rubles and in foreign exchange. For the time being, adding two noncomparable indicators, let us point out that by no means are all foreign exchange expenditures included in this part. For example, it does not include appropriations for the cost of maintaining missions abroad, dues to international organizations and some other outlays related to the foreign economic activities of the state.

As we can see, the questions this item raises are substantially bigger than the answers. This is natural, for we are merely taking the initial steps toward glasnost, including in the economic area. The departments are firmly holding on to their monopoly on information even in the case of the deputies. In a number of areas of economic activities we are as yet to develop an information system which would be acceptable and understandable

throughout the world. This process will require a certain amount of time. However, we must not postpone the organization of a reliable system through which the government will supply information to the deputies. Unfortunately, inaccurate information is already becoming a regular occurrence.

Let us try to remember the last session of the old Supreme Soviet, when the then minister of finance B. Gostev reduced the amount of the state budget deficit by two-thirds. The supreme authority voted "for" it. At the very first congress of people's deputies, the government's report showed an increase of nearly 20 percent in the country's foreign indebtedness. Some parts dealing with foreign economic cooperation included four major inaccuracies which had international repercussions.

Let me recall them: the entire debt, including clearing accounts and accounts with CEMA members in convertible rubles (a total of 34 billion instead of 28 billion rubles as was subsequently stated) was quoted as income in freely convertible currency, even though the sum of entirely different types of debts, without stipulations, is inadmissible. The outlays for servicing the debt were listed at 12 billion rubles. Conversely, in the state budget the figure was 5.3 billion. The report listed expenditures on importing equipment, technologies and pipes and for paying loans "for which no funds are left." The point is that virtually all of the enumerated items are being purchased on credit. In other words, today we are paying for what we purchased several years ago. The summing of expenditures for imports and loans means double accounting. Once again the deputies did not voice their objections. However, the international markets reacted by immediately increasing the "cost" of loans to the USSR. At the Second Congress, against a background of a general worsening of the economic situation, the suggestion submitted by Deputy L. Shmelev of using the country's gold reserves as collateral was considered at the international financial markets as yet another alarming signal, with the same result: increasing the cost of loans to the USSR. This time the government kept silent.

The new session brought new difficulties. By the end of March millions of television viewers were able to watch A. Biryukov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, together with Supreme Soviet deputies who tried at length but in vain to locate the "vanished" 9 billion rubles which had been allocated for importing consumer goods. The deputies claimed that the government had appropriated 10 billion while the representative of the government claimed 1 billion rubles only. The entire problem was that this billion in foreign exchange would have made it possible to purchase goods worth 10 billion at domestic prices.

Several days later, speaking on Central Television, V. Nikitin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food Supplies and Purchases, stated that fruit purchases from Cuba had been reduced because of insufficient foreign exchange. How could one combine this insufficiency with postponing Cuba's

repayment of debts to our country, totaling 2.3 billion rubles, over the past 4 years.

Naturally, the deputies do not have to be familiar with all financial fine points nor are they bound to vote for something which they do not understand. With a conversion to market relations and gradual integration with the global economy, any inaccuracy which appears in the course of parliamentary debates assumes an entirely different value compared to the conditions of a command-ran economy. It increases the cost of new loans granted to us and the withholding of deposits, a revision of investment programs by foreign investors and many others.

Naturally, we cannot assign an expert to every deputy. However, it is entirely possible to have a group of controllers, which would enable us to avoid accidental inaccuracies and errors. The people's deputies have the right to immediate expert opinion directly at their sessions and not long afterwards, gained from journals and newspapers.

To this effect, the Supreme Soviet should have a small group for "operative reaction" consisting of experts who would be familiar not only with economic problems in general find their way in the "departmental kitchen" and in international practices, and would be able to block efforts at accidental or deliberate disinformation through preliminary or subsequent expert evaluations of projects, reports or statements. The examples we cited the existing committees either do not deal with such problems at all or are unable to cope with them. We should consider the legal status of such a group, and thus guarantee the independence of the experts. Naturally, such expert evaluations would cost something but the errors made by the Supreme Soviet are much more costly.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## THE STATE AND SOCIETY

### Electoral Campaign—Lessons for the Future

915B00021 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 83-93

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanchenko, consultant, USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Text] It would be no exaggeration to qualify the period from March 1989 to March 1990 as an electoral marathon. It was initiated by people campaigning for becoming USSR People's Deputy. Subsequently, this included candidates for deputies to republic and local state agencies. What have we learned after 1 year of active perestroika in the Soviet political system? What lessons should be drawn from it for future use? These are very relevant questions. The speed with which we shall

be able accurately to assess the results of these elections will greatly determine the future fate of political changes in the country.

## I

Rather thoughtlessly, this electoral campaign was described as the "first truly democratic elections in the USSR." This assessment could have been simply ignored, considering our old glorification habit. However, it contains a substantial portion of truth, for said campaign was indeed drastically different from the long string of previous electoral motions which resembled each other like drops of water. For the first time in many decades, we saw in the campaign an open political struggle and rivalry among candidates. It is precisely this that substantiates our claim that there has been a serious rejection of the previous concepts governing our electoral theory and practice, when the people were actually removed from any real participation in the exercise of power and when the very understanding of elections as expressing the attitude of the voters toward the regime had been turned upside-down: for many long years elections were nothing other than a test of the reliability and loyalty of the voters to the authorities.

The problems which currently confront the Soviet electoral system cannot be solved in one fell swoop, for they have been accumulating as a result of long years of deformations. Clearly, we shall require an entire transitional period in order to clear the obstructions which have become stacked up in our electoral system. Actually, such work has already started. Its first stage was the drafting and adoption of the USSR Law on the Election of USSR People's Deputies and the first set of changes in the USSR Constitution on problems related to the electoral system, which were enacted on 1 December 1988. It is obvious today that the two-step structure of legislative powers: congress-Supreme Soviet and direct representation by public organizations and district electoral meetings proved by no means universally accepted. It took less than 6 months for the majority of Union and autonomous republics to abandon the introduction within the system of their state agencies congresses of people's deputies (with the exception of the RSFSR and the Dagestan ASSR) and a direct representation of social organizations in such bodies (except for the Kazakh and Belorussian SSRs), as well as the holding of district electoral meetings (with the exception of the Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazakh SSRs).

Taking this into consideration, the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies introduced in the Union Constitution a set of new changes on matters related to the electoral system, which made it possible to eliminate disparities between the Union and republic legislations. In particular, deleted from the Constitution were stipulations on the mandatory election of republic congresses of people's deputies and Supreme Soviets, the direct representation of social organizations and a number of other stipulations which restricted the autonomy of the republics in such matters.

Let us assume that the passing of new republic laws on elections is only the beginning of a major reform in Soviet electoral legislation. Amending Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution by the Extraordinary Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies will require a more serious updating of electoral laws. The abandoning of the monopoly on power by the CPSU means that now, along with it and on an equal footing, other political parties as well as trade union, youth and other public organizations and mass movements will participate in the electoral campaign. This means that a radical renovation of electoral legislation is needed, based on multiparty elections.

By making the creation of new sociopolitical structures possible, our state took a major step toward democracy and a law-governed state. In fulfilling the functions stipulated in their programs and bylaws, all political parties, social organizations and mass movements must function within the framework of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws. This also pertains to their participation in elections. Here as well, we believe, one should not rely on having a great deal of time until the next electoral campaign: by-elections for vacant seats are already raising a number of problems. Therefore, it would be inexpedient to postpone the passing of new Union and republic legislation on parties and public organizations and their participation in the electoral campaign. This would delay the development of political processes in society.

Taking into consideration the situation which is actually developing in the Georgian SSR, for instance, election times for republic and local soviets have been postponed in order conceptually to redraft the recently passed laws on elections and structure them on a multiparty basis and only then hold the elections. Another form of compromise is that of the roundtable meetings of representatives of various social movements. Moldavia is an example of this. Initially it was considered somewhat unlikely that the Moldavian People's Front, the "Unity" Joint Movement, the Union of Moldavian Working People, the Humanists Club, the Union of War Veterans "Gagauz Khalky," the Peasant Union, the League of Women, the Bulgarian and Jewish cultural societies and other social organizations, divided on the basis of ethnic features, could reach agreement. Nonetheless, a political consensus was reached on the question of the republic's sovereignty, emigration problems, laws on languages, and guarantees of the rights of national minorities. This form of preliminary consultations could be used also in drafting electoral laws and setting up electoral commissions. Naturally, the final decisions should be made by the republic's parliament. However, the usefulness of such discussions is tremendous. They indicate that confrontations at meetings and hurling reciprocal insults and claims are not the best way leading to the truth. Possibly, roundtable meetings will become a regular form of work by turning into standing public fora.

The establishment of the position of president of the USSR also demands more active improvements to be

made in electoral legislation. Above all, this position substantially broadens the framework of the electoral system itself. Now it will include, in addition to elections for people's deputies, presidential elections as well and elections for other officials (chairmen of soviets, chairmen of executive committees). This will require essentially new approaches to strengthening the foundations of the electoral system in the Union and republic constitutions. It has already become clear that the country's fundamental law cannot exhaustively regulate all details of the electoral system. It would be expedient to codify within it only the basic principles: universal, equal and direct and secret balloting. All other, in my view, should be regulated by special Union and republic laws.

The institution of the position of president of the USSR is aimed at consolidating political and social movements, including elections. This should also be the purpose of the electoral laws aimed at a multiparty system, as well as laws on referendums, parties and public organizations. Many social organizations and movements hold diametrically opposite political views, and providing for them equal conditions for participation in the country's political life can be achieved only with the help of well thought-out laws and the efficient work of law enforcement authorities.

The electoral campaign for the election of republic and local soviets of people's deputies proved to be quite similar to the campaign for USSR People's Deputies. This was greatly assisted by the republic electoral laws which, as a whole, duplicated the concept of the Union law. The sole exception in this case was the Estonian SSR, where the laws were initially based on a multiparty system. The decision made by many republics to hold elections for republic and local soviets at the same time, greatly complicated the electoral campaign. Such was the case of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Kirghizia and Turkmenia. They encountered an array of organizational problems. The voters as well found themselves in a very difficult situation: under circumstances in which several candidates were competing for rural, rayon, oblast and republic soviets of people's deputies, and in individual districts, such as Moscow, for example, the voters were given several ballots some of which included as many as 50 names! Naturally, finding one's way in such a list was quite difficult.

The candidates for deputies as well lost as a result of this combination of times for holding elections for the parliament and for the local soviets. For example, if in Russia elections for republic people's deputies had taken place first and, after a while, for local soviets, candidates who had not been elected to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet would have had the opportunity to participate in electoral campaigns for local soviets. Yet what happened was that many potentially strong candidates remained outside the power system. The need for upgrading the professional standards of soviets is quite pressing.



For the time being, all that we can mention is that separate (in terms of time) elections for republic and local soviets were held in the Kazakh, Lithuanian, Latvian, Tajik and Estonian SSRs. In these republics elections were better organized and the share of other rounds of balloting and elections was lower.

Electoral commissions prepared and managed the elections for republic and local soviets. Practical experience proved that this is quite a responsible project which it would be undesirable to pass on to the small collegiums of deputies of the previous convocation, not to mention the executive authorities. In a number of areas, where the creation of commissions took place in secrecy, social tension broke out literally from the very beginning of the electoral campaign. Naturally, it would be unfair, in general, to remove from this work the presidiums of soviets, without the help of which the electoral commissions would have hardly been able to resolve problems of the material and technical support needed for the elections. It is obvious, however, that the presidiums must not manage the procedure for setting up the commissions. This procedure must take place as publicly as possible, on the basis of representation of organizationally established main political forces which intend to participate in the elections.

In all likelihood, greater attention will have to be paid in the future to defining the status of the electoral commissions and to upgrading their responsibility for the decisions they make. Some changes have already been made in that direction. Many Union republics decided to set up not only republic but also district permanent electoral commissions for the election of republic people's deputies. However, they did not include territorial electoral commissions in charge of managing the elections of deputies for local soviets. Very promising on this level is the experience of Belorussia and Estonia, where unified systems of electoral commissions for elections on all levels of soviets, headed by a central electoral commission of the republic, were created. This made possible to eliminate the influence of excessively zealous local administrators on the commissions, and to assign to the latter the full responsibility for the efficient observance of electoral laws. It would be logical to introduce a legal procedure for appealing illegal decisions made by the electoral commissions. This would make them truly independent of the power and management authorities and subordinate them exclusively to the laws. Currently, in accordance with electoral laws, one can appeal to the court only irregularities in the lists of voters. In practice, such cases are rare although this too must not be excluded. In my view, it would be expedient, in general, substantially to broaden the range of electoral affairs decided by the courts: they could include controversial problems in the setting up of electoral commissions, the nomination of candidates for deputies, their use of funds, etc.

## II

It would be no exaggeration to say that the gravest problem in the past elections was determining the range of participants in the nomination of candidates for deputies. In general, the Soviet Constitution has codified the basic changes which had taken place in the course of the reforms in the Soviet electoral system. Above all, let us note the expanded range of participants in the electoral process. In addition to traditional units, such as labor collectives, social organizations and meetings of military servicemen in armed forces units, today the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies has been given also to collectives of secondary special and higher educational institutions and voters' meetings at places of residence. First in this list, in accordance with the amendments which were codified through the USSR Constitution on 1 December 1988, are, as we can see, the labor collectives. Indeed, of late they have played the main role in the nomination of candidates. The question that arises is the extent to which this is justified and whether such a trend is a positive one.

Let us recall that in accordance with the 1936 Soviet Constitution, the right to "nominate" candidates for deputies was granted only to the social organizations and societies of working people. This right was not granted to meetings of voters at their place of residence or meetings of labor collectives. However, as early as the start of the 1960s, the right to nominate candidates was granted, in addition to the social organizations, also to the general meetings of peasants in kolkhozes and to workers and employees in sovkhozes. Already then the special role of production collectives in the country's political life was affirmed. The reason was less the idea of democratizing social life than somehow compensating for the obvious alienation of the working people from politics, which had developed as a result of the one-party system. The logical completion of this process was the codification in the 1977 Soviet Constitution of the status of labor collectives as "the most important element" in the political system of society and granting them the right to nominate candidates for deputies.

Subsequent practical experience proved that the labor collectives were the units most easily controllable through manipulations relative to the nomination of candidates by the apparat, while the social organizations lost even more of their already weak positions in the electoral process. Let us note that giving priority to labor collectives in political life is a rather unusual means, typical only of our country, ensuring the participation of the electorate in setting up representative authorities. Frequently it is justified by references to the advantages noted by V.I. Lenin of elections based on production electoral districts. Indeed, Lenin considered the close and steadily renewable ties between soviets and production cells a radical advantage of soviets compared to the bourgeois parliament. Unquestionably, its significance has not been lost to this day. However, it would be hardly justified today to reduce the problem to duplicating the experience of the first elections of soviets of people's deputies by production district which, at that time, was

based above all on class principles or, even more precisely, on the principle of excluding the former exploiters from participation in the electoral process. We believe that, in itself, the question of the representation of the different social groups in the soviets, workers and peasants above all, is worthy of closer attention but not for the sake of looking back but of the multiparty system which is developing today and, consequently, of the need to develop a reciprocal understanding among all social forces.

Under contemporary conditions, strengthening the ties between soviets and production collectives is important not only in the course of elections but also in the daily activities of the deputies. Nonetheless, practical experience proves that, as in the past, the main emphasis is precisely the stage at which the candidates are nominated and nothing else. This approach not only fails to solve the problem of taking into consideration the interests of the various social groups in the activities of the soviets but, conversely, makes it even worse. The practice of alternate elections indicated that today it is insufficient simply to nominate a candidate. He must be "accompanied" to the end and given comprehensive assistance. As a rule, successful candidates are not only those who can convince their own collective but also all voters of their readiness to do the difficult work of deputy. Surveys and the social status of the candidate frequently play a secondary role. The voters are looking above all at what someone can do for them.

Nonetheless, the significance of the social and professional composition of the corps of deputies must not be underestimated. What did practical experience show? In the course of elections for RSFSR People's Deputies the labor collectives nominated 75.6 percent of all candidates. Social organizations nominated 21.5 percent and meetings at places of residence nominated no more than 3.2 percent. However, no more than some 6 percent of the elected deputies turned out to be workers, and the number of kolkhoz members was even smaller. The advantage which the labor collectives had at the initial stage of the electoral campaign was lost as its end neared.

The situation in the other Union republics was roughly the same. Even in Lithuania, where the level of activity of political parties and movements was the highest, about 70 percent of candidates for deputies to the republic's Supreme Soviet were nominated at meetings at places of work and residential areas. However, the victory went to the candidates supported by the social organizations and movements. This became possible because they were more energetic in the subsequent stages of the electoral campaign and, in particular, in the course of promoting their candidates. It is true that we must take into consideration the fact that parties and social organizations, familiar with the "loophole" in the law governing the nomination of candidates, made active use to this effect precisely of the labor collectives and only then took under their wing their own candidates. It was only in the Estonian SSR that the percentage of candidates nominated by labor collectives

remained relatively low. However, here the social organizations had all the necessary opportunities for the independent nomination of candidates.

The following question arises: What will be the further correlation in the participation of labor collectives, social organizations, and meetings of voters by place of residence in the nomination of candidates? We believe that already now a trend has become apparent of a redistribution of their share in the electoral process. Although in the case of the social organizations the results are, for the time being, not all that impressive, it is precisely they, we believe, that will have priority in setting up electoral commissions and in the nomination of candidates for deputies.

The current deployment of forces, in which the main role is played by labor collectives, is largely predetermined by the imperfect nature of electoral legislation. Suffice it to recall that in the course of elections for USSR People's Deputies, the right to nominate candidates was also granted to labor collectives numbering literally just a few individuals. Such small collectives had an equal right to nominate several candidates. The result was that in some electoral districts there were several dozen running candidates for deputies, which created a number of difficulties in organizing and holding the elections. Against this background, meetings of voters at places of residence found themselves in clearly unsuitable conditions. Convening such meetings and the procedure for holding them proved to be excessively strictly regulated.

Nonetheless, in my view, the future belongs not to meetings of voters at home and not to labor collectives. They could hardly become worthy competitors of parties and social organizations, the number of which is multiplying with every passing day, whose main purpose is to take part in elections. The nomination of candidates at places of residence and places of work, particularly in Supreme Soviet elections will, obviously, play a certain role only during the period of establishing a multiparty system. During that time, in order to increase the responsibility of labor collectives, social organizations and voters' meetings, it would be quite useful to have them pay for the registration of each candidate they nominate. To begin with, this step would contribute to a more weighed approach to the nomination of candidates and, second, would encourage helping them in the struggle for deputy seats throughout the subsequent stages of the electoral process. However, as confirmed by the practice of the last elections, it was precisely at this point that labor collectives and voters' meetings at places of residence proved quite inconsistent. In the course of the electoral campaign the labor collectives proved that they could cope with even the most stressed plans of "delivering" candidates and, subsequently, bear no responsibility at all for them. In Leningrad, for example, rayon departments of the Society of Disabled nominated candidates for deputies to local soviets in three-digit numbers, although the candidates frequently had nothing to do with them or their problems. Let us note that in this

case the RSFSR Electoral Law was not violated. This emphasizes, once again, its basic imperfection.

Nonetheless, it would be unwise totally to reject the participation of labor collectives in shaping and governing the activities of local soviets of people's deputies. Applying the principles of local self-management will require a closer interaction among soviets and enterprises located on their territory. Where, if not within the local representative authorities, could all problems which arise be resolved?

In the course of the election of people's deputies to republic and local soviets in the Estonian SSR the petition system for the nomination of candidates was tested. In the course of this procedure, it sufficed for a nomination to submit to the electoral commission the legally required number of signatures by voters supporting the candidate. The nomination of a candidate for deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR required no less than 75 signatures; for a city soviet, no less than 50; and for a rural or settlement, no less than 25. Any voter who would be responsible for the legitimacy of the signatures could start gathering them.

Electoral commissions had the right to check the legitimacy of the signatures. However, they did this only if someone complained. Despite the fears, there was no excessive number of nominations based on petitions. We must point out that this procedure was used mainly by small social organizations and unregistered political parties. This system was highly rated in villages and small settlements where this form of nomination of voters was considered the most convenient.

### III

The last electoral campaign proved that the social organizations, despite legislative limitations, noticeably intensified their work in the course of the elections. Thus, in Lithuania an open electoral struggle for deputy seats in the supreme authority was waged among members of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, members of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), members of the social democratic, democratic and Christian-democratic parties, the "Greens" and others. In Estonia, the right to nominate candidates for elections to local soviets and to the republic's Supreme Soviet was given to the Estonian Communist Party, the Estonian People's Front, the trade unions, the cooperative organizations, the Estonian Komsomol, associations of women, labor and war veterans, and scientific workers, creative associations, and other legally registered social organizations and social movements and electoral alliances.

The latter deserve particular attention, for they are an essentially new form of association used exclusively for purposes of the electoral campaign. Legally, this form was established only in Estonia. For example, the Tallinn Electoral Alliance rallied organizations and movements such as the People's Front, the Union of Labor Collectives, the Society for the Preservation of Monuments and

an entire range of other groups. This union assumed full responsibility for promoting the candidates who, in turn, pledged to support its platform. Furthermore, the candidates certified that they would not vote in some districts or, in general, participate in the elections, should the tactics of the electoral alliance so require. The alliance engaged in electoral campaigning based on the importance of the candidacies. On the posters the names of the candidates by district were listed not alphabetically but in accordance with their rating. The results of the activities of the Tallinn Electoral District proved impressive: the majority of the deputies to the city soviets who were elected were its candidates.

Electoral blocs developed into a more popular variety of electoral associations. Two largest such blocs could be singled out in the RSFSR: "Democratic Russia" and "Russian Sociopatriotic Movements," which came out with extensive electoral programs. Other political groups were created as well. Although most electoral laws in the republic were based on the single-party system, informal associations were able to achieve quite substantial results, particularly in the large industrial centers. This phenomenon is as yet to be studied. Obviously, however, the main thing now is the fact that the informals were able to achieve success thanks to the concentration of their main promotion efforts not of individual candidates but of entire tickets of candidates who supported their platform. This was the basic distinguishing feature of the past elections, compared to the elections for USSR People's Deputies, in which the voters voted for the personality, social status and professional qualities of the candidate. In less than 1 year the emphasis had shifted: priority was given to promoting the political features of the candidate and the program he supports. This was most clearly visible in the appeal of the "For a Latvian State and for a Free Individual" electoral alliance, whose main slogan was loyalty to the cause of renovation while the position held was "left to the formalists." This is an indication that the process of political awareness is increasingly penetrating within society. The voters are voting less for a specific candidate than for the political force which supports him.

Unfortunately, this trend was not noticed on time by many organizations within the CPSU, the trade unions and the Komsomol. In a number of cases they were unable to formulate clear electoral programs and rally their supporters within united blocs. Furthermore, the constructive ideas and slogans initiated by the ruling party were taken up by many other associations to which they brought success. This situation largely predetermined the improperly chosen tactics in the electoral struggle, subordinated to the principle that what mattered was not "who" was nominated but who nominated him. We believe that for a party which had surrendered the monopoly on power and, furthermore, with weakened unity within its ranks, this was an unforgivable tactical error. The party thus actually provided its rivals with a firm forum. Indicative in this respect was Lithuania, where the independent Lithuanian Communist



Party also went to the elections for the republic's Supreme Soviet with similar slogans. The result was that Saudis, which officially is not considered a party but which, nonetheless, actively used the tactic of uniting its candidates under the flag of a single platform, benefited. Furthermore, Algirdas Brazauskas, whose rating in the republic was quite high, was not elected chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. This too was the consequence of the dispersal of communist forces, as a result of which they failed to obtain a parliamentary majority.

It is more likely that the ruling party forgot its old firm foundation: "The inviolable bloc of communists and nonparty people." Understandably, in the course of time this slogan had assumed a formal nature. However, the idea is essentially correct and, above all, functional. It was precisely thanks to it that many informals succeeded! We believe that, as whole, the ruling party and the party organizations in cities and rayons simply had no right to fail to state the political and socioeconomic problems they intended to emphasize and undertake to resolve, initially in the course of the electoral campaign and, subsequently, in the newly elected soviets of people's deputies. The jointly formulated program of the various groups, supporting specific candidates, makes it possible to provide a more accurate guidance to the voters, the more so since under contemporary conditions they must choose among several dozen candidates. For example, the "Democratic Russia" bloc used the system of related and combined promotion of all of its candidates, although they were running for soviets on different levels. Thus, in Moscow many voters received brief appeals signed by the leaders of the interregional deputy group. They were asked to vote for specific candidates for the Russian Parliament and for the local soviets. This led their rivals to accuse them of violating the rules of the electoral campaign. They also pointed out the scarcity of paper. We believe that if there is food for thought in this case, it should be a question, above all, of the fact that the voters were given a prepared "prompting" concerning the candidate to vote for, which maximally facilitated their. However, this is a fully admissible form of promotion. In this case we should have considered what prevented that same city party committee from drafting its own program for the elections and rallying its candidates and, finally, campaigning for them with the same method.

The electoral results were influenced also by the fact that, as in the past, the party committees were structuring their work on the basis of the production principle. However, the voters had become tired after decades of production pressure. The informals shifted the center of gravity in the electoral campaign to the place of residence. For the first time in many years, the candidates went to the voters rather than vice versa and the voters could not fail to appreciate this.

The rather high percentage of communists elected to the soviets on different levels is not in itself an indicator of the full support given to the CPSU at the last elections. The communist "factions" in the soviets of the new

convocation are unlikely to be unanimous in their decisions. Many party members felt, in the course of the elections, that they were left to their own devices. Obviously, they will try to make their independence from the party committees in their future work as deputies clear.

One can dare to insist that the numerous conflicts related to the participation of the social organizations in the elections were, actually, predetermined. In the majority of Union republics the people simply deviated from the legislation concerning the status of social organizations and their participation in the elections. The Supreme Soviets of the previous convocation shifted the burden of unsolved problems to the new body of deputies, thus substantially worsening the stress of the situation within society.

The stipulations of electoral laws, concerning social organizations, clearly confirm that the legislator deems as such, above all, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations. However, this is only half the problem. The stipulation of the law to the effect that the nomination of a candidate must take place only at plenums of elected authorities of social organizations excluded from the electoral campaign general meetings, conferences and even congresses of social organizations. The legislator thus created a most favorable system for small collegiums of electoral authorities, eliminating from participation in the elections the members of social organizations. In frequent cases three to four people, members of the rayon board of an organization, would nominate several candidates for deputies to the local soviet while the general assembly of that same social organization would have no such prerogatives.

The artificial classification of social organizations based on the Union, republic, kray or oblast scale of their activities and, consequently, assigning them to the respective soviets in the elections of whose members they were given the right to participate, was another error. The prehistory of this problem is the following: the previous electoral laws contained an approximate list of social organizations with the right to nominate candidates for deputies. Other social organizations would not even dream of receiving such an honor. The USSR Law on the Election of USSR People's Deputies, as we know, stipulated direct representation of all-Union social organizations, while the right to nominate candidates for USSR People's Deputies by electoral district was given to republic and other social organizations. The republic laws on elections were an almost word-for-word duplication of the Union law on the participation of social organizations in the nomination of candidates by electoral district. It was natural to assume that this right would be given to all social organizations, regardless of the scale of their activities, the more so since the right to nominate candidates for RSFSR People's Deputies was given to labor collectives, meetings of voters at places of residence and meetings of military servicemen in military units of relatively small size. In practice, however, this did not take place. In violation of the laws on the election of people's deputies for republics, their central

electoral commissions issued instructions which prohibited the participation in the nomination of candidates by social organizations lacking a republic structure. Therefore, elements of direct representation of exclusively republic social organizations were introduced in electoral practices. In the absolute majority of Union republics (with the exception of Belorussia and Kazakhstan) this was not stipulated by the law.

Let us consider the outcome of this decision. Above all, it excluded from the electoral campaign for the election of people's deputies of Union republics a large number of informal associations and organizations which had not organized their republic-level structures. Obviously, this was the main purpose for the decision. However, this also limited the rights of many national, cultural and ethnic social organizations on the level of autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, not to mention kray, city and rayon organizations. This was an excessively high price to be paid for conditions benefiting the activities of individual organizations, particularly bearing in mind the present condition of interethnic relations....

The obvious gaps in the electoral laws, concerning the participation of social organizations in the electoral campaign, led to attempts on the part of the central electoral commissions of republics to settle such matters independently. In a number of cases they introduced essentially new standards governing electoral laws. This situation cannot be tolerated. It is a question of the exercise of governmental power and, consequently, of the exclusive competence of its superior authorities to regulate this area of social relations. Electoral commissions do not have the right to amend them. If necessary, they could submit to the respective supreme soviets concepts on the interpretation of electoral laws.

For the sake of fairness, let us note that the legislation of individual Union republics not only did not limit but, conversely, expanded the participation of different social organizations in the electoral campaign. For example, the Belorussian SSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies to Local Soviets stipulated that the nomination of candidates for deputies by social organizations is done by the oblast, rayon, city and urban rayon agencies, while nomination for urban (cities on the rayon administration), settlement and rural soviets, also at meetings of primary organizations. The Law on the Election of People's Deputies to Local Soviets of the Latvian SSR stipulates that the nomination of candidates for deputies must be made by rayon, city and city rayon authorities of the social organizations, their primary organizations and the general meetings (meetings of representatives) of kolkhozes and their subdivisions. The legislation of the Estonian SSR calls for an even broader range of social organizations with the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies.

The elections in the Union republics indicated that whereas in some republics there was an actual and a legal

conversion to a multiparty system for holding elections, this process was only beginning in other.

It would be no exaggeration to say that republic electoral laws have made a very great contribution to the democratization of social life. Although based on a single party system, under the conditions of the establishment of a multiparty system they highlighted an entire system of restrictions, traditionally applied in Soviet electoral practices without legitimacy. Ignored by the legislator were problems of setting up the electoral commissions, the use of material and financial funds and many other problems which can in no case be considered either petty or insignificant. This calls for the immediate revision of the entire concept of soviet electoral legislation and shaping it within a streamlined system of standards of material and procedural law which would take into consideration contemporary trends in our social development.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PAGES FROM HISTORY

### Stalin's Letters to Molotov

915B0002J Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 94-106

[Article prepared by scientific associates of the CPSU Central Committee Institute for Marxism-Leninism: I.N. Kitayev, candidate of historical sciences; L.P. Kosheleva; V.S. Lelchuk, doctor of historical sciences; V.P. Naumov, doctor of historical sciences; and O.V. Khlevnyuk, candidate of historical sciences, based on documents studied in the course of preparing "Ocherkov Istorii KPSS" [Studies on CPSU History]. The selection of letters will be published in full in IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS]

[Text] The letters presented to our readers attention are stored in the Central Party Archives of the CPSU Central Committee Institute for Marxism-Leninism, where V.M. Molotov sent them in December, 1969. Regardless of their somewhat fragmented nature, these documents enable us to substantially expand and elaborate on existing concepts on the nature and mechanism of the country's party and state leadership at the turn of the 1920-1930's.

It is known that I.V. Stalin conducted such business correspondence with his colleagues mainly when he was out of Moscow on vacation. Not wishing at that time to let the situation in the higher echelons of power get beyond of his control, he carefully directed the activities of the Politburo and gave its members "advice" and instructions. This practice was constant. In 1932, L.M. Kaganovich reported, for instance, to G.K. Ordzhonikidze: "From our master, as before, we receive regular and frequent directives, giving us the possibility of not overlooking anything. True, in fact he has to work

(during vacation—author). However, nothing can be done otherwise." The last phrase in Kaganovich's letter is not simply an expression of "loyal sentiments." This system really was built relying on the leader's one-man guidance and could no longer function any other way. Stalin kept all the most important problems of the country's development under his control. Moreover, his opinions on them inevitably acquired the force of law. The logic of Stalinist acts and decisions was displayed most fully, of course, not in his public speeches, but in the "especially secret" documents above all, in his correspondence.

The letters presented below fully support such a conclusion. Events related to making a turn away from the NEP [New Economic Policy], toward the policy which now is most often characterized as the course toward strengthening the administrative-command system, held the center of attention in them.

Unquestionably, the struggle between Stalin and Bukharin's group, victory in which was one of the turning points on the way to asserting a regime of personal power, could be considered a key point in this history. The circumstances of this struggle, which occurred in 1928-1929, have been studied relatively fully. We know far less about the events of 1930, which occurred under the slogans of "stirring up the country," of unrestrained, forced industrialization and of forced collectivization. At precisely that time, the last attempts to resist Stalin's plans were suppressed.

Most of the published letters were written under conditions of the dramatic reorganization of agriculture, which in a brief period significantly undermined the production forces of the countryside and deprived millions of people. At the same time, capital investments in heavy industry were groundlessly increased. As a result, a crisis seized the country. The population's standard of living dropped sharply. Labor productivity in industry decreased. The complete derangement of the financial system attested to the extreme trouble in the economy. Increasing inflation undermined the ruble. Along with the inclusion of the urban population in a rationing system, there was increased barter of commodities, exchanged in the free markets between the city and countryside. Once again, soap, thread, sugar, textiles and shoes became monetary units. Paper money increasingly lost its value, and people preferred small silver change, which disappeared from circulation and turned into an object of speculation and accumulation.

The growing crisis objectively weakened Stalin's position. In the party, his policy was criticized ever more often. One of the most painful blows for Stalin was the opposition of a recently elected candidate member of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo and the appointed chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom, S.I. Syrtsov. Not wishing to accept any criticism whatsoever, Stalin continued to make the intra-party regime stricter and dealt with all who were dissatisfied with a firm hand. M.N. Ryutin was among the victims of these reprisals at that

time. For disagreeing with Stalin's policy, he was dismissed from the position of secretary of the Moscow Krasnopresnenskiy Raykom at the end of 1928. Two years later, Ryutin was expelled from the Party and arrested on a denunciation. As the letters attest, Stalin played an active role in this matter, having strived in truth at any price to assert a regime of personal power.

After the political defeat of Bukharin's group, he succeeded in many ways in coming closer to this goal. A clear confirmation of this is Stalin's celebration of his 50th birthday in December 1929, unprecedented in terms of scale. Nonetheless, he still saw a number of obstacles on his path. In his opinion, "the gap between soviet and party leadership" was one of the main ones. The embodiment of this "gap" was A.I. Rykov, who, regardless of political defeat in 1929, had retained the high state post of chairman of the Sovnarkom [SNK] and chairman of the USSR Council for Labor and Defense.

Rykov, who had replaced V.I. Lenin in the post of SNK chairman, enjoyed great authority in the party and in the country. The first of the letters gives a definite idea of Rykov's influence even after April 1929, when the "right" had suffered a definitive defeat, as well as of the methods by which Stalin gradually removed him from power. Its subject was Rykov's speech to the Moscow Oblast Congress of Soviets at the end of September 1929. In terms of tone and content, it was the speech of a Sovnarkom chairman who possessed full powers. As PRAVDA reported, the hall met it "with loud, continued applause, which became an ovation." Stalin's reaction soon followed. Literally a day after the appearance of this speech in the press, he firmly advised his supporters to condemn Rykov and finally deprive him of the right to chair Politburo meetings. Stalin's sharp demands were accepted. On 5 October 1929, the Politburo passed a resolution that stated: "...in his speech at the Moscow Oblast Congress of Soviets, Comrade Rykov avoided a central issue of party policy. Comrade Rykov did not note the decisive role of the party, which, despite the right-wing and the compromisers with the right-wing deviation and in systematic struggle against them, has provided the greatest successes in fulfilling the 5-year economic plans. He entirely avoided the question of the struggle against the right-wing deviation, not having disassociated himself from the right-wing, regardless of well-known party and Komintern resolutions. The fact that, in the indicated speech, Comrade Rykov completely avoided the most important issue of party policy concerning state procurements, on which the Party had and still has radical disagreements with the right-wing, also attests to this. All this shows that Comrade Rykov has violated the decisions of the April Central Committee Plenum, which emphasized that the right-wing deviation is the main danger in the party, and instructed every party member, especially Central Committee members, to wage a decisive struggle against the right deviation and against compromise with it." Nonetheless, Stalin did not decide to raise the question of removing Rykov from the post of Sovnarkom chairman immediately; as always, he prepared it by degrees and carefully.



It is no accident in those days that the officials in close contact with the head of the government evoked his constant irritation and dissatisfaction. Stalin's letters attacked G.L. Pyatakov, chairman of Gosbank, N.P. Bryukhanov, people's commissar of finances and former people's commissar of finances and, in 1930, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, ambassador plenipotentiary to Great Britain, V.V. Shmidt, USSR SNK deputy chairman, I.A. Teodorovich, former deputy of Narkomzem, E.I. Kvirin, deputy chairman of Gosplan, and M. Bogolepov, chief of the budget and financial section of this department. Stalin accused them of complicity with the old specialists and a lack of desire to implement the policy of the party Central Committee. Study of the real facts indicates: in reality, the specific decisions made by the above-mentioned leaders and the economic departments that they headed rarely opposed the Stalinist policy of administration: pressure and arbitrariness.

The circumstances of one of these conflicts between Stalin and the leadership of the financial agencies are explained in the letters. It was a question of measures in the struggle against the disappearance of small change and, more broadly, of improving the financial system on the whole. In connection with the crisis, the leaders of Gosbank and the People's Commissariat for Finances suggested changing the fundamental attitude toward commodity-monetary relations, discarding the ultra-left theories that propagandized the rapid fading away of money, strengthening finances by increasing the output of extensively consumed goods, by using part of export funds in the internal market, by introducing a system of purposeful loans for broadly consumed items, for strengthening the financing of capital construction, etc. In order to overcome the scarcity of small change, the increased minting of it was suggested. In practice, all these measures meant a substantial change in the policy of the maximally rapid development of heavy industry at any price. Therefore, Stalin sharply condemned the proposals of the financial bodies and advanced his own prescriptions for solving the problem: "mandatorily execute 2-3 dozen saboteurs" from the financial departments and more energetically conduct the OGPU [Special Government Political Administration] operation against speculators in small change.

Stalin personally directed these operations. On 2 August 1930, he sent the following letter to V.R. Menzhinskiy, OGPU chairman: "Send information on the results of the struggle against speculators in small change (how much silver was taken, and in what time period; which institutions are most of all involved in this work; the role of foreign countries and their agents; how many people in general have been arrested, what kind of people precisely, etc.). Also, report Your considerations on measures for further struggle." A few days later, the required information was sent to Stalin. On 9 August, in response, he rebuked Menzhinskiy: "I have received your information. Your point of view is correct. There can be no doubt of this. However, the problem is that the results of the operations to remove small change are

almost deplorable: 280,000 rubles is a trifling matter. It is hardly worth providing information about it. Apparently, you stung the cashiers a bit and then rested content, as often happens here. That is not good." As is obvious from his letters, Stalin rejected the previously passed Politburo resolution to release small nickel change, which was rapidly revoked.

Stalin's instructions on financial matters reflected the then-prevailing understanding of the methods of economic leadership. Once again, this was fully displayed at the end of 1930, when the next attempt was made to give impetus to forced industrialization with the help of administrative pressure, the broad use of assault methods of labor organization, and stricter labor legislation. The program of sorts for this campaign was the VKP(b) Central Committee address "On the 3rd Year of the 5-Year Period," the idea for which, as the published materials indicate, came from Molotov and was approved by Stalin. In this regard, an intransigent attribute of economic policy was the super-charging of the so-called "class struggle." Loudly publicized actions to reveal "saboteurs," etc., became the norm. One purpose of these measures was to distract society's attention from the true causes of the troubles, to put the blame for failures on the false "saboteurs." In this regard, 1930 was only the beginning stage. However, already at that time, as the given documents show, Stalin personally ordered the execution without trial of 48 specialists accused of trying "to create starvation in the country and to generate dissatisfaction among the broad working masses, and thus assist in restraining the dictatorship of the proletariat."

A report on the execution of the "supply saboteurs" was publicized in September 1930. This was the "bone," thrown to a people tormented by food supply difficulties, having promised that the situation would improve after the eradication of sabotage. By this time, the OGPU had also obtained the confessions of a large group arrested in the cases of the so-called "Labor Peasant Party," the "United Bureau of Mensheviks" and the "Promparty." However, Stalin was in no hurry to play this "card." The letters shed light on many circumstances of the political processes of 1930-1931 and reveal Stalin's role in preparing them.

In fabricating cases concerning a widespread network of counterrevolutionary sabotage parties, the OGPU arrested a large group of prominent specialists from the central economic departments. Basically, these were well-known scientists who had begun their work before the revolution, and many were recent political proponents of the bolsheviks. In the 1920s, inspired by the ideas of the NEP, they switched to the side of Soviet power and actively labored to strengthen the country's economy. They included Professor N.D. Kondratyev, a former SR and associate of the Ministry of Food during the Provisional Government, who worked in the Soviet agricultural agencies and headed the Market Institute of the People's Commissariat for Finances; Professor L.N. Yurovskiy, a collegium member of the same people's

commissariat; Professors N.P. Makarov and A.V. Chayanov, who worked in the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Land Use; and Professor P.A. Sadyrin, a former member of the Central Committee of the People's Freedom Party who was on the board of directors of USSR Gosbank. The experienced statistician and economist V.G. Groman had remained a menshevik until 1921, then worked for Gosplan and the USSR TsSU. Another prominent menshevik, V.A. Bazarov, an associate of USSR Gosplan since 1921, took roughly the same path. N.N. Sukhanov, a writer with whom V.I. Lenin debated, worked in the economic bodies and in the Soviet trade offices in Berlin and Paris in the 1920s. On 10 October 1917, in the apartment of Sukhanov, whose wife was a bolshevik, the famous meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee was held, which was a turning point on the way to organizing the armed uprising. Yet, in 1930, Stalin demanded the interrogation of Sukhanov's wife on the subject of "the disgraceful things that happened in their home."

Soon, through the efforts of the OGPU, which Stalin attentively directed, documents were prepared concerning an allegedly powerful network of interconnected anti-Soviet organizations in many state institutions. The leaders of departments where "saboteurs" had been exposed were put in a difficult situation. In the best case, over them hung the threat of accusations of "political blindness," and then of direct complicity with saboteurs. The confessions, illegally obtained from those arrested, compromised Rykov, Kalinin and Teodorovich. One of the key lines of these "confessions" was the verification of an organic link between the programs of "anti-Soviet parties" and of the "right-wing opposition." Thus, Stalin had new "evidence" at his disposal against all the party leaders, whom he intended to get rid of or whom he decided to frighten.

The documents being published indicate how the confessions of those arrested were used. Above all, Stalin used them in trying to cast a shadow on Rykov and on the "right-wing" and hesitant Kalinin, to blacken them in the eyes of a broad circle of party and state leaders, primarily members of the party Central Committee, who were faced, in Stalin's reckoning, with making a decision about Rykov in a brief period of time. Stalin's proposal to distribute the confessions of the accused was rapidly implemented. Many people received the typographically published book "Documents on the Case of the Counterrevolutionary 'Labor Peasant Party' and Sukhanov-Groman Group (from the Materials of OGPU Investigative Proceedings)." It contained the minutes of the interrogations, conducted from 27 July to 2 September 1930, of Kondratyev, Yurovskiy, Makarov, Chayanov, Sadyrin, Groman and others who were arrested.

The "confessions" arranged a definite scenario: the OGPU had allegedly discovered a counterrevolutionary "Labor Peasant Party" [TKP] (the central committee chairman was Kondratyev), which had an organization in Moscow and a "strong periphery." The central committee of this party, as the OGPU showed, met regularly

and had even planned the structure of the future government, headed by Kondratyev. It was to have come to power as a result of an armed uprising. The TKP Central Committee, as the published "confessions" confirmed, had close ties with the emigrant White "Republican Democratic Association," which included the emigrant leaders P. Milyukov, S. Maslov, A. Kerenskiy, B. Bratskus, S. Prokopovich and Ye. Kuskova. On the one hand, the OGPU investigators "linked" the TKP Central Committee to the "counterrevolutionary organization" of Sukhanov-Groman-Bazarov (it would soon think up the name of "United Bureau of Mensheviks"). Allegedly, with it they discussed matters of the structure of a future government, participation in the organization of peasant uprisings, and so on.

In fabricating the case, the OGPU also claimed that the TKP Central Committee was "in communication" with a certain engineering and industrial center, which included leading specialists: L.K. Ramzin, director of the Thermal Technical Institute; V.A. Larichev, presidium member of USSR Gosplan; A.A. Fedotov, collegium chairman, Scientific Research Textile Institute; S.V. Kupriyanov, technical director of the USSR "Orgtekstil" VSNKh, and others. It "fell" to the lot of Chayanov to be the TKP Central Committee representative at the engineering and industrial center. He supposedly regularly informed the TKP Central Committee of the development of measures aimed at bringing the country's entire economic life to a halt at the moment of intervention.

Soon, in December 1930, the arrested engineers (Ramzin, Larichev, Fedotov, Kupriyanov and others) were tried in the so-called "Promparty" case. At the same time, a noisy propaganda campaign was arranged surrounding this event in the country. They tried to distract people from the difficulties of everyday life, to frighten them with the threat of a new war.

As explained in the verdict on the "Promparty" case, this organization was linked to the so-called "Torgprom," a foreign counterrevolutionary group which included former Russian capitalists, headed by Denisov, Ryabushinskiy, Tretyakov, Kononov, Gukasov, Nobel and Mantashev. "The Promparty," the verdict further stated, "put the basic emphasis on military intervention against the USSR, for the preparation of which... it entered into organizational communication with interventionist organizations both in the USSR (the SR-Cadet and kulak groups of Kondratyev and Chayanov, as well as the Sukhanov-Groman menshevik group), as well as abroad ('Torgprom,' Milyukov's group and interventionist circles in Paris)."

It was shown in the Promparty trial that military intervention had been readied in 1930 by the forces of foreign expeditionary corps, with the participation of remnants of Vrangeli's army and Krasnov's Cossack units. These formations were supposed to inflict a combined blow against Moscow and Leningrad. "In the intervention plan," stated the verdict, "they intended to use some

kind of border conflict as cause for the attack of interventionists against the USSR, so that in the process of its further development the armed forces of states allied with France (Poland and Romania), as well as the armies of the border states (groups of states, formed on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire after 1917—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland—author) could be used. The time period for the intervention," the verdict further stated, "was shifted mainly due to the absence 'within the USSR of conditions, suitable for implementing an intervention.'"

The origin of all these formulations and stories becomes more understandable after reading the following letter from Stalin.

The envelope is addressed: "To the OGPU, Comrade Menzhinskiy, personally. From Stalin."

"Comrade Menzhinskiy! I received your letter of 2 October and the documents. Ramzin's confessions are very interesting. In my opinion, the most interesting thing about his confessions is the question of the intervention in general, especially of the time frame for the intervention. It seems, they had planned the intervention for 1930, but put it off until 1931 or even 1932. This is quite likely and important. It is even more important that it comes from the primary source, i.e., from the Ryabushinskiy-Gukasov-Denisov-Nobel group, which represents the strongest socioeconomic group of all those existing in the USSR and abroad, strongest both in the sense of capital, as well as in the sense of connections with the French and English governments. It could be shown that the TKP or the 'Promparty' or Milyukov's 'party' represent the main force. However, this is untrue. The main force is the Ryabushinskiy-Denisov-Nobel-etc. group, i.e., 'Torgprom.' The TKP, the 'Promparty' and Milyukov's 'party' are small fry compared to 'Torgprom.' The information on the time frame for the intervention, coming from 'Torgprom,' is especially interesting. The question of the intervention in general, as well as of the time frame for the intervention in particular, as everyone knows, is of first-priority interest to us.

"Hence, my suggestions:

"a) Make the question of the intervention and its time frame one of the most important in new (future) confessions by the upper levels of the TKP, the 'Promparty' and, especially, by Ramzin: 1) Why was the intervention delayed in 1930? 2) Was this not because Poland was not yet ready? 3) Perhaps, because Romania was unprepared? 4) Perhaps because the border states had not yet made contact with Poland? 5) Why was the intervention put off for 1931? 6) Why "might" they put it off for 1932? 7) etc., etc.

"b) Institute proceedings against Larichev and other members of the 'Promparty' Central Committee and interrogate them most severely about same, having allowed them to read Ramzin's confessions.

"c) Most severely interrogate Groman, who, according to Ramzin's confessions, once stated at the "United Center" that the 'intervention was put off for 1932.'

"d) Take Kondratyev, Yurovskiy, Chayanov, etc., who are cunningly evading the admission of their "tendencies toward intervention," but are (unquestionably!) interventionists, through the system and interrogate them most severely about the time frames for the intervention (Kondratyev, Yurovskiy and Chayanov should know about this, just as Milyukov, whom they went to for the 'talk,' knows of this).

"If Ramzin's confessions are verified and specifically detailed in the confessions of the others (Groman, Larichev, Kondratyev, etc.), this will be a serious success for the OGPU, since we will make the material thus obtained available in one or another form to sections of the Communist International and to workers of all countries. We will wage the broadest campaign against interventionists and we will try to paralyze and undermine intervention attempts in the next 1-2 years, which is of great importance for us. Understood? Greetings! I. Stalin."

In the wave of "saboteur-mania" in the economic bodies in the fall of 1930, as Stalin suggested, "enemy-checking work" was carried out. All who were inconvenient were removed from their posts. In December 1930, the line reached Rykov. At the December Plenum, he and Bukharin's entire group were once again accused of ideological complicity with hostile forces. "Both saboteurs from the 'Promparty,' as well as the Chayanov-Kondratyev and Groman wings," V.V. Kuybyshev stated on this subject, "have all hoped for victories by the right-wing opportunists." A resolution was passed to remove Rykov and appoint Molotov to the post of USSR Sovnarkom chairman.

The new Sovnarkom chairman informed the plenum of the decision to conduct a reform in the higher bodies of state power, and set forth in full Stalin's considerations, expressed in the letter of 22 September. The plenum approved the proposals to bring Stalin into the Council for Labor and Defense and to turn this council into "a fighting body for economic leadership." The very same plenum accepted the idea of creating an Executive Commission under the USSR Sovnarkom, consisting of the Sovnarkom chairman, the RKI people's commissar, the AUCCTU [All Union Central Council of Trade Unions] secretary and one of the secretaries of the VKP(b) Central Committee. This commission's tasks included the verification of actual implementation of party directives and Sovnarkom decisions. As we now know from the cited letters, all these suggestions came from Stalin.

The diligently prepared operation to eliminate the "gap between soviet and party leadership" was thus accomplished. Unobstructed, Stalin put his own people, unquestioning supporters of forming a regime of personal power, everywhere in the higher echelons of state power.



The last two documents in the selection relate chronologically to 1933. Usually, in speaking of the period after the defeat of Bukharin's group, historians and journalists use the concept of "Stalin and his colleagues," indicating that the leaders of the country and party all thought and acted exclusively in a Stalinist manner. To a significant extent, this is true. However, it is no less true that in practice we are not utilizing facts enabling us to reveal the real position of each of the members of Stalin's Politburo. The published letters once more remind us of this.

The circumstances that generated them are as follows. In 1933, the situation with the country's economy was extremely serious. Industry had emerged from the crisis caused by the great leap with difficulty. Production quality was one of its most acute problems. Often, the production of utterly unsuitable output was concealed behind outwardly favorable gross growth figures. Tremendous amounts of material resources were wasted and the labor of thousands of people was devalued. Administrative repressive measures were then proposed for solving the problem, including the stricter criminal accountability of enterprise leaders for the output of defective and imperfect production. A component part of this campaign was the organization of extensively publicized "show" trials. One of these cases, against the employees of a number of economic bodies and the Kharkov "Kommunar" Plant, concerning a defective shipment of combines, occurred in August 1933. A.Ye. Vyshinskiy, USSR deputy prosecutor, testified in court as the prosecutor. In striving to use this specific case to intensify pressure on economic workers on the whole, Vyshinskiy declared in his concluding speech: "The trial gives us grounds for raising general questions about the work of Soviet economic organizations... I am speaking of the Union Narkomzem..., I am speaking of the Narkomtyzhprom..., I am speaking of the republic bodies... I greatly regret that the circumstances of conducting the preliminary investigation did not allow us to put the basic leaders of Ukrselmash on the bar... and has forced us to isolate the case against them, so as not to hold back the entire trial." This formulation of the question alarmed the leader of Narkomtyzhprom, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, and of Narkomzem, Ya.A. Yakovlev. In Stalin's absence, they achieved the passing of a Politburo resolution condemning Vyshinskiy's statement. After a while, Stalin learned of this. His reaction is quite obvious from the letters making up the selection of documents. These letters are also interesting because they raise new questions for historians. For instance, what was the nature of such conflicts, what roles did they play in the political "mechanics" of the 1930s, and to what extent did they grow into more fundamental disagreements?

To Molotov (Molotov's signature is on the upper left corner of Stalin's letter: "On the whole, I agree with everything said. I have not read Rykov's speech, but only ran my eyes over the title. I will read it. It is obvious to me, however, even now that Stalin is right. I do not agree that we should only "rebuken" Rykov. However, we must

correct the matter as Stalin suggests—V. Molotov.), Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze,

1) Have you read Rykov's speech? In my opinion, it is the speech of a non-party Soviet bureaucrat, playing up to the soviets under a "loyal" and "sympathetic" tone. Not a word about the party! Not one word about right-wing deviation! Not a word about the party's achievements, which Rykov now dishonestly attributes to himself, achieved in the struggle against the right-wing, including in the struggle against Rykov! All our responsible officials, in making speeches, usually consider themselves obliged to speak of the right-wing, to call for a struggle against it. Yet Rykov, it seems, is free of these obligations! Why, one asks? On what grounds? How can you tolerate (which also means cover up) this political hypocrisy? You do realize that, in tolerating such hypocrisy, you are creating the illusion of Rykov's withdrawal from the right and are thus misleading the party, when as everyone knows, Rykov has not thought and is not thinking of withdrawing from the right? Should not Rykov be faced with an alternative: either disassociate himself openly and honestly from the right and from compromisers, or be deprived of the right to speak in the name of the Central Committee and Sovnarkom? I think that this is a minimum, which the Central Committee cannot reject, without wishing to risk rejecting itself.

2) I found out that Rykov continues as chairman on Mondays and Thursdays. Is this true? If so, why do you permit this farce? For whom and why is it necessary? Is it impossible to put an end to this comedy? Is it not time to put an end to it?

3) I am thinking of remaining in Sochi another week. What is your opinion? If you say so, I can quickly return.

Greetings, Stalin. 30 September 1929

[2 August 1930]

Vyacheslav!

You should have already received the new confessions from Groman, Kondratyev and Makarov. Yagoda brought them to confess to me. I think that all these confessions, plus Groman's first confession, should be sent to all members of the Central Committee and TsKK, as well as to our most active economic leaders<sup>1</sup>. These are documents of first-priority importance.

Sincerely, Stalin.

[after 6 August 1930]

Vyacheslav!

I received your letter of 6 August.

1) I am against Mirzoyan's<sup>2</sup> transfer into the Profin-tern, since I have always stood and continue to stand

against bringing an oblast to ruin, especially an oblast such as the Ural, which is growing at an accelerated pace and is in need of workers.

2) The results of the struggle against the shortage of small change are almost insignificant: 280,000 rubles is a trifling matter. Apparently, you have stung the cashiers a bit and rested content. It is not only a matter of cashiers. It is a matter of Pyatakov, Bryukhanov and their colleagues. Both Pyatakov and Bryukhanov supported the import of silver. Both Pyatakov and Bryukhanov have preached the need to import silver and made the corresponding decision at the conference of deputies (or STO), which we rejected at the Monday meeting, having derided them as the "rear-ends" of financial saboteurs. It is now clear even to the blind that Yurovskiy (and not Bryukhanov) directed the NKF [People's Commissariat for Finances] measures, and Gosbank's "policy" was directed by sabotage elements in the Gosbank apparatus (and not Pyatakov), inspired by the Kondratyev-Groman "government." Consequently, the point is that a) there are grounds for purging the apparatus of the NKF and Gosbank, regardless of the howling of questionable communists like Bryukhanov and Pyatakov, b) there are grounds for executing 2-3 dozen saboteurs from these apparatuses, including a dozen cashiers of any type, c) continue OGPU operations throughout the USSR to remove small change (silver).

3) I think that an investigation of the Kondratyev-Groman-Sadyrin case must be conducted with full substantiation, not hastily. This is a very important matter. All documents on this case must be distributed to members of the Central Committee and TsKK. I do not doubt that a direct connection (through Sokolnikov and Teodorovich) is concealed between these gentlemen and the right-wing (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy). Kondratyev, Groman and another one or two of the scoundrels must mandatorily be executed.

4) We must mandatorily execute the entire group of saboteurs in the meat industry, having publicized this in the press<sup>3</sup>.

5) Is it true that you have now decided to release small nickel change? If this is so, it is a mistake. We must wait for a while on this matter.

6) Is it true that boots were imported from England (for several million rubles)? If this is true, it is a mistake.

7) It is good that the SASSh has permitted the import of our forest products. Our patience has yielded results. Meanwhile, wait concerning Bogdanov<sup>4</sup>.

8) The treaty with Italy is a plus. Germany may be pulled in after it. Incidentally, how is the situation with German credits?

9) Force the export of grain to the utmost. This is now crucial. If we export grain, there will be credit.

10) Direct attention to the Stalingrad and Pitserskiy tractor plants<sup>5</sup>. The situation there is bad.

Sincerely, Stalin.

[no later than 23 August 1930]

Vyacheslav!

1) The results for the 10 months show a 26 percent increase in state industry (instead of 32). This is a depressing outcome. You speak of the counterplan for industrial finance and the Central Committee address. In my opinion, it would be possible to do everything, if only a 30-32 percent increase had been achieved. I fear that it is too late to speak of this now. Nonetheless, great changes can scarcely be introduced in October (the end of the year). Yet, perhaps one could try? Please, we must try.

2) We still have 1 and a half months to export grain: at the end of October (or maybe even earlier), American grain will begin to enter the market on a mass scale, which it will be hard for us to withstand. If we do not export 130-150 million poods of grain in these 1 and a half months, our hard currency situation may become desperate. Once more: we must force the export of grain using all forces<sup>6</sup>!

3) We must mandatorily arrest Sukhanov, Bazarov and Ramzin. We must interrogate Sukhanov's wife (a communist!): she cannot help but know about the disgraceful things that occurred in their home. We must distribute all confessions, without exception (both basic and supplementary) to members of the Central Committee. There can be no doubt that Kalinin is guilty. Everything that was reported about Kalinin in the confessions is the absolute truth. We must mandatorily inform the Central Committee of this, so that Kalinin is taught not to get mixed up with scoundrels in the future.

4) I received Osinskiy's letter about NAMI. Osinskiy is wrong. I am sticking to my own opinion<sup>8</sup>. Klim will speak of the motives. Well, this Os-skiy is an insolent fellow.

5) I am attaching an article concerning the Mariupol'skiy Metallurgical Plant<sup>9</sup>. This is the fourth provocation trick by the accursed Giprometz. Cannot the culprit be punished as an example?

(a copy of PRAVDA from 23 August 1930)

Well, that is all for now. Sincerely, Stalin.

2 September 1930

Vyacheslav!

1) As regards Tomskiy's "retirement," I agree. He is doing nothing for us in chemistry<sup>10</sup>.

2) An explanation in the press concerning the "Kondratyev" case is expedient only if we intend to bring this "case" to trial. Are we prepared for this? Do we consider it necessary to take the "case" to court? Perhaps, it will be difficult to get by without a trial.

Incidentally, are not the accused gentlemen thinking of admitting their mistakes and properly humiliating themselves politically, having at the same time acknowledged the solidity of Soviet power and the correctness of the method of collectivization? It would be wise.

3) As regards the prosecution of the communists who helped Groman and Kondratyev, I agree, but what will we do then with Rykov (who unquestionably helped them) and Kalinin (who obviously involved the scoundrel Teodorovich in this "case")? We must think about this.

4) It is very good that an end has finally been made to the work of the "free hands" in Gosbank, which have also rotted through Narkomfin. What are Karklin, Koktyn and the others doing in Gosbank? Do they really agree with Pyatakov on everything? In my opinion, we must renew the upper levels of Gosbank and Narkomfin, using the OGPU and RKI, after these latter agencies perform enemy-checking work there...

[13 September 1930]

Vyacheslav!

1) We must quickly publish all confessions by saboteurs in the meat, fishing, canning and vegetable industries. What are we pickling them for? Why the "secrets?" We must publish them along with information that the TsIK or the SNK has submitted this case for the examination of the collegium of the OGPU (it is something like a tribunal here), and after a week we must issue a report from the OGPU that all these scoundrels have been executed. They must all be shot...

4) [paragraph number as published] As regards Ryutin, I have already sent you a message.

5) Our central soviet upper ranks (the STO, SNK and the conference of deputies) are afflicted with a deadly disease. The STO has been turned from a practical, fighting body into an idle parliament. The SNK has been paralyzed by the wishy-washy and, essentially, anti-party speeches of Rykov. The conference of deputies, which was previously the Rykov-Sokolnikov-Sheynman<sup>11</sup> staff, now has a tendency to turn into the Rykov-Pyatakov-Kvirng or Bogolepov staff (I see no great difference between the last and the next to last), which opposes the party Central Committee. Obviously, this cannot continue further. Radical steps are needed. I will speak of which steps when I arrive in Moscow. Meanwhile, you must carefully follow Pyatakov, this genuinely right-wing Trotskyite (Sokolnikov is the second), who right now is the most harmful element in the structure of the Rykov-Pyatakov bloc, plus the Kondratyev defeatist moods of bureaucrats in the soviet apparatus. It would be good to hasten the return of Sergo and Mikoyan from vacation, who, jointly with Rudzutak and Kuybyshev (as well as Voroshilov), will manage to isolate Rykov and Pyatakov in the STO and the conference of deputies.

6) I am now entirely well.

Sincerely, I. Stalin.

Vyacheslav!

I am writing to you in addition to today's letter.

1) It seems to me that with regard to Ryutin, we must not limit ourselves to expulsion. He must, a certain time after expulsion, be sent somewhere far from Moscow. This counterrevolutionary vermin must be destroyed once and for all.

2) I spoke with Ganshin. It seems to me that the question must mandatorily be raised in the Politburo in September about oil, from the viewpoint of increasing the quantity of oil refineries for the production of benzine. Without this, we will stand still. It will be too late to put it off until October<sup>12</sup>.

3) I caught, thank heavens, the newspapers with their squealing about "complete and utter failures," "endless mistakes," "breakdowns" and other such nonsense. This is a hysterical, Trotskyite right-wing tone, unsupported by the data and inappropriate for bolsheviks. EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN, PRAVDA, ZA INDUSTRII and parts of IZVESTIYA are being especially shrill. They write about the "decline" of the pace, about the "outflow" of workers, but do not explain what is the matter. In fact, where did this "sudden" outflow of workers to the countryside come from, this "catastrophic" turnover? How do they explain it? Perhaps, by poor supply? However, were we really better supplied last year than this year? How come at that time there was no such turnover, no such outflow? Is it not obvious that the workers have gone to the countryside for the harvest, that they have gone so that the kolkhozes do not do them out of their fair share in the sense of distribution of the harvest. Have they not gone in order to work a month or two in the kolkhozes, and thus ensure for themselves the right to their full kolkhoz share? How come they do not write about this, but limit themselves to yelps of panic? Incidentally, the Central Committee "Address" also overlooked this element.

Well, so long. Sincerely, I. Stalin. 13 September 1930

22 September 1930

Vyacheslav!

1) It seems to me that it is necessary this autumn finally to resolve the question of the soviet upper ranks. This will be along with the resolution of the question of leadership in general, since the party and soviet bodies are intertwined and inseparable from each other. My opinion on this score:

a) it is necessary to release Rykov and Shmidt and to disband their entire bureaucratic advisory and secretarial apparatus.

b) you must replace Rykov as chairman of the SNK and chairman of the STO. This is necessary. Otherwise,



there is a gap between the soviet and the party leadership. With such a combination, we will have full unity of the soviet and party upper ranks, which will unquestionably double our strength;

c) the STO must be converted from an idle body into a fighting and competent agency for economic leadership, and the number of members of the STO should be kept at roughly 10-11 (a chairman, two deputies, the chairmen of Gosplan, Narkomfin, Narkomtrud, the VSNKh, the NKPS, the Narkomvoyoyn, Narkomtorg and Narkomzem);

d) under the USSR SNK, we must form a permanent commission ("Executive Commission") for the exclusive purpose of systematic verification of the implementation of the center's decisions, with the right of rapid and direct institution of proceedings both against party, as well as non-party members, for bureaucratism, failure to fulfill or avoidance of the center's decisions, inefficiency, mismanagement, etc. This commission should have the right directly to use the services of the RKI, above all, the GPU, the Prosecutor's Office and the press. Without such an authoritative and rapidly acting commission, we will not break through the wall of bureaucracy and the sloppiness of our apparatuses. Without this, or a reform similar to it, the directives of the center will nearly always remain on paper. This commission should be headed by Sergo (SNK deputy chairman and people's commissar of the RKI).

Thus, under the USSR SNK there will be all of three main commissions: Gosplan, the STO and the Executive Commission.

e) the current conference of deputies must be abolished, having left it to the SNK chairman to consult with his deputies at his discretion (with the involvement of one or another officials).

For the time being, all this is between us. I will speak in detail of this in autumn. Meanwhile, think this over in a close circle of good friends and report objections...

4) Wait on the matter of sending the Kondratyev case to trial. This is not entirely without danger. Wait until autumn to solve this problem. In October we will resolve the matter jointly. I have several considerations against it.

Well, so long. Sincerely, Stalin.

To Comrade Molotov,

1) It must be admitted, I (and Voroshilov as well) do not like it that you are leaving for 1 and a half months, and not for 2 weeks as was stipulated when we drew up the plan for vacations. If I had known that you wanted to leave for 1 and a half months, I would have suggested a different vacation plan. I cannot understand why you have changed plans. Running from Sergo? Really, it is hard to understand why you must leave the Politburo and SNK to Kuybyshev (he might take to drink) and

Kaganovich for so long. True, I gave consent (by telegraph) for a long vacation, but you will understand that I could not act otherwise.

2) I consider Sergo's trick regarding Vyshinskiy to be hooliganism. How could you give in to him? It is clear that with his protest Sergo wanted to ruin the SNK and Central Committee campaign for completeness. What is the matter? He took in Kaganovich? Apparently, he did fool him, and not just him.

Greetings! I. Stalin. 1 September (1933)

Hello, Vyacheslav!

1) I agree that we should not undertake more than 21 billion rubles in capital work in 1934, and that the increase in industrial production should be no more than 15 percent. It will be better thus.

2) I also agree that it is necessary to take 698 million centners in the gross collection of grain for 1932, and no less<sup>13</sup>.

3) The behavior of Sergo and Yakovlev on the matter of production completeness can be called nothing other than anti-party, since its objective purpose is to defend reactionary elements of the party against the VKP(b) Central Committee. In fact, the whole country suffers from the incompleteness of production; the party has begun a campaign for completeness, an openly publicized and punitive campaign; the verdict has already been made against enemies of the party, insolently and maliciously violating the resolutions of the party and government, but Sergo (and Yakovlev), who is responsible for these violations, instead of repenting his sins, is striking out against the prosecutor! What for? Of course, not in order to restrain the reactionary violators of party resolutions, but in order to morally support them, to justify them in the eyes of party public opinion and thus to ruin the party's developing campaign, i.e., to wreck the practical policy of the Central Committee.

I wrote to Kaganovich that, against my expectations, in this matter he ended up in the camp of reactionary party elements.

4) It is somewhat awkward for me that I served as the reason for your urgent return from vacation. However, if we digress from this awkwardness, it is clear that it would be rash to leave central work to Kaganovich alone (Kuybyshev may take to drink) for a long period of time, keeping in mind that Kaganovich should be torn between local and central work. In a month I will be in Moscow, and then you can go on vacation.

5) At last, I am firmly convinced that you should not go to Turkey. Let Voroshilov and Litvinov go<sup>14</sup>.

Sincerely, I. Stalin. 12 September 1933

## Footnotes

1. On 10 August 1930, the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo resolved to send the confessions of those arrested in the "Labor Peasant Party" case to Central Committee and TsKK members and candidate members and to leading cadres of economic managers.

2. L.I. Mirzoyan (1897-1939) was secretary of the Perm Okrug Committee and second secretary of the Ural VKP(b) Obkom in 1929-1933.

3. On 25 September 1930, a report was published in the newspapers on the execution of 48 specialists from Soyuzmyasa, Soyuzryba, Narkomtorg and other departments as "saboteurs of the workers' supply."

4. P.A. Bogdanov (1882-1939) was a party member since 1905. In 1930-1934, he was leader of Amtorg.

5. The question of tractor building at the Stalingrad and Pitserskiy plants was discussed at the 25 August, 5 and 25 September 1930 meetings of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo.

6. The export of grain was one of the main sources for hard currency receipts. Under conditions of the economic crisis that seized the capitalist countries at the end of 1929, grain prices dropped sharply. In order to cover the growing hard currency expenditures for the acquisition of foreign equipment, the government was forced to export grain, regardless of increasing the threat of starvation in the country. In 1930, of the 835 million centners of grain collected, 48.4 million were exported, and in 1931, of 695 million centners, 51.8 million were exported.

7. N. Osinskiy (V.V. Obolenskiy) (1887-1938) had been deputy chairman of the VSNKh since 1929.

8. The essence of the disputes between Osinskiy and Stalin is not clear. On 5 September 1930, the Politburo instructed the VSNKh to urgently create a sufficient base for the organization of an independent institute for automotive building.

9. On 23 August, a short report was published in PRAVDA to the effect that the board of the State Institute for the Design of Metallurgical Plants had examined the design for the new Mariupolskiy plant, which was to be the largest metallurgical plant in the USSR with a production capacity of 816,000 tons of cast iron and 1,100,000 tons of steel. Stalin's annoyance was sparked by the inadequacy of the paces and scales of the planned construction.

10. M.P. Tomskiy's request to be released from his work in Vsekhimprom due to illness was granted by the Politburo on 6 September 1930.

11. A.L. Sheynman had been a party member since 1903. In the 1920s, he was chairman of the board of the USSR Gosbank, and deputy USSR people's commissar for finances.

12. The proposals of the VSNKh on developing the production of oil refineries in the USSR was approved by the Politburo on 5 October 1930.

13. It was a question of approving the figures for the development of the USSR national economy for 1934.

14. On 20 September 1930, the Politburo passed a resolution on reciprocal visits to Turkey.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990

## SOCIAL THOUGHT ABROAD

## The World in the Year 2000: Our Synopses

915B0002K Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 107-112

[Synopsis of a book by John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene: "Megatrends 2000. The New Directions for the 1990s"]

[Text] There are many forecasts for mankind's future. The number of international futurologists is also multiplying. In the era of industrialization and the scientific and technical revolution, forecasting has become a very serious profession, trying to avoid pretensions of an eschatological and messianistic nature and establishing itself ever more solidly on a foundation of computer calculations and comprehensive statistics.

Recently, the Americans John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene advanced to the forefront of the world's leading futurologists. Naisbitt called attention to himself with his book "Megatrends. Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives" (New York, 1982), in which he confidently and, we can now say, rather accurately predicted the further strengthening of the role of advanced technologies and the informatization of social development, of integration forces in the world economy and of centrifugal forces in world politics. It is no accident that the book was almost unanimously named one of the best works in futurology.

Eight complex years have passed for mankind, yet Naisbitt and Aburdene's new forecasts, as before, radiate optimism, perhaps even stronger than before, in the new book, "Megatrends 2000. The New Directions for the 1990s" (New York, 1990). They see the last decade of the 20th century as a "new era," a time for "stunning technological innovations, unprecedented economic opportunities, surprising political reforms and a great revival of culture." Their forecast for the 1990s analyzes the basic megatrends in world development at the end of our century. Let the reader himself judge the breadth of their scope: 1) the thriving of a world economy; 2) a renaissance in the arts; 3) the rise of socialism with free market relations; 4) global lifestyles and cultural and linguistic nationalism; 5) the privatization of the welfare state; 6) the growing influence of states in the Asian-Pacific region; 7) the broad entry of women in leading

posts; 8) the flourishing of biology; 9) a religious revival; 10) growth in the role of the individual.

Of course, if so desired, the circle of highly important directions of social development on the threshold of the 21st century could be expanded (for instance, the limitation of the arms race, man's struggle to save the environment, and the growth of possibilities in medicine). On the other hand, among the trends singled out, several hold a more noticeable, higher-priority position than others, both in the book and in real life. Above all, these include the strengthening of the interconnection of the basic elements of the world economy and broad privatization in all types of states and societies: processes which are leading, in the authors' opinion, to a new economic boom.

In addition, one should guard against excessive euphoria when reading "*Megatrends 2000*." After all, the tremendous amount of statistical material used by the authors, naturally, relates not to the future, but to the present and past. Naisbitt and Aburdene are essentially only extrapolating the positive trends which have manifested most clearly today into tomorrow. No one who is optimistically inclined would reproach them for this. Nonetheless, in evaluating the book one must understand that any forecast for social development is always closer to the initial diagnosis than the final outcome. The authors themselves write that mankind's splendid future is not guaranteed: "Apocalypse or Golden Age? The choice is up to us."

A synopsis of several chapters in the work by the American futurologists is published below. Unquestionably, this will be of interest to the reader and may be useful as food for thought, although some of the authors' opinions and conclusions are debatable.

### Introduction

The goal of the book is to single out the most important trends of the 1990s. In this regard, it is interesting to recall the forecasts contained in the previous edition of "*Megatrends*" for the 1980s. At that time, the ten megatrends were: 1) from an industrial to an information society; 2) from forced technological development to advanced technologies; 3) from national economies to a world economy; 4) from short-term to long-term trends; 5) from centralization to decentralization; 6) from institutional help to self-help; 7) from representative democracy to participatory democracy; 8) from hierarchies to network structures; 9) from the unconditional primacy of the North to the equalization of the South; 10) from either/or choices to multiple options. All these changes have happened or are happening, yet new ones, the megatrends of the 1990s, are being added to them.

"What is the world coming to in the last decade of the 20th century? The 'cold war' ended in the late 1980s and the arms race has slowed or, perhaps, has come to a halt. The postwar period of nationalism and the ideological 'cold war' is over and a new era of globalization has

begun. The arts are flourishing throughout the world. The slogans of protecting the surrounding environment have taken on an international scope. The communist countries are experimenting with democracy and market mechanisms. The aspiration of nations toward economic cooperation is stronger than their inclination toward military adventures entailing enormous human and financial losses. Asia has rewritten the rules of economic development: after all, many of its residents have achieved the European standard of living. The free trade movement is gaining strength. In the poorest countries of Africa, the principles of privatization and models for self-support are being asserted. Respect for the human spirit has increased" (pp 14-15).

Usually, hopes for further scientific and technical progress and, above all, for the mastery of space, the development of biotechnologies and the creation of robots are linked to the 21st century. However, the main breakthroughs in progress and knowledge in the future century will be produced not so much as a consequence of scientific and technical progress, as thanks to a growing understanding of what it means to be human. The world is ridding itself of the "troubled times" of the 20th century, when industrialization, totalitarianism and technical progress intruded on our lives all at once. To replace them, there will be bold experiments in the direction of market socialism, a spiritual revival and an economic leap, which will begin in the Pacific rim area. George Orwell's prediction of the dehumanization of modern society by 1984 did not occur. Conversely, the significance of the individual has grown, especially in the communist bloc countries (see p 17).

### Chapter 1. The Global Economic Boom of the 1990s

The predicted boom will be caused not by any one particular reason, but by an unusual coincidence of a number of factors, by an unprecedented acceleration of changes in the direction of creating a unified world economy, "a new global economy." It can already be said that the U.S. no longer has a separate economy. The capital of U.S. companies in Japan amounts to 81 billion dollars. "Whose economy is this, American or Japanese?" In time, there will also no longer be separate economies in Europe, the Soviet bloc countries or the "Third World."

Of course, there are gloomy prophets who have been predicting the end of the world ever since the founding of the Club of Rome and its first prediction, "*The Limits of Growth*" (1972). However, their predictions of an energy dead-end and economic depression have not come to pass (see p 21). Right now, international economic ties are growing stronger and are prevailing over political ties. Managers are now gaining greater fame than politicians.

When trade barriers disappear, the U.S. and Japan will trade as freely between each other as Tokyo and Osaka or Denver and Dallas now trade. The most important steps in the direction of creating a worldwide market were the



1988 treaties to eliminate customs barriers between Australia and New Zealand and between the U.S. and Canada. When the U.S. concludes a similar treaty with Mexico, North America will become an enormous free trade zone. Brazil and Argentina are moving toward similar agreements. In 1992, trade barriers will be removed in the 12 countries of the EEC. The formation of a "golden triangle"—North America, Europe and Japan—will be the megatrend of the start of the 21st century.

The advancement of the communications system and, primarily, the development of the telecommunications network using optical fiber cables will contribute to this. The new communications cables, making it possible to hold 40,000 conversations simultaneously (twice the capacity that satellites and the old cable system permitted previously), were established between America and Europe in December 1988, and between the U.S. and Japan in April 1989. By 1992, the world's countries will be linked by optical fiber cables more than 16 million miles long. Matters are moving toward the creation of a global telecommunications network, when it will be possible to communicate wherever one pleases and with whomever one pleases in a matter of seconds.

There will be an end to energy crises. While producing more energy, the world is moving toward consuming less. The extraction of oil is increasing, especially due to new deposits in India, Egypt, Brazil, Columbia, Syria, China, South Yemen, Alaska and the North Sea. Whereas the established world oil reserves amounted to 611 billion barrels in 1979 and it seemed as though they were being exhausted, they now amount to 887 billion barrels and are continuing to increase. Today, the OPEC countries are extracting less than the non-OPEC countries (17 million barrels a day, versus 29).

The need to decrease the West's dependency on OPEC has promoted the construction of nuclear power plants, which currently produce 35 percent of the overall electricity of countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Yet another factor acting in the same direction, to which few have directed attention, is the growing use of direct solar energy. With the sharp drop in the price of photovoltaic generators, solar energy production is growing by a factor of over 100 and may possibly become a main energy source in the 21st century (see p 25).

The decrease in taxes should play an important role in forming the unified world market. A "tax reform revolution," begun by Reagan in the U.S. in 1981 and continued by M. Thatcher in Great Britain, is already occurring. In Australia and New Zealand, taxes were decreased even more sharply than in countries where conservatives were in power. In Japan, according to a new 1989 law, the tax ceilings were dropped from 60 to 30 percent; in Brazil, from 60 to 25 percent. Even Sweden, the model for high taxation, is decreasing its upper tax rate from 75 to 60 percent. In 1984 on the whole, income taxes were decreased in 55 countries.

In this regard, inflation and percentage rates will not grow, due to global price competition, production quality and lease payment.

"The global shift from authoritarian regimes to democracy is laying the political foundation for economic growth. Communist dictators have suffered defeat everywhere and the call for 'democratization' of state management is being heard ceaselessly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." Increased democracy was also noted in the "third world" (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Mexico).

Let us add to this the achievements in strengthening peace. Forty-four of the planet's wealthiest countries have not warred against each other since 1945. Peace has reigned for just as long on the European continent. Recently, we witnessed the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the improvement of the situation in Angola. "In his brilliant speech to the UN Assembly in December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev rejected war as a means of solving problems." The lessons of Afghanistan and, before, of Vietnam make it possible to hope that the super-powers will "not be too involved in regional conflicts in the 1990s." "The USSR will hardly be able to pursue expansionistic goals, since its foreign policy will be determined... by broader circles. On matters of U.S. national security, there is a shift from positions of struggle against communism to the position of participation in global economic competition" (p 29). This is natural, since even in the 1980s it had become clear that economics means more than ideology.

However, serious problems and difficulties still exist in the area of protecting the surrounding environment. Bush, Gorbachev, Thatcher, and the "big seven" of the capitalist world are troubled by this. The understanding that ecological threats can be dealt with only by the entire world community is growing.

Moreover, the authors make forecasts for the economic development of individual countries and regions, devoting the greatest attention to the U.S.

### Chapter 3. The Rise of a Socialist Free Market

"The results of the transformation of socialism will be displayed in a clearer form during the 1990s. The last decade of the century will be the stage for unusual experimentation for the sake of saving socialism.

"The two main figures in this global drama are Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher. This is quite a strange pair: Thatcher is dismantling the welfare state; Gorbachev is dismantling the command economy of the biggest socialist state" (p 93).

"When we look back from the year 2010 or 2020, we will all see that socialism, in the face of almost inevitable destruction, was radically transformed on the threshold of the 21st century" (ibid.).

Six main factors led to the decline of classical socialism:

1. The global economy. Under its conditions, not one country in the world, be it capitalist or socialist, will be able to permit itself to maintain a closed, self-sufficient economy. This would be as though, for instance, the state of Ohio had decided to isolate its economic structures from the other U.S. states. "President Gorbachev realizes this and is guided by this" (p 94).

2. Technological progress, especially in telecommunications and electronics. As the most developed sector of the world economy, right now the financial services have more to do with electronics than with finances or services.

3. The collapse of centralization. Not one of the centrally planned economies has achieved noteworthy success. Conversely, the model of a decentralized, entrepreneurial, market economy operates more successfully everywhere.

4. The high cost of implementing state universal welfare systems and socialist systems. These systems did not take into account the demographic trends of the last half of the 20th century: the increased number of retirees and social dependents.

5. Changes in the structure of the work force: the reduction in the number and significance of "blue collar" workers, especially in the production of widely consumed goods.

6. The increase in the value of the individual. The nature of an information society itself calls for a change of priorities: from the state to the individual. "Despite the widespread opinion, coming from Orwell, that computers would strengthen state control over the individual, we have seen that they are strengthening the capabilities of the individual and weakening the might of the state" (p 95).

Due to the above, "the Soviet Union and its allies are faced with a difficult dilemma: either invent socialism anew for the third millennium, or reject it completely. The tough choice between the one and the other will be the great drama of the 1990s. It is still unclear whether or not the year 2000 will witness the disappearance of socialism or the development of a new hybrid form of socialism which utilizes market mechanisms" (p 95). Experiments with such mechanisms have already begun: they include the privatization of industry and distribution, the creation of a securities market, decentralization, the possibility of bankruptcy, market prices and the rejection of regulation." It would seem that market socialism is this magical formula. The Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, calls himself "a free market socialist," while the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Hawke, considers himself "a socialist, driven by the market" (see *ibid.*).

**Gorbachev's revolution.** The re-interpretation of socialism is occurring most dramatically in the USSR. It was started by Gorbachev, but is being urged on by global processes.

"Think of what a situation Gorbachev was in, when he came to power in March 1985...

"Looking to the East, he sees China, enormous, communist China, which looks increasingly less communist with every passing day and is accelerating its experiments with a free market. Gorbachev obviously understands that in the last 5 years, the Chinese farmers achieved the highest crop yields in the world. It is clear to him that China is obliged by its own success to eliminate the collective farming system and to introduce elementary market incentives. While Gorbachev observes, the Chinese are proclaiming their own "urban policy," applying these incentives to enterprises in the cities.

"What if China follows the path of the economically thriving 'four tigers': South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong?.. What influence will a powerful Chinese economy have on the Soviet Union? Especially if the Soviet Union, as before, is still stagnating?

"Looking to the West, Gorbachev sees Europe, which only a month before (February 1985) had announced that the 12 countries of the European Economic Community will be forming the world's largest market, united and free of barriers, by the end of 1992. In general and on the whole, he cannot help but see the accelerating trends of economic globalization, where competitiveness will be the decisive factor. He also cannot ignore an unmistakable scenario for the future: the USSR is lagging ever more and more behind" (pp 96-97).

From the very start, Gorbachev set reforms and structural changes in the economy as the goal of perestroika, yet at the same time emphasized the importance of glasnost, without which perestroika would be impossible. It later became clear that radical shifts in the economy are impossible without political reform, as the June 1989 events in Tianamen Square in Beijing confirmed. "Perestroika is inconceivable without individual freedoms. This is the real revolution that has begun in the Soviet Union" (p 97).

A comparison of the economic reforms in the USSR and in China lead to the following conclusions:

- It is easier for China than for the USSR to redirect resources and production away from defense and into the civil sector, since its military obligations abroad are fewer;
- The USSR is being restructured more boldly, with regard to the fact that it is reinforcing the economic reforms with democratization;
- Regardless of this, economic liberalization in China has advanced somewhat farther, especially in agriculture;
- In China, the first steps have been taken toward creating a securities market;

- China has been developing without capitalism for less time than the USSR, and it was for many centuries one of the world's greatest trading countries;
- In 1988, when cooperatives and individual enterprises had only begun to appear in the Soviet Union, there were more than 20 million of them in China;
- China started along the path of economic reform in 1978, but the USSR began only after 1985 (see pp 101-103).

"On entering the 1990s, there are signs that perestroika has slowed down, that the economic situation is growing worse and that disturbances of an ethnic nature are intensifying. Gorbachev retains power, but requires all conceivable help in order to accomplish a miracle—to save the Soviet economy. In the final account, Gorbachev's role may lie in leading a real social revolution, which may lead to confusion and chaos before a new order arises. With the great irony of fate, Hungary and Poland, where the revolution would never have begun if not for Gorbachev's initiative, may take a more direct path to a free market" (p 107).

#### Chapter 4. Global Lifestyles and Cultural and Linguistic Nationalism

In our time, in many ways thanks to the dynamic development of the world economy, to global telecommunications systems and to international tourism, the expansion of contacts between the peoples of Europe, North America and the Asian-Pacific region is occurring at unprecedented rates. In various countries of the world—Osaka, Madrid and Seattle—there are features of a new and universal international lifestyle. This style is based on consumer demands and applies mainly to the consumption of food, music and fashion. In terms of consumption, the modern world is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan. It is typical, for instance, that in New York, Stockholm and Milan there are already groups of consumers, whose similarities are greater than those of certain groups of consumers within New York itself. "However, regardless of the fact that our lifestyles are becoming more similar, there are unquestionable signs of a powerful opposing trend, a reaction against uniformity, a desire to preserve the uniqueness of one's culture and language, and an opposition to foreign influence" (p 119).

Upsurges in cultural and linguistic nationalism are appearing in all corners of the planet. For instance, the Canadians, worried about the possibility of a "cultural annexation" on the part of the United States, almost ruined the conclusion of a free trade treaty, highly profitable for Canada, with the U.S. in 1988. One of the clearest examples (at least, for the Americans) of nationalist reaction is the international revival of Islam, initiated by the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

The trend toward an overall international lifestyle and the more profound trend toward revival of cultural and linguistic nationalism are not contradictory. These

trends are interdependent. "The more similar our lifestyles become, the more stubbornly we retain profound values expressed in religion, language, art and literature. As our 'outer worlds' become increasingly similar, the more we value the traditions that come from the heart of our own worlds" (p 120).

A global lifestyle is being formed, above all, thanks to the interpenetration and mixing of customs with regard to food, fashion and entertainment, since these customs have a fairly superficial nature and do not obligate one to anything serious. However, the imbalance that is taking shape in the area of cultural exchange, in which U.S. production, as a rule, holds the dominant position, does represent a certain threat to cultural values. American movies captured 50 percent of the film market in France, Italy, Denmark and Holland, 60 percent in the FRG, 80 percent in Great Britain, and over 80 percent in Japan. Unquestionably, the United States also leads in the export of mass culture, especially music. American and British rock music is the basis of an international youth culture. In the overall volume of exported television programs, the U.S. share is 75 percent. In connection with the globalization of television, we are being faced with entirely new and fundamental questions. Will global television lead to the homogenization of culture? Does this process threaten the interesting individual features of separate countries? Does this not grant an opportunity for countries like the U.S. to thrust their own system of values on developing (or maybe, even on industrially developed) countries?

As opposed to the spread of jeans and cheeses, the globalization of television entails considerable consequences, since more fundamental values are transmitted with its help (just as with literature). Entertaining broadcasts, combining linguistic and visual means of expression, are overcoming the boundaries of superficial communication and intruding into the realm of cultural values. "They penetrate directly into the ethos of a culture and are addressed toward the fundamental essence of the concepts and social practices comprising it. Language is the most important path to the heart of a culture" (p 139).

In this case, when the population of a developing country realizes that a foreign culture is acquiring an extraordinary influence and is threatening its national system of values, it may answer by strengthening its cultural and linguistic nationalism. However, such processes are not limited to developing countries. We are scarcely beginning to realize how deep the roots of cultural and linguistic nationalism are. It is obvious that the greater the influence we have on each other, the more we will strive to preserve our own traditions. "In the face of growing homogenization, we will all strive to retain our own religious, cultural, national, linguistic and racial self-awareness" (p 147).

#### Chapter 10. The Triumph of the Individual

"The greatest and the unifying 'theme' at the end of the 20th century is the triumph of the individual. Having



experienced the threat of totalitarianism during a large part of this century, people who possess their own individuality are meeting the new millennium with an unprecedented blossoming of forces" (p 298).

Precisely individuals are creating works of art, studying the philosophy of politics, investing their savings in new businesses, helping their friends or relatives achieve success, emigrating to other countries and experiencing spiritual enlightenment. Precisely individuals are changing themselves, before trying to change society. At the present time, separate individuals are capable of making changes in society significantly more effectively than most social institutions.

"The newly arising respect for the individual as the foundation of society and as the basic element of the changes occurring within it will be typical of the 1990s" (p 298). The most important principle, forming the basis of our progress toward a new era, is the principle of individual responsibility. It implies a special significance for the present day: the individual's responsibility for everything he does.

In addition, it is not a question of individualism of the "every man for himself" type. Precisely high ethical principles are elevating the individual to a global level, to a feeling of responsibility for protecting the environment, preventing nuclear war and eliminating poverty.

A new era of individualism is being born simultaneously with the new era of globalization. Strange though it may seem, globalization does not contradict the increased role of the individual. The spread of modern information systems, computers and telecommunications has not at all led to a strengthening of the bases of totalitarianism in modern society (as imagined in the anti-utopias of Orwell and Huxley). Conversely, having ensured the sharp expansion of possibilities for individual interaction and the uncontrollable reception of information, it has threatened the very possibility of existence of totalitarian regimes. "There are fewer dictators on our planet today, because they are no longer able to control information" (pp 302-303).

The triumph of individual responsibility implies a decline in collective responsibility. It is always possible to avoid personal responsibility in the frameworks of collective structures—religious and trade union organizations, political parties, governments, large enterprises, and cities. However, there is no such possibility at the individual level.

In the information society that is taking shape, it is precisely the individual's unique capabilities that are highly valued, intellectual and creative abilities above all. The most important duty of a modern society is to encourage individual initiative.

The priority significance of the potential of individuals is gradually, albeit with great difficulties, being recognized. Throughout history, power and force were associated with social institutions, with physical and military

might. Rulers, governments and God were powerful, but not separate individuals, who sensed their helplessness in the face of social reality. The opposition of tradition, rejection of the obsolete and the inconvenient and open uprising were the only means of self-assertion.

"Today there is a new possibility: the individual can have an influence on the surrounding world, determining the direction in which society moves. It is usually said that knowledge is strength. Even if the direction of existing development trends does not satisfy you, you become stronger through knowing them. You may prefer to oppose these trends, but even to do this you must, above all, know where they are headed. In determining the moving forces of the future, and not the past, you gain the strength for active participation in reality" (p 309).

### Conclusion

So, these are the ten most important trends in world development up to the year 2000. "We have the means and capabilities to create a utopia—in this time and on this planet" (p 311). Of course, there are also obstacles: the economic backwardness of the "third world," the pollution of the environment, cancerous diseases and AIDS. However, the economic boom in the developed part of the planet will be a decisive factor. "As ever more countries begin to thrive, they will have to seek new regions for capital investments. The less developed countries, where the work force is cheaper, will become more attractive regions for profitable investments" (p 312).

In the sphere of politics, the conciliation between the superpowers is reducing the probability that regional conflicts could develop into a world war. Indeed, there will be fewer grounds for these conflicts themselves, since the U.S. and USSR are losing interest in them. This will create a more favorable situation in the world on the whole, in which terrorism will cease to be an effective means of achieving political goals. Competition between large states will be shifted into the area of ecology and the struggle against poverty.

"The 1990s will be an extraordinary time. Prepare yourself. You have front row seats. A journey is beginning into the most responsible, yet also most exciting decade in the history of civilization" (p 313).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990

## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Vietnam: Traditions and Renewal

915B0002L Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 113-120

[Article by Nikolay Makarov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh was born 100 years ago. He entered history above all as the founder of an independent state

on Vietnamese territory and as the recognized leader of the national liberation struggle waged by the Vietnamese people. On the occasion of this centennial, there has been a noticeable increase in the attention paid in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to Ho Chi Minh's legacy and to the study of his theoretical contributions. National and international scientific conferences are taking place, and the publication of a 10-volume complete collected works of Vietnam's first president has been completed.

The stormy events which spread over the socialist world did not bypass Vietnam but triggered a "ferment of the minds" among the Vietnamese public and raised questions which, only yesterday, seemed impossible, including whether the idea voiced by Ho Chi Minh of the socialist nature of the Vietnamese revolution was justified and what determined the course he formulated for building socialism in Vietnam: was it "revolutionary enthusiasm" exclusively or did he proceed from a scientific substantiation and consideration of the real circumstances.

To contemporary Vietnam these questions are by no means of academic significance only. They arise against the background of a profound crisis affecting communist ideology in the countries of Eastern Europe, the painful search for a new meaning of socialism and for ways which truly lead to the implementation of the socialist ideal, and the attempts on the part of Vietnam itself to pull itself out of the clutches of economic backwardness. Nor should we ignore the fact that the attractiveness of a socialist orientation has become substantially weakened among a certain segment of the Vietnamese population in the face of the phenomenal leap made by the "new industrial countries" of the area, the members of the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] countries. No more than a few decades ago, some of them had reached a level of economic development comparable to Vietnam whereas now they are far ahead, having displayed essentially different ways of surmounting underdevelopment.

The Vietnamese Communist Party, which is currently pursuing a course of comprehensive renovation, is steadily emphasizing that "progress toward socialism is the legitimate path of our country and the wise choice made by Ho Chi Minh and by our party.... Renovation means not abandoning the socialist objective but formulating more efficient steps to achieve it on the basis of accurate concepts of socialism...." The legitimate question arises: What were the views of Ho Chi Minh himself about socialism and why at the present stage of social development has the need for a policy of renovation appeared?

The Vietnamese researchers note that Ho Chi Minh dedicated his life above all to the cause of national liberation and unification of the country and "lacked the necessary conditions to guide the party in the formulation of a full and accurate line of progress of the

Vietnamese Revolution toward socialism." Nonetheless, we find in his works essential concepts on this basic problem.

Ho Chi Minh wrote: "Initially, it was precisely patriotism and by no means communism at that point, that led me to Lenin and to the Communist International. It was only gradually, in the course of the struggle, as I studied Marxist-Leninist theory and as I engaged in practical work, that I reached the understanding that only socialism, only communism, could free from slavery and oppression nations and working people the world over." Unquestionably, Lenin's ideas on the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in an individual country had a decisive influence on Ho Chi Minh's outlook. He saw prerequisites for a conversion to socialism less in the maturing socioeconomic conditions than the readiness of the oppressed to overthrow the existing system and that the stronger the oppression, the greater such readiness became. A confirmation of this concept is found in the recently published Ho Chi Minh articles in Vietnam. In considering whether communism can be established in Asia, in Indochina in particular, he reached the conclusion that as a result of historical and geographic conditions it would be easier for communism to penetrate Asia than Europe and, in this connection, noted the following: "On the day that hundreds of millions of shamefully oppressed Asians will rise to reject the barbaric yoke of infinitely greedy colonizers, these hundreds of millions will become a great power and will be able to destroy imperialist colonialism and help their brothers in Europe to achieve their full liberation." These words were written in 1921, when the hope that the European proletariat would follow the example of the Russian bolsheviks had vanished and when Lenin had turned to the colonial East in the search for new motive forces for the world revolution.

The restructuring, on a socialist basis, of the semifeudal colonial society in the Northern part of the country reached its full magnitude, after the war of resistance to the French colonizers ended in 1954. Ho Chi Minh saw the ideals of socialism above all in the creation of a society in which not a single person would be exploited. In his works priority is given to moral-ethical standards and principles of social justice: "One should not fear poverty. One should fear injustice." According to Ho Chi Minh, socialist society is a socially homogeneous society, organized on the proletarian model. He wrote: "In the future, after agricultural cooperatives have been organized everywhere, and when the countryside will convert to the extensive use of machines, the peasants will become workers. Gradually, the intelligentsia will become accustomed to physical labor and differences between the working class and the intelligentsia will gradually disappear."

Economic development was related essentially to "socialist changes" in archaic production forces, aimed at "eliminating nonsocialist forms of ownership and

transforming the complex mixed economy into a homogeneous economy, based on national and collective ownership" and functioning on the basis of a unified plan.

It is natural for the ideas of homogeneousness and uniformity and the primacy of the collective over the individual to be frequently encountered in Ho Chi Minh's articles and speeches. He believed that "however talented an individual may be he is incapable of doing anything good if he is separated from the party, from the working class." He saw in individualism one of the main enemies of the Vietnamese revolution. He opposed particularly strongly this phenomenon among party members, according to which there are those who "demand the satisfaction of their needs and relaxation, ...aspiring to choose for themselves work in accordance with their own personal preferences and unwilling to do that which is assigned to them by their organization."

In 1959, in substantiating the need for the conversion of North Vietnam to socialism, the first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam believed that the entire society was united in this aspiration, as it had been in the struggle for national liberation. He claimed that the peasants, having obtained the land in the course of the agrarian reform, "are marching with enthusiasm on the path of agricultural cooperativization. This is explained by the revolutionary activeness of our peasants and the persistent and continuing educational work done by our party and the working class." The artisans and the petty merchants, as working people, "willingly follow the path of cooperativization. They approve and support the socialist revolution." The intelligentsia as well is in favor of socialism, for "the socialist revolution is related to the development of science and technology and to the development of the culture of the people. ...The party steadily helps them and provides conditions for their development." Finally, the national bourgeoisie, which supports the national people's democratic revolution, is ready "to accept the socialist changes and to make its contribution to the building of the homeland, the building of socialism."

In reading Ho Chi Minh's works, particularly in studying the socioeconomic development of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, one unwittingly draws an analogy with Soviet experience and notes the similarity in the basic features found in the plan for the transitional period. The Vietnamese practice reminds us of the "basic laws governing the transition to socialism" as interpreted at that time. This is no accident. The Soviet biographers of Ho Chi Minh write that he frequently referred to the historical experience of the VKP(b) as presented in Stalin's *Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*, which he deemed necessary personally to translate into the Vietnamese language. To the party activists, this publication became the "main textbook, their handbook" (Ye. Kobelev, *Ho Chi Minh*. Moscow, 1979, p 204).

Of late, within Vietnam itself, not only are individual aspects of the "course of the socialist revolution" of

previous years being subjected to a critical review in the spirit of the "renovated thinking", but also voices are heard on the need to provide a new assessment to the entire previously existing concept of a transition to socialism. In particular, one of the latest issues of the journal TAP TI KONG SHAN noted that "we must frankly say that the model of socialism adopted by the Northern part of our country after 1955... was actually a copy of the Soviet and Chinese models."

However, after the liberation of South Vietnam in 1975 and the subsequent national unification, an essentially different viewpoint prevailed in the VCP. In December 1986, it was emphasized at the Fourth Party Congress, that a "fast and efficient transition... from a colonial and a semifeudal regime, with an extremely backward agrarian economy, to a socialist system" had taken place in North Vietnam.

This approach was one of the main arguments in favor of the accuracy and realism of the course formulated at the Fourth Congress: "An independent united country implementing the exclusive strategic task of making a socialist revolution and marching toward socialism, rapidly, energetically, confidently and firmly." From the viewpoint of the Marxist understanding of socialism, the objective prerequisites for such "simple" formulations of the question were lacking in the case of Vietnam, where precapitalist forms of a backward economy predominated. It was rather subjective factors that were of decisive significance: "High revolutionism and passionate aspiration toward independence and socialism," as well as the existence of a "tempered Marxist-Leninist party enjoying the love and confidence of the people." The North Vietnamese model was made the foundation of a design for the accelerated building of socialism throughout the country.

The implementation of the idea of a possible direct conversion to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalist development, was manifested within unified Vietnam in the fact that from a historical prospect socialism became a self-seeking objective, while pressing problems were resolved through "socialist methods." Economic policy assumed a clearly expressed ideologized nature, according to which decisions are dictated not by existing reality but by the aspiration to achieve as soon as possible purely external features of socialism and consistency with ideological dogmas.

**Dogma No 1:** It is only large-scale machine output that can become the material base for socialism, giving priority to the slogan of "accelerated socialist industrialization." In a country the economy of which is unable to ensure not only internal accumulations but also current needs, large-scale building of heavy industry projects is promoted, into which significant foreign revenue is channeled, while funds are being pumped out of a backward agriculture and the traditional sectors.



**Dogma No 2:** Clear superiority of the state sector and the related cooperative sector over any other economic systems. In this case cause and consequence are reversed: it is not the level of production forces that determines the form of production relations but, conversely, decreed socialist production relations allegedly provide scope for the development of the former regardless of their real condition. According to which concepts, South Vietnam's mixed economy, with its relatively high level of development of commodity-monetary relations and market ties, was considered an obstacle on the path to building socialism. Hence the conclusion of the need for the fast "reorganization" of the nonsocialist systems. Private enterprises in industry and trade were to be nationalized and a policy of production cooperativization was pursued, essentially through administrative methods, aimed at the bulk of producers—peasants and artisans.

In other words, the lengthy historical process of real socialization of production was replaced by a formal conversion of backward production forces into a socialist system, legislatively codifying its leading role in the national economy.

The aspiration of the Vietnamese Communist Party [VCP] toward the purely legal socialization of the economy can be explained not only in terms of the pressure of ideological slogans, such as eliminating the exploitation of man by man, social equality, etc. The formal socialization created the appearance of a unification of the socioeconomic structures of North and South and laid a "theoretical" foundation for the need to subordinate the entire economic life to rigid centralized management based on barter planning or, to use Vietnamese terminology, a centralized-bureaucratic distribution mechanism. A fixed attribute of it was the bureaucratic apparatus, the purpose of which was to ensure the directives issued at the "top" to the "lower levels." Since reality kept "exceeding" the framework stipulated by the directives, the apparatus kept expanding.

Although not immediately, the VCP realized the faultiness of the administrative-command system of managing the national economy. Despite innumerable decisions and resolutions on the elimination of this system, it continued to exist and to strengthen. The reason for its durability was the concept of the "rapid conversion from petty to socialist large-scale production, bypassing the capitalist stage of development." An economic policy alienated from reality and totally subordinated to ideological concepts could be implemented exclusively through administrative-command methods, for otherwise the socioeconomic structures could not receive the signals coming "from above" and would try to develop in accordance with their inherent laws.

Major indications of the failure of the efforts to implant an orthodox model of state socialism under Vietnamese conditions appeared as early as the end of the 1970s. This was manifested by a growing socioeconomic crisis and stagnation in public production. This forced the

then leadership to make certain corrections to the pace and methods of building socialism. In particular, the rights of the local authorities and the production-economic autonomy of state enterprises were broadened; the state regulation on activities of agricultural cooperatives was loosened and the forms of "socialist changes" eased for peasants and artisans. A certain freedom was granted to private entrepreneurs and greater attention was paid to economic methods of management and to material incentive.

Even though limited, these steps of economic liberalization greatly contributed to surmounting stagnation in the national economy. Meanwhile, the trend leading to improving the health of the economy increasingly clashed with the "general course" of the VCP and did not indicate any strengthening of the positions of socialism. Increased industrial output was ensured essentially through the private and nominal cooperative sectors engaged in petty and artisan production. Despite all the benefits and growing budget subsidies, the state industrial sector remained essentially losing. The official recognition of the family contracting system in agricultural cooperatives tangibly improved the rice harvests. However, the further development of this form of production organization was steadily restricted for ideological considerations, primarily based on the property stratification in the countryside.

The first half of the 1980s became for Vietnam a kind of transitional stage in the struggle between the ideologized model of building socialism and pragmatism in the solution of socioeconomic problems. Official policy was not changed in the main areas. The large-scale building of industrial projects continued, the state tried to intensify administrative control over commodity-monetary turnover and did everything possible to keep "afloat" an ineffective industrial sector. The previous concepts were preserved: increasing the role of state planning, strengthening command positions of the socialist economy, completing socialist reorganization in agriculture, restoring the socialist order on the market, etc.

In the resolutions of plenums of the VCP Central Committee the study of the growing economic problems assumed an increasingly politicized aspect. The worsening of the situation was largely explained as the "subversive activities of imperialism and of international and domestic reaction," as well as the weakened dictatorship of the proletariat and lack of understanding of the gravity of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist ways of development." Meanwhile, two areas became clearly apparent in the national economy: the officially recognized planned socialist economy and an economy controlled by the free market, which increasingly drew into its own orbit state enterprises and state trade.

The disparate and conflicting development of Vietnam, the aggravation of existing and the appearance of new problems and the halfway nature of their resolution within the framework of the old systems intensified the

moods of apathy in society and the mistrust of significant social strata in the ability of the VCP to take the country out of the impasse. The appeals to "tighten up the belt for the sake of the bright future" no longer met with any response on the part of the working people, the more so since it was precisely workers and employees in the state sector—the social base of the new system—that felt to the greatest extent a worsening in their material situation.

On the eve of the Sixth VCP Congress (December 1986) the subjective and objective conditions for a radical revision of the socioeconomic model of socialism, which was initially applied in the North and, after 1975, was extended to the entire Vietnam, had matured. The same trend was followed by international factors as well. The perestroika processes in the Soviet Union signaled to the Vietnamese leadership that the "classical" model of building socialism was no longer something sacred and that the practical results of the economic reforms in China indicated the fruitfulness of unorthodox ways of surmounting underdevelopment. The Sixth VCP Congress formulated the initiative of a comprehensive renovation of the traditional course.

Particular emphasis was put on acknowledging the fact that the transitional period to socialism in Vietnam would be a historically lengthy process and that throughout this period it would be necessary to go through all the legitimate steps. In this connection, a new interpretation was given to the thesis of the "direct conversion to socialism, bypassing capitalism." Priority was given not to the struggle between capitalism and socialism but to the task of "releasing all productive forces of society" for the sake of economic growth. It can be said that the VCP, in formulating the new course of economic building, returned to Ho Chi Minh's basic idea, which had brought about victory in the struggle for the freedom and independence of Vietnam: the idea of the supremacy of national interests over narrowly viewed class ones.

Real economic reforms began in Vietnam in 1988-1989 and yielded tangible results quite quickly. It appears that the main reasons for the efficiency of the reforms are related to the deideologizing of economic policy and the strengthening of its pragmatic aspect. The pivotal idea of economic renovation was the abandonment of the efforts of total statification of all forms of economic life and their subordination to centralized directive-oriented planning and the conversion to a truly mixed market model without mandatory definition of the "socialist" model. It was stated that all existing systems, including private capitalist, are equal in the eyes of the law. It was not necessary in Vietnam to "introduce" a mixed system, for it had already existed despite the numerous prohibitions, restrictions and "reorganizations."

In the first stage, priority was given to efforts of limiting the activities of the private sector in material production, building and transportation. However, the logic of reform demanded the legalizing of the private sector in

trade, retail as well as wholesale, and allowing private enterprise in the gold, silver and precious stone trade. The private sector actively showed itself in the banking-credit system and, together with the state, participated in the opening of share holding banks. Of late, experimentally, the opening of private banks has been allowed.

At the start of 1989 a series of steps were taken in Vietnam to improve commodity-monetary circulation, including market regulatory agents. Directive-based planning was actually abolished and the limits of administrative interference by state authorities in production-economic activities were sharply reduced. Essentially, the double-price system (free market and centralized approved prices) was eliminated; the state retained the right to set prices only for a very limited range of prime necessity goods and material and technical resources. All other prices, like the foreign exchange rate of the Vietnamese dong, are determined by the market. The banking-credit system experienced major changes. Interest rates paid on deposits and loans were based on the pace of inflation.

The conversion of the economy to a market system is accompanied by structural changes and by reassessing the actual possibilities of the various systems and a change in ownership relations.

In agriculture, within the framework of officially retained production cooperatives, leasing and contracting for land is developing. Granting peasants who are members of cooperatives the right to acquire means of production and freely to handle the goods produced on their assigned land, after paying their taxes, make the individual farmsteads the basic production and economic unit in the countryside.

The "rehabilitation" of nonsocialist systems prove the groundlessness of mass production cooperatives in the areas of petty and craft industries behind which, in frequent cases, a private entrepreneur may be found.

The most painful area of the restructuring in the state sector is in industry, after it was put on equal footing with the other systems. It lost its budget subsidies. The artificially low prices of raw and other materials were eliminated. The marketing of finished products was assigned to the enterprises themselves. Many of them were threatened with closure, essentially as a result of the shortage of funds and overstocking of finished goods, due to the fierce competition by the other systems and foreign goods which flooded the country after imports and exports became liberalized. State industry is adapting with a great deal of difficulty to a market mechanism. Given this situation, a variety of solutions have been suggested for the problem, including substantially reducing the scale of the state sector through denationalization and privatization. Of late there have been active discussions on the possibility of converting some state enterprises into stock companies.

In summing up the initial results of the policy of economic renovation, the Sixth VCP Central Committee

Plenum, held in March 1989, expressed the firm intention systematically to pursue a line of development of a mixed economy as a long-term strategy. Delegates to the plenum acknowledged the need to accelerate the development of legislative acts which regulate the functioning of the private sector. The plenum confirmed that private entrepreneurs can carry out their activities with no restrictions as to the scale and size of hired labor in areas permitted by the law.

The initial stage in the conversion to a mixed market economy in Vietnam had a positive influence on the stabilization of the socioeconomic situation. Above all, the rate of inflation and price increases declined sharply. Whereas in 1988 the average monthly price increase was 14.2 percent, by 1989 this indicator had dropped to 2.8 percent. For the first time in many years a worsening of the living standard of the working people was prevented.

While undertaking radical reforms in the economy, the VCP displayed a rather cautious approach to reforms in the political area, relying on improvements in the existing one-party system. This was clearly stated by Nguyen Van Linh in a recent interview: "On the basis of each historical experience, for which we paid a high price, the Vietnamese people recognize only the Vietnamese Communist Party as their exclusive leading force and reject political pluralism along with a multi-party system, as well as the possibility of the existence of opposition trends and parties in our society."

At the same time, a conversion to the market and a real mixed economy in Vietnam are paralleled by profound changes in the social structures. Vietnamese society is becoming increasingly heterogeneous and multipolar. The interests of the different classes and population strata are becoming crystallized and shaped. The developing economic pluralism faces the country's leadership with basically new problems of an economic as well as social, political and ideological nature. Therefore, the Vietnamese Communist Party must find a solution to a difficult situation: in order to accelerate the country's development, it is necessary to intensify the economic reform. Objectively, this leads to undermining the economic and social foundations of the monopoly on power while, at the same time, preserving the existing monopoly of the political system which had developed under qualitatively different conditions and was aimed at resolving different problems. We would like to hope that in resolving this dilemma preference will be given to national interests and not to ideological dogmas and that the Vietnamese people will be able to achieve success in implementing one of the main behests of Ho Chi Minh: building a "peaceful, united, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam."

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

### On Social Progress in a Changing World

915B0002M Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 121-127

[Review by Yuriy Borko, doctor of economic sciences, of the following books: 1. "Chelovecheskoye Izmereniye Progressa" [The Human Dimension of Progress] by A.I. Volkov. Moscow, 1990, 298 pp (I); 2. "V Mire Utopii. Pyat Dialogov Ob Utopii, Utopicheskoy Soznanii i Utopicheskikh Eksperimentakh" [In the World of Utopia. Five Dialogues on Utopia, Utopic Awareness and Utopic Experiments] by E.Ya. Batalov. Moscow, 1989, 319 pp (II); 3. "Sovremennyy Sotsializm. Voprosy Teorii" [Contemporary Socialism. Problems of Theory] by A.P. Butenko. Moscow, 1989, 303 pp (III); 4. *Sotsializm: Problemy Deformatsii (Filosofsko-Publitsisticheskii Analiz)* [Socialism: Problems of Deformation (Philosophical-Journalistic Analysis)] by Ye.V. Zolotukhina-Abolina and V.E. Zolotukhin. Rostov-na-Donu, 1989, 90 pp (IV); and 5. "Kapitalizm Segodnya: Paradoksy Razvitiya" [Capitalism Today: Development and Paradoxes] by A.A. Galkin, V.L. Kotov, Yu.A. Krasin and S.M. Menshikov. Moscow, 1989, 317 pp (V)]

[Text] Dates are conventional matters. Actually, they are nothing but a reminder of the fact that at one point an event took place and was adopted as a reference point. Nonetheless, they have a magnetic effect. As the year 2000 approaches, mankind is tensely looking at its past and its future. However, despite its entire uniqueness, this date as well is no more than a reason for thoughts, the alarming nature of which is consistent with their real reasons. The last century of the second millennium of our era is ending, facing not the individual but all mankind with Hamlet's choice: To be or not to be?

The lessons of the 20th century and the choice of the path into the future are being discussed throughout the world. Until recently, a groundless optimism prevailed in our country, opposing the myth of the "developed socialism" to the allegedly increasingly intensified "general crisis of capitalism." Today Soviet society is abandoning dogmas and parting with illusions. This applies not only to self-knowledge, for the suitable evaluation of oneself is possible only by comparing one's experience with the experience of other countries and social systems. To this effect, however, we need a different system of measurements and, therefore, a radical renovation of scientific methodology.

The recently published book by A.I. Volkov includes an entire packet of questions which await their profound interpretation. Let us single out merely a few of them which, in our view, are of key significance: "What is the main criterion of social progress and, consequently, what will determine the outcome and the intermediary results of the historical competition between the two social



systems—capitalism and socialism?" (I, p 8); "do we face the theoretical problem of the essential nature of changes in the capitalist system and the socialist system in the course of their lengthy peaceful competition, interaction and reciprocal influence?" (ibid., p 6).

Thus, capital reconstruction needs at least three bearing walls on which our concepts of the nature of the historical process in this century rests. This refers to fundamental concepts, such as social progress, capitalism and socialism. The concepts themselves as well as their interrelationships must be revised.

What does a revision mean? What are its limits and what is its depth?

In the classical Marxist work "*Development of Socialism From Utopia to Science*," Engels formulated his view both on the meaning of social progress as well as on the historical role of the two systems. In his words, the essence of progress is "to ensure for all members of society, through public production, not only fully adequate and ever improving material conditions for life, but also the full free development and application of physical and spiritual capabilities" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 19, p 227). To this effect, capitalism creates a material foundation: it socializes production and raises it to a level at which the elimination of social obstacles to the development of mankind becomes possible. However, it is only with the proletarian revolution and the conversion to socialism of "people who, finally, have become the masters of their own social life, become, as a result of this, the masters of nature and the masters of themselves—free people" (ibid., pp 229-230).

These repeatedly quoted formulations have two different aspects: the attitude of man toward nature, and relations among people. As to the former, Engels merely mentions the rule of man over nature but not the limits of this rule. Naturally, the founders of Marxism accused capitalism of wasting natural resources. From the positions of the 19th century, however, the essence of the problem was nonetheless that of replacing a predatory with a civilized rule of man over nature. The sinister seamy side of the endless growth of industrial-consumer civilization was obviously unnoticed by Marx and Engels. If such is the case, we should seek the explanation even less in the relatively limited possibilities of science and technology and the production process at that time than in the belief of the classics that under socialism man will have an infinite possibility for self-control. The optimism of this vision was consistent with optimism in assessing the future of the socialist revolution which, they predicted, would mark an end to the prehistory and start the true history of mankind.

The 20th century disposed of this matter differently. It passed under the sign of the confrontation between the two social systems, one of which, capitalism, experienced a lengthy period of profound upheavals and was not only able to withstand them but also to experience

"essential changes;" the other, the socialist, was unable to bring forth proof of its advantages and is meeting the end of the century in a condition of acute crisis, and in a search for ways of renovation. Meanwhile, the problem of the "man-nature" relationship, which had been relegated to the margin by the social difficulties and contradictions of capitalism, has emerged on the foreground.

Volkov is aware of this radical change and its critical significance to the fate of mankind. While accepting the concept of "crisis of civilization," suggested by Western non-Marxists, he considers the essence of the crisis in the fact that "human activities, carrying within themselves the contradictions related to the existing forms of social life, have clashed with nature itself and with the laws governing its functioning, which has created a threat to the existence of mankind" (I, pp 23, 24). Genetically, this crisis is related "to contradictions and essential features" within capitalism, although "socialism in its existing forms" and the "third world" have also made their contribution.

The way of solving this crisis, he believes, does not coincide with the struggle for replacing capitalism with socialism. We must seek another standards in universal human relations, economics, politics and ideology. The starting point for such a search is the "new quality of interdependence in the world... the interdependence of survival" (ibid., p 38) in which the interests of social development are transformed into a universal human interest, while intersystemic, intergovernmental and class antagonisms are replaced by "civilized relations," and a "culture of peace."

Such is the new and healthy logic of views which, only recently, was categorically rejected by our official ideology. However, there are problems for which, for the time being, there are no answers, and there are answers which may be considered arguable.

One such question deals with the possibility of achieving a new type of relations which would be based on the interests of mankind. Positive answers prevail in the works of Soviet authors who consider this topic from antidogmatic positions, occasionally expressed cautiously. Such caution is worthy of respect. We object to something else—to the traditional version according to which the most important in terms of the assertion of civilized relations based on the priority of universal human interests is the interaction between the two social systems. This was accurate yesterday and, obviously, is consistent with today's truth. However, as intersystemic relations become normalized, a normalization which started 15 years ago in Helsinki and was resumed after 1985, another truth becomes increasingly clear: the decisive factor in the global strategy of the self-preservation of mankind will be its ability to cope with hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy in the third world. This affects the lives of hundreds of millions of people who find themselves, every day, on the line between life and death. The ability to rescue them from this condition is a question to which, for the time being, there is no

encouraging answer. However, it is this answer that will determine the future of mankind.

It is in this context that we should go back to the question of the criteria of social progress. Today a great deal is being said and written about "humanizing the economy," and the "quality of life," and upgrading its standard for those who are below the poverty line. To oppose such demands is immoral. However, what do they mean? Will the developed countries continue to be governed by the growth of consumer standards and accumulation of material wealth? To what extent is this path acceptable to the developing countries, for we are facing a different task: ensuring the population with a minimum of means of existence, while an orientation toward progress based on Western canons appears incompatible with the preservation of the human habitat itself.

The concept of "social progress" appeared in Europe during the period of dynamic growth of the young industrial civilization. However, the territorial range of its action always remained limited. To this day it is extended to a minority of the population on earth. However, the integral nature of the contemporary world requires an interpretation of the "social progress" formula which would be acceptable to all mankind. Apparently, it is not ready for this as yet, and this applies, above all, to the developed countries. Nonetheless, it is precisely they that will have to do this and the key word in the new concept of social development will, obviously, be not "progress" but "survival."

This, however, presumes radical changes in the way of life, motivations for action, rates of economic activities, etc. In addition to everything else, we face here a major psychological problem determined by the role which ideas and utopias play in human life. Will man accept a model of the future on the face of which is written the basic slogan of "survival?" It is true, as E. Ya. Batalov (II) notes in his interesting and unusual dialogues on utopia, that modern utopia reveals a "tendency toward deabsolutizing (demaximalizing)" the utopian ideal, which confirms a weakening of "the faith of man in social progress" (II, pp 119, 122). Could this trend be considered irreversible? The author does not exclude the fact that in the future a situation may reappear "which would provide a new impetus for the growth of man's faith not simply in a better... but, precisely a perfect world" (II, p 122). Will this occur or will social ideals gel in the form of Toffler's "practopias?" Be that as it may, the question of the form in which we shall succeed in combining man's aspiration for the better and the new daily reality and reconcile Hope with Reality remains, for the time being, unanswered.

Finally, the problem which is crucial to us: What are the parts played by socialism and capitalism in this global future and how will they change and interact? The questions which A. Volkov raises are worth quoting verbatim: "What characterizes to the greatest extent

today the historical moment: the general crisis of capitalism and the transition of mankind to socialism or the crisis of civilization (industrialism) and the conversion to a new level of civilization? Could it be that we are watching the intertwining of such processes and that emerging on a new level of civilization will be inevitably paralleled by such substantive changes in social relations that even their definition with the help of the concepts of "capitalism" and "socialism" will prove impossible?" (I, p 27).

These are new problems facing our social science. The answer so far preferred by Soviet scientific publications is that capitalism and socialism will both evolve in the course of a lengthy competition, thus offering two types of answers to the questions raised by universal human practice.

Avoiding categorical statements, let us dare to suggest a different viewpoint. To begin with, today we should speak not of the crisis of capitalism, which has already completed its restructuring, but of the crisis of socialism, which is as yet to complete such restructuring. Second, the concept of the competition between the two systems as the axis of global development is nothing but a due to the past, one of the main stereotypes of an obsolete system of concepts concerning the contemporary world order. The competition has been removed from the agenda, at least until perestroika in the USSR can yield convincing results. However, there is more to it. The very concept of competition proceeded from traditional concepts of pitting against each other the capitalism of the times of Marx and Lenin, which allegedly had retained its essential features to this day, and the propaganda of socialism, the Soviet model. The old capitalism no longer exists, however, and real socialism does not resemble the demonstration model. The question of the future of the two systems and their interrelationship and possible role in the reorganization of global civilization can be answered only after determining their true nature.

What kind of society was built in our country? Let us immediately say that the most consistent are the views of those who reject its socialist nature, for it violated the humanistic ideals of socialism. The best that could be said about this assessment is that it is a moral one. However, is it sufficient for the purposes of a scientific analysis of the type of social system it is? Most likely, it is not.

Some arguments cannot be ignored. Above all, no one can ignore a reality such as the historical memory of mankind. For 73 years we kept convincing ourselves and the rest of the world that we were building and had built socialism. Now, forgive us, it turns out that we were wrong. One could change shingles but not the past. The past will enter history as the first attempt at implementing the socialist idea and what is meant throughout the world by socialism is precisely the type of society which has collectivistic forms of ownership, and centralized management of the production process and distribution of the social product.

The view is frequently expressed in the course of the current debate that the statification of the economy is not as yet socialism, for the basic feature of this doctrine is its humanistic content. Yet the universal human ideals do not include anything which could be exclusively ascribed to socialism. Such ideals are shared despite different interpretations by all—believers and atheists, radicals and conservatives, monarchists and republicans. Nor are even ideals, such as social equality and social justice, the monopoly of the socialists. However, it was precisely socialists who gave priority to such principles and took them to their logical end, suggesting as a universal means of "healing" mankind the elimination of private property as the prime foundation of social difficulties and injustice. This idea runs through the entire history of socialist thinking, starting with Thomas Moore's *"Utopia."* This is where we find the main feature which distinguishes socialism from all other ideological trends which lay a claim to explaining and improving society.

The theoreticians of socialism traditionally considered the humanistic objectives and the means they suggested for achieving such objectives as interconnected and internally coordinated. What was the basis for this belief? What are the origins of this striking confidence that it would be sufficient to eliminate the distinction between what is "mine" and "someone else's" for everything to take a new course: solidarity to prevail over division, love for one's neighbor over egotism, justice over injustice and peace over war?

The real historical process proved to be 100 times more difficult than the theoretical path of socialism "from utopia to science." The means monstrously clashed with human ideals. Nonetheless, replacing the form of economic management, based on private ownership, with centralized management of the economy and of society as a whole gives grounds to classify this system as part of the classical socialist designs of the past.

Neither Volkov, nor Batalov or the authors of the recently published books *"Contemporary Socialism"* (III) and *"Socialism: Problems of Deformation"* (IV) question the fact that our society is socialist. Although agreeing with them, we would also like to object to the concept of "deformed socialism." Logically, it presumes the existence of a "nondeformed" socialism, yet no such thing exists. What could we use as a standard? A theoretical model developed by Marxism-Leninism? No one, including Marx and Engels, ever dreamed of writing, in the 19th century, about a deformed bourgeois society merely on the basis that it proved to be quite distant from the prototype depicted by the rulers of the mind of the age of Enlightenment and inscribed in the great slogan of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. In general, in such a case we should acknowledge that mankind has lived in deformed societies at least since the time of Christ, who called for creating a "kingdom of God" on earth.

Therefore, there is socialism "in the flesh," not as some kind of deformation but as historical reality. If we consider it precisely as reality we must note that it failed to ensure a higher labor productivity, social justice or democracy. Could it have been different in our country? Their neither is nor ever will be an answer to this question any more than one could dive twice into the same water in a river. A discussion on this topic would make sense only to the extent to which it helps us to determine why it was that socialism proved to be what it became and not different.

This range of questions has been extensively discussed in Soviet publications. Among the books published in recent years, great interest was triggered by the books by L. Gordon and E. Klopov *"What Was That?"*, Ye. Plimak's *"V.I. Lenin's Political Testament,"* and many others which have already been reviewed in KOMMUNIST. It is in this same rank that the very meaningful books we mentioned, written by A. Butenko and the Rostov scientists Ye. Zolotukhina-Abolina and V. Zolotukhin will assume their place.

As we analyze the debate under way and agree with the description of the adverse international and internal conditions for the building of socialism in a country which was totally isolated from the outside world and which had not gone through the stage of capitalist civilization, let us nonetheless express a number of considerations which, possibly, may not coincide with some popular views. Let us recall, above all, the fact that the fate of a revolution on such a scale and with such depth as the one in Russia was determined by tens of millions of people, not on the day of the October uprising but in the course of the Civil War and the establishment of the new system. Their interests, concepts and ways of action were what determined the features of the new society which was already then taking shape.

The second consideration organically stems from the first: the soil on which real socialism grew was the existing culture, in the broadest possible meaning of the term. This was not an elitist culture, isolated and destructible, but a mass culture. The theme of lack of culture and civilization assumes a simply tragic aspect in V.I. Lenin's final articles. In commenting on the notes of N. Sukhanov, he expressed the hope that "if the creation of socialism requires a certain standard of culture..., why should we not begin by acquiring through a revolution the prerequisites for such a specific standard and only then, on the basis of worker-peasant power and a Soviet system catch up with the other nations" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 381). Our history not only did not confirm this hope but, conversely, refuted it most mercilessly.

This could be considered also as a lesson which must be learned from our experience. The main lesson, obviously, is the following: it is above all the inflated ideas on the role of revolutionary violence, on the state as an instrument of such violence, and of the nationalization of the ownership of means of production as decisive



prerequisites for achieving the humanistic objectives of socialism that must be subjected to a radical revision.

Did real socialism make a contribution to social progress? Obviously, this question cannot be peremptorily answered with a "yes." Could we categorically answer "no?" The temptation to update the past has always been great. It is as though an inconceivable historical paradox is found in the fact that, having proclaimed throughout the world the new ideals and stimulated powerful renovation processes, both in the capitalist countries and their colonial periphery, our country took a path involving huge sacrifices and deprivations: however we may be measuring the scales of social progress, its price turned out to be inconsistent with the results which were achieved.

What should renovated socialism look like? Naturally, Academician S. Shatalin is right by asking, initially, to define the current meaning of this concept and only then to sound the rally. A variety of views have been expressed on this account. Thus, according to Zolotukhina-Abolina and Zolotukhin, "the objectively existing fundamental foundations of socialism (necessary and adequate) have not disappeared," and that "we have all the possibilities of purposefully asserting the Marxist-Leninist model of socialism in our country" (IV, p 6). Let us point out that this book leads to the unexpected conclusion that the study of the "deformations" of the past, suggested by the authors, and the part dealing with humanistic socialism rather refute the earlier view. Essentially, they are suggesting a different model of socialism, structured in accordance with historical experience and contemporary development trends, not only ours but global as well. However, the essential approach has been described precisely as we depicted it.

A. Butenko believes that "perestroika raises the question not simply of a better implementation of the already familiar model of real socialism but, on the basis of a contemporary vision of the new society, asserting within Marxist-Leninist theory a more advanced model of socialism and ensuring its practical implementation" (III, p 291). The difference seems minor but, in explaining his approach, Butenko draws our attention to that which was lacking and which could not be taken into consideration by Marx, Engels and Lenin. He emphasizes that history made corrections both to the forecasts concerning the development of capitalism and the description of the essential features and basic structures of the new society. The constructive nature of this approach is unquestionable.

If such is the case, what remains of the classical Marxist model of socialism? Furthermore, are we right in considering, as in the past, the concept of the classics as the only and the universal foundation for this model? Would this not lead to making the latest Procrustean bed which existing society will be made to fit?

The indicated answer is that we must most carefully study life and the real trends of social progress in other countries and, above all, in those which have gone ahead in their development. We must study not only the new practices but also new social theories. To this effect we must abandon the rigid "capitalism-socialism" scheme to which many Soviet scientists remain attached. For the sake of fairness, let us note that both Volkov and Butenko question this scheme.

What prevents the firm rejection of the theoretical design of a "bipolar" world? Obviously, one of the main obstacles is the still unsurmounted doctrinaire approach to the study of social processes. For example, could we learn a great deal from the statement that a great variety of quality characteristics of countries such as the Netherlands and Portugal, Sweden and Greece, Venezuela and Paraguay, Egypt and South Korea, India and Pakistan are capitalist? Why are there such different levels of development of countries which took the path of capitalism almost at the same time, and why is it that totally different political systems prevail in different countries despite the same economic base? The number of such questions could be extended.

Real society does not fit concepts such as "production method" or "socioeconomic system." These are only some of the analytical approaches. Equally important, theoretically and practically, is a different approach: that of civilization. If the history of mankind is the history of the development of civilization, the essence of development obviously is broadening the possibilities for man's self-assertion. In the final account, this is a single and integral process. Social standards, material and spiritual, and labor standards in particular, as well as moral norms and traditions and specific nature of relations among individuals, the civil society and the state take shape and develop in the course of centuries, transmitted from generation to generation, and from age to age. The social process is characterized not only by a break with the past but also by continuity; not only by rejecting obsolete forms of organization but again also continuity and not only the interdependence among different areas of social life but also their autonomy and a synchronous development. Let us add that the more developed a society is and the more complex its organization is, the greater the continuity and the greater the role which the so-called superstructure plays in it (let us note, incidentally, that this is discussed by Volkov). Finally, civilization grows on national soil, the fertility of which is determined by the thickness of the culture stratum. Therefore, the very same production method and the very same forms of political organization of society yields such disparate results in different countries.

The level of civilization is not something abstract and intangible. On the contrary, it could be measured and expressed through a number of specific indicators which encompass all areas of social life—economic, social, political-legal, spiritual and personality relations. If we classify a country on the basis of such criteria, we would find out that the highest achievements go to countries

which belong to the European type of civilization (except for Japan, which became a member of this group quite recently) and which went through the classical cycle of capitalist evolution.

Although it may appear that the connection between the capitalist production method and the level of civilization is simple, nonetheless we must ask ourselves the following: To what feature do those countries owe the most: to capitalism as such or to the type of development inherent in European civilization, characterized by the combination of an uninterrupted process of renovation with an exceptionally high level of continuity and a steady expansion of a fruitful cultural stratum?

The answer to this question is particularly important to our country which, in the 20th century, displayed a truly barbaric attitude toward its own culture. As long as we do not learn how to protect that which we have inherited from previous generations and as long as we have not understood the irreplaceable role of the cultural, the civilizing foundations of the social process, not even the latest concepts of socialism could be of any help to us.

Increasingly we hear in discussions on the contemporary vision of socialism the appeal to go back to understanding social development as a natural-historical process. This is a profound and important concept. What should we understand by a natural-historical process? At which point does it stop being such?

Obviously, we can consider that the dynamics of society retain their natural character to the extent to which the historical process develops as a result of a variety of interactions among a large number of different natural human aspirations. The possibility of conscious human action, dictated by such aspirations, is proportional to the extent of man's freedom. The history of different countries and ages has proved the striking variety of specific variants of social systems which meet this condition to a greater or lesser extent. However, does this apply to totalitarian societies? Could we speak of a natural dynamics of life in the GULAG Archipelago, Orwell's Oceania or Zamyatin's Unified State?

The concept of the natural-historical process, as the gradual establishment of a free civil society, enables us to assess differently some aspects of the history of capitalism. Bourgeois society owes its birth not to the "development of production forces" alone. If the historical process could be reduced merely to this, the capitalist production method would have probably appeared initially in much older Asian societies. However, it was born in Europe, in countries where the specific variant for the solution of the fundamental problem of any social system—the interrelationship between the individual and the collective—was tested and implemented. Capitalism arose where two processes coincided in time and became interwoven: the development of production forces and the establishment of an independent civil society, based on the priority of the individual and the inviolability of his rights and freedoms.

Should we emphasize the fact that the first and most expressive aspect of freedom was the freedom of private property and enterprise, which turned into lack of freedom and exploitation of those who were deprived of the means of production? Past philosophers have expressed the profound thought that freedom is manifested above all in the aspiration to restrict the freedom of others. Obviously, however, it is only thus, within the civil society itself, that the aspiration could naturally appear to limit the freedom of those who had monopolized freedom. In that sense the ideas of socialism and communism are as much a legitimate product of European civilization as capitalism with its freedom of private enterprise. The former was the legitimate consequence and rejection of the latter.

In the middle of the 19th century, Marx and Engels suggested the theory of revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism. The power and lasting influence of these great philosophers in the real historical process are unique. Nonetheless, their political project of a conversion to socialism in Europe remained unrealized. Taking the realities of the 20th century into consideration, including the experience of the building of socialism in the USSR, the international social democratic movement made a different choice. After a number of decades of successes and failures, losses and gains, it reached the conclusion that the path to the implementation of the socialist ideals goes only through the broadening and intensification of democracy and the struggle among interests and ideas but only within the framework of an overall civil consensus, through reforms which presume dialogue and compromise.

Did this development of socialism play any role in the evolution of capitalist society in Western Europe? Unquestionably it did, a rather considerable one at that. Above all, it became the organizing ideological force of the mass labor movement, which not only achieved real socioeconomic and political gains but also turned tens of millions of working people from objects of politics into active participants in it. Furthermore, it was precisely this that played the leading role in the practical implementation of the idea of state control of the economy and in the implementation of major social reforms. Finally, the social democrats headed the struggle for the restructuring of sociopolitical mechanisms and for the assertion of democracy in its present aspects.

To sum it up, we have the right to conclude that modern Western society bears the imprint of socialist thinking and the socialist movement. Furthermore, it no longer fits within the concept of "capitalism." Discussions on this subject have spread outside scientific audiences and become public.

Currently the predominant concept is that of modified capitalism. Among recently published views which substantiate this viewpoint, noteworthy is the book "*Capitalism Today: Development Paradoxes*" (V) authored by a group of noted Soviet scientists. In defining their approach, from the very start the authors emphasize that

"the facts prove that capitalism did not abandon the channel of the forward development of human civilization; within it, through most acute contradictions, the mechanisms are taking shape consistent with the needs of our time and a system of prerequisites and elements of more progressive relations of a socialist type is developing" (V, p 3). Despite the entire dynamic nature and adaptability of this society, which developed from state-monopoly capitalism into transnational capitalism, it nonetheless "bears within itself its own negation" (ibid., p 7). However, today its contradictions are of a different nature and appear differently. In all likelihood this will also affect the forms of transition from capitalism to socialism. In the process of this transition "increasingly the emphasis will shift with the development of an even more profound continuity in the progress of general civilization and universal human values. Rather, it is a process of "self-denial" of capitalist society which develops from within, not through the elimination of the acquired values but through their further qualitative development and transformation. Possibilities are broadening for the gradual and not so drastic conversion to socialism as a result of the intensive ripening of its prerequisites within the capitalist system and the accumulation within it of elements of a new, a socialist quality" (ibid., pp 15-16).

Unquestionably, this is a different interpretation of contemporary capitalism compared to the one which prevailed in Soviet social science a few years ago. It quite accurately reflects the general trend and nature of development of capitalism in this century. Nonetheless, questions arise. Is the content of contemporary society in the developed Western countries covered entirely by the concepts of "state-monopoly" or "transnational" capitalism? Does this society remain the opposite of some kind of future socialism, and if so what precisely? Does this mean that the transition from the first to the second will take place some time in the future or is this process developing already now?

In my view, this society, after the transformations to which it was subjected in the postwar period, is only partially capitalist. Capitalism exists and develops as a form of economic management, as one of the types of socioeconomic relations into which people enter in the course of the production process. While remaining the most powerful and dynamic sector of a market oriented economy, it has an influence on all aspects of human community life. At the same time, however, this society is, if not socialist in the traditional understanding of this word, largely socialized. Incentives within society include capitalist business, the standards of bourgeois individualism as well as the principles of social solidarity and the priority of collective needs. Briefly, it is a dualistic society. Let us repeat, once again, that it is a society which has reached a new level in the development of civilization.

Bearing this in mind, should we not conclude that we are witnessing a variant of a current transformation of capitalism into a new social system, born of the tempests

of the 20th century, not envisioned by Marxism, and quite different from it, as socialism was viewed by the previous generations? Let that not be a categorical assertion but a hypothesis worthy of further study. Let us merely express the assumption that at the present time this society is characterized by a relative balance between capitalism which, as in the past, ensures the greatest efficiency in production and socialization, manifested directly in the production area but, above all, in the systems for the distribution of the social product, regulating social relations and managing society. Possibly such a balance explains the relative stability of society in the developed countries and the peaceful nature of its evolution during the postwar period.

Naturally, this society is far from perfect. It has its contradictions, problems, social difficulties and sources of destabilization. In recent decades, however, having achieved in their own way a perestroika, the developed countries of the West and Japan have accumulated rich experience in resolving the problems which puzzled the theory and practices of "real socialism."

Naturally, the experience of global civilization, even the best, cannot be simply borrowed. It requires a critical reinterpretation and correlation with the culture and traditions of the peoples of our country. Numerous examples indicate the promising nature of this path. It is important only to recall that moral principles and social ideals and not at all any new rigid doctrines and ambitious "big leap" projects should be adopted as a guideline. In conclusion, let us quote the thought with which Batalov ends the dialogue with himself: "A utopian measurement was and remains an inherent measurement in the human mind and the question is not how to expel utopia from our life but how to learn to live with utopia without living according to utopia" (II, p 305). This is our main lesson of the past and guarantee for the future.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Chronicle

915B0002N Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) p 128

[Text] A meeting was held between the editors and the All-Union Scientific Research and Design Institute of the Asbestos-Cement Goods Industry. A wide range of problems of life in the CPSU and in Soviet society was discussed.

Ha Suan Chiong, editor-in-chief of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee journal TAP TI KONG SHAN was interested, in the course of his talk in the premises of *KOMMUNIST*, in the plans of the editors in covering the results of the 28th CPSU Congress and the journal's study of the documents it adopted. Also discussed were problems of bilateral cooperation.

The editors were visited by representatives of the International Committee of the Fourth International Corinne



edgrave and Vanessa Redgrave (British section), Vasilis Sakellariou (Greek section) and Jadier Aubia (Spanish section). The guests expressed their full support of the policy of perestroika and were interested in the situation within the CPSU and in the preparations for the 20th Party Congress. They also spoke of the plans for cooperation with the Soviet public in the study of Soviet history. In the view of Corinne Redgrave, an international symposium organized by his party on "The Historical Truth of the 1920s and 1930s in the USSR," with the participation of Soviet historians and public figures, which took place last April in London, was successful.

The editors were visited by members of a group for the study of the future of relations between East and West, belonging to the West German branch of the International Aspen Institute of Humanitarian Research. The talk dealt with the current stage and trends of political development in Soviet society.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

#### Publication Data

915B00020 Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 11, Jul 90

English Title: *KOMMUNIST*, No 11, July 1990

Russian title: *KOMMUNIST*, 11 (1363), Iyul 1990

Editors: N.B. Bikkenin (editor-in-chief), A.I. Antipov (responsible secretary), E.A. Arab-Ogly, K.N. Brutents, I.A. Dedkov, Yu.V.S. Kudryavtsev, O.V. Kuprin (deputy editor-in-chief), O.R. Latsis (first deputy editor-in-chief), V.N. Nekrasov, Ye.Z. Razumov, N.N. Sibiryakov, Yu.A. Sklyarov, V.P. Trubnikov, P.N. Fedoseyev, S.F. Yarmolyuk.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: July 1990

Signed to Press: 17 July 1990

Copies: 595,000

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

24 Oct. 1990